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Bay, Japan. The landing represented the 
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the Pacific, 1945,” Richard J. Shuster and 
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FROM THE EDITORS
Much has been written about the Maritime Strategy developed by the U�S� Navy 
in the 1980s to counter Soviet ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) operations in 
a major war� Less attention has been given to its intelligence backstory� Bradford 
Dismukes, in “The Return of Great-Power Competition: Cold War Lessons about 
Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication,” 
analyzes the failure of the Navy in the 1970s to understand the essentially de-
fensive posture of the Soviet SSBN force in its northern “bastions,” and hence 
the USN exaggeration of the Soviet naval threat to NATO’s sea lines of commu-
nication in the North Atlantic� Dismukes argues that we must be careful not to 
repeat this error in designing naval forces and strategies to counter the Russian 
(or Chinese) navy today� Bradford Dismukes is a former U�S� naval intelligence 
officer and long-standing student of the Soviet navy�
The reemergence of great-power competition is also the premise of James A� 
Russell’s “Twenty-First Century Innovation Pathways for the U�S� Navy in the Age 
of Competition�” Beginning with a brief review of the two great historical eras of 
American naval innovation, with their effective adaptation to the strategic and 
fiscal realities of the day, he then focuses on the broad failure of the Navy in the 
1990s to design and build a fleet adequate to the demands of the twenty-first cen-
tury� Faulting in particular the innovative yet problem-plagued littoral combat 
ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class aircraft carrier, he argues that the 
Navy missed an opportunity to anticipate the era of unmanned systems that is 
now so rapidly upon us� James A� Russell is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California�
James Kraska and Yusuke Saito, in “The Law of Military Operations and Self-
Defense in the U�S�-Japan Alliance,” provide a valuable analysis of a potential fault 
line in America’s alliance with Japan that perhaps is not recognized sufficiently� 
In the United States, of course, the executive branch as personified in the presi-
dent has considerable leeway to respond to military crises on its own; in Japan, 
reflecting the constitutional legacy of its defeat in World War II, a variety of con-
tingencies involving the commitment of Japanese military forces require formal 
approval by the Japanese Diet� It is critical that these differences and their effects 
be understood fully on both sides and reflected in operational planning� James 
Kraska is chairman of the Stockton Center for International Law at the Naval 
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War College; Commander Yusuke Saito is a legal officer in the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force�
War termination is an underappreciated and understudied aspect of war� One 
has only to look at the performance of the U�S� government in the aftermath of 
its recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to be convinced of this� The story of the 
management of the end of World War II in the Pacific is a great object lesson in 
this regard� In “Conditional Surrender: Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945,” 
Richard J� Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira present an unusual analysis of these 
events from the perspectives of both the victor and the vanquished� As the title of 
the piece suggests, the American victory may have been unconditional as far as 
the Japanese military was concerned, but the translation of military victory into 
strategic success had everything to do with America’s acceptance of one “condi-
tion”: retention of the Japanese emperor, as titular head of state� The authors call 
attention to the fact that both American and Japanese decision-making in the final 
stage of the war featured sharp internal disagreements� The emperor’s decisive 
embrace of the arguments of the Japanese “peace party” following the shocks of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, together with the Americans’ acceptance of his continu-
ing role in the Japanese polity, was decisive for the (in retrospect) amazing suc-
cess of the postwar settlement, and, for that matter, the durability of an alliance 
relationship that continues today—as is evidenced by, among other things, this 
coauthored article (as well as the previous one)� Richard J� Shuster is a professor 
at the Naval War College; Rear Admiral, retired, Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF, is a 
senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo�
In other matters, a perusal of our masthead will show that some routine ro-
tation has occurred in the membership of our advisory board� The Naval War 
College and the Press thank off-going members Adam Bellow, Gale A� Mattox, 
Robert A� Silano, and Marin Strmecki most sincerely for their long years of yeo-
man service, and welcome aboard Ambassador Paula J� Dobriansky, Geoffrey 
Till, and Francis J� West, with thanks for their willingness to serve�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to 
meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead 
of time (401-841-2236)�
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EDUCATION FOR SEAPOWER STRATEGY 2020
Message from SECNAV
 We live in a dynamic era� For our Navy and Marine Corps team, this dynamism will present challenges—known and unknown, seen and 
unseen� In fact, perhaps the most predictable thing we can say about the future is 
that it will be unpredictable� Preparing for that future surely means investing in 
more platforms and new weapons systems, but nothing will be more important 
than the investment that we make in learning, and in creating a force made up of 
people who thirst for it� Accordingly, the landmark 2018 Education for Seapower 
(E4S) report recognized that the intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine 
Corps team and a lifelong passion for continuous learning will be our foundation 
of any credible deterrent to war� 
Further, the E4S report recommended organizational and functional changes 
designed to lift education to a strategic and budgeting priority alongside our 
platforms and weapons systems� It also identified, and follow-on Secretarial 
direction confirmed, the need for a comprehensive education strategy to unify 
the disparate elements of our Naval University System and to integrate education 
effectively into talent-management initiatives� With that direction in mind, the 
Department of the Navy’s Chief Learning Officer, in coordination with the Chief 
of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, developed the 
following, first-ever Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 to align the policies 
and resources required to produce a better educated and more agile naval force—
for officers, enlisted, and civilians alike� 
Above all, this strategy provides unified Departmental leadership direction to 
regard naval education as a critical warfighting enabler� It is only through a sound 
educational foundation and supported, continuous lifelong learning that our 
naval leaders will be able to comprehend the dynamic geopolitical environment 
and make key decisions that will ultimately affect the security and prosperity of 
the United States� By implementing and iterating this Education for Seapower 
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Strategy 2020 for the long run, we will continue to build an integrated naval 
force that is intellectually agile and adaptive—a decisive force from the sea that 
can out-think and out-fight any challenger to American interests, while better 
enabling our national security to prevail despite an unpredictable future�
INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy and Marine Corps have a long and successful history of 
creating world-class educational institutions to prepare their forces for all aspects 
of naval warfare� The United States Naval Academy, the Naval War College, the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University, and the Naval ROTC pro-
grams have produced some of our nation’s finest leaders in war and peace� We 
are proud of this legacy, which provides an outstanding foundation as we move 
toward the future� We must, however, continually seek to improve our approach 
to education to ensure our competitive advantage�
In recent years, Defense and Naval Leaders have repeatedly called for a re-
newed emphasis on professional military education as a foundation of national 
security� The 2018 National Defense Strategy observed that “the creativity and 
talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength,” but warned 
that our professional military education system had “stagnated�” The following 
year, the landmark Education for Seapower (E4S) report concluded that to main-
tain naval power in an era of great-power competition and technological change, 
the Navy and Marine Corps need to strengthen and expand their educational ef-
forts� In line with these conclusions, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the 
Chief of Naval Operations’ Fragmentary Order, and the Department of the Navy’s 
Human Capital Strategy all recognize the need for changes in the prioritization, 
integration, and resourcing of naval education�
On February 5, 2019, the Secretary of the Navy issued his E4S Decision 
Memorandum calling for a bold new direction for naval education� The E4S 
Decision Memorandum ordered, among other things, the development of a 
comprehensive naval education strategy� Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 
responds to this mandate, and to calls for improvement from the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, by providing a clear plan 
to help Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civil servants develop the 
knowledge, critical thinking skills, and strategic perspectives necessary to prevail 
against any adversary across the full spectrum of conflict�
This strategy is informed by and responds to our current geopolitical context� 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States possessed a massive economic 
and technological edge over all potential opponents� Today, for the first time 
in decades, we are competing on a more level playing field and our advantage 
is declining� In this new era, the intellectual capability of our Navy and Marine 
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Corps team will be the primary military differentiator between our nation and its 
adversaries and the true foundation of any credible deterrent to war�
INTENT OF EDUCATION FOR SEAPOWER STRATEGY 2020 
This strategy seeks to advance the intellectual capability of our naval forces� The 
strategy will create a decisive competitive advantage by:
• Developing leaders and warfighters who possess good judgment, creativity, a 
commitment to ethics, and excellent analytic and problem-solving skills;
• Providing naval forces with an intellectual overmatch against our adversaries;
• Making the naval force more proficient by improving strategic thinking, increas-
ing geopolitical awareness, building key technical and professional capabilities, 
and deepening our understanding of the conditions in which military force can 
be used effectively.
Responsibilities
In order for this strategy to succeed, it will take much more than good plans, good 
intentions, and sufficient resources� Success will require every Sailor, Marine, 
and Department of the Navy civilian employee to invest in their educational and 
professional competencies�
Individual Sailors, Marines, and Civil Servants. Marines, Sailors, and civilians of 
all ranks should value learning as the cornerstone of their professional develop-
ment� They have a responsibility to take full advantage of learning opportunities 
and to treat education as an integral component of their operational competence� 
They should value academic, technical, and ethical excellence and embrace a 
commitment to become lifelong learners�
Naval Leaders. Current and rising naval leaders bear a special responsibility in 
our education system� They should support, encourage, and advise the men and 
women they lead as those Sailors, Marines, and civilian employees chart their 
educational courses� Leaders must create a climate of intellectual exchange and 
take an active role in debates over the future of our force structures, strategy, and 
tactics� Most importantly, senior civilian and military leaders must ensure that 
our education system is properly designed, resourced, and supported so that we 
deliver on the educational promises we make to our force� 
Senior leaders should seek to become warrior-scholars and warrior-diplomats, 
proficient in military history, strategy, planning, and operations� They must 
be lifelong learners and educational role models for the men and women they 
lead�
Naval Educators. Naval educators bear a particular responsibility to ensure 
that men and women in the Marine Corps and Navy receive the best military 
13
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education in the world� Leaders of our military education institutions must run 
world-class, cost-effective institutions that produce high-quality graduates with 
relevant strategic and warfighting skills� Faculty members must be leaders in 
their respective fields and consistently deliver high-quality education to Sail-
ors and Marines operating across the globe, using the full range of education- 
delivery methods� Above all, naval educators should uphold and enforce rigor-
ous academic standards, support academic freedom, and encourage intellectual 
preparedness among their students and colleagues�
Assumptions
The following key assumptions bear on this strategy’s approach to fulfilling the 
vision and specified tasks set forth in the Secretary of the Navy’s E4S Decision 
Memorandum:
• The Navy and Marine Corps are composed of diverse officer and enlisted 
communities that have unique career path requirements and high operation-
al tempos, which our approach to education should respect and value�
• This endeavor should optimize the quantity, quality, and accessibility of our 
programs and curricula—creating the right number of programs of the right 
size and delivery method, offered in the appropriate subjects—to meet our 
educational requirements�
• To target appropriate educational opportunities to the appropriate audience, 
the Navy and Marine Corps must identify what everyone needs to know, 
what many people need to know, and what a few people need to know (All, 
Many, Few)�
• Certain external laws and policies, such as the Blended Retirement System, 
Department of Defense Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) re-
quirements, and “Up or Out” policies bear directly on this strategy’s imple-
mentation� Where authority for change rests outside of the Department’s 
span of control, we will advocate for the changes necessary to achieve this 
strategy’s goals�
• Learning is integral to every aspect of a naval leader’s career� Formal educa-
tion is complemented by both experiential learning obtained in the operating 
forces and self-directed study that taps into an individual’s natural curiosity 
and personal interests�
Naval Education Pillars
Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 is based upon three pillars� First, the Navy 
and Marine Corps must create a continuum of learning for the entire force� 
Second, our organization must integrate education into our talent-management 
frameworks� Finally, the Department of the Navy must strengthen and invest 
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in the Naval University System� For each of these pillars, this strategy identifies 
objectives that the Department of the Navy should accomplish in the near-, mid-, 
and long-term, as well as specific action items to accomplish these objectives�
Collectively, these three pillars seek to strengthen intellectual development 
in seven critical areas: creative and critical analysis; ethical decision-making; 
strategic thinking; warfighting excellence; geopolitical awareness; technical and 
technological competence; and resource management and acquisition acuity�
PILLAR 1: CREATE A CONTINUUM OF LEARNING FOR THE  
ENTIRE FORCE
Today’s Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy civil servants are well-
educated� Many of them have graduated from great colleges and universities in 
the United States and abroad, attended rigorous professional military education 
and training programs, and pursued off-duty learning opportunities on their own 
time� Despite this, the Navy and Marine Corps have not taken full advantage of 
our force’s intellectual potential� Our enlisted Sailors and Marines should have 
the opportunity to study and learn in world-class education programs that are 
directly relevant to their professional careers� Our officers need a career road 
map that enhances their warfighting capabilities through professional military 
education and world-class civilian degree programs� Our civilian team members 
need access to long-term professional development support throughout their 
tenure with the Department of the Navy� Sustained career development through 
educational and professional opportunities contributes to the system of continu-
ous learning that will forge the naval warfighters of tomorrow�
Objective A: Create the U.S. Naval Community College
Twenty years ago, General Charles C� Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps, highlighted the growing strategic importance of the most junior non-
commissioned officers� In the coming years, this trend will accelerate as warfight-
ing becomes more technologically complex, the pace of combat decision-making 
accelerates, and ship crews become smaller and more versatile�
To fully capitalize on the potential capabilities of enlisted Sailors and Marines 
and to support their intellectual development, the Department of the Navy will 
establish the United States Naval Community College (USNCC)� All enlisted 
Sailors and Marines will be enrolled in the community college upon enlistment 
and will accrue appropriate college credit on their USNCC transcript when they 
complete military training schools� These Sailors and Marines will be able to be-
gin to earn an associate degree at the USNCC at no cost once they have completed 
their accessions training pipeline� Eventually, select civil servant cohorts will have 
an opportunity to learn alongside their uniformed peers� 
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The USNCC will ultimately be a fully-accredited higher education institution, 
but degrees will initially be issued by high-quality, accredited civilian education 
partners with successful track records of delivering associate degrees online� The 
USNCC will create and offer a small number of “navalized” general education 
courses, but the majority of course work will be offered by civilian university 
or community college partners in fields relevant to modern naval warfighting, 
including but not limited to cyber, information technology, management, data 
analytics, and computer science�
The USNCC will enter into transfer (articulation) agreements with its partners 
to ensure that all course work can transfer to civilian degree programs, which 
will provide a foundation from which Sailors and Marines can continue formal 
education� Since Sailors and Marines face many time constraints associated 
with service needs, the USNCC and its partners will offer courses in a variety of 
flexible formats—synchronous, asynchronous, and self-paced—so that rigorous 
naval education is available wherever and whenever needed� This new effort will 
supplement, not replace, traditional tuition assistance� Tuition assistance will still 
be available to Sailors and Marines to pursue degrees beyond the associate level, 
or in fields less relevant to warfighting�
Action. The USNCC is a top priority for the Department of the Navy� In support 
of this goal, the Department of the Navy will complete initial program design 
by February 28, 2020; seek Congressional authorization during 2020; and enroll 
students for its initial proof of concept in the January term of 2021� USNCC part-
nerships will continue to expand until the college is fully operational within the 
next five years�
Objective B: Strengthen and Align Mid-career Officer Warfighting Curricula
The basic elements of a first-class officer-education system are (a) an outstanding 
undergraduate education; (b) primary and intermediate career educational op-
portunities that advance professionalism, warfighting capability, and intellectual 
development; and (c) a senior in-residence strategic educational experience that
prepares the officer for senior leadership positions� While the Navy and Marine 
Corps programs for undergraduate and senior strategic education are excellent, 
the current methods used to educate junior and mid-grade officers are not as well 
aligned to educational goals and career paths� 
The Marine Corps offers the Expeditionary Warfare School and Marine 
Corps University Command and Staff College to officers in the O-3 to O-4 range 
through a wide variety of delivery methods� Comparable primary and interme-
diate curricula exist at the Naval Command and Staff College, but in-residence 
attendance is limited to O-4s and officer inventory makes filling its quotas a 
perennial challenge� The Navy also provides aspects of primary and intermediate 
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education through the warfare communities’ tactical and leader-development 
courses, but these do not uniformly bridge the gap between undergraduate and 
senior strategic studies programs�
Strengthening standardized primary and intermediate warfighting curricula 
for Navy and Marine Corps officers is critical to advancing naval officer educa-
tion and to promoting naval integration� The curriculum should offer approxi-
mately twenty courses directly relevant to current warfighting challenges� The 
courses will be free-standing and stackable and eventually could be pursued to 
meet requirements for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) or a master’s 
degree in military science� These courses should continue the developmental 
effort that began during our officers’ undergraduate studies and set them on 
track to grow into tomorrow’s senior leaders� We will offer these courses through 
a range of appropriate learning formats, focusing primarily on online and ex-
ecutive courses, which combine short in-residence terms with study away from 
campus� To expand access to these programs to our entire Department of the 
Navy workforce, we will also explore the potential of open enrollment for these 
programs�
Action. Immediately, the Chief Learning Officer (CLO), in coordination with 
DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will create a process to identify learning outcomes 
to bridge the gap between precommissioning education and senior war college–
level education for junior and mid-grade Navy and Marine Corps officers� The 
process will assess how best to deliver a curriculum across warfare communities, 
with a mid-term goal of piloting a small number of courses with two to four 
communities� The CLO will also immediately identify civilian education oppor-
tunities that meet these desired learning outcomes and work to make the courses 
available to our force by FY-21�
Objective C: Adjust the Focus of Naval Education
The CLO’s Coordinating Group (CLO-CG) consists of DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), 
Navy and Marine Corps leaders from the Fleet, the Naval University System, and 
Cyber, Naval Research, and Naval Intelligence enterprises� In its inaugural meet-
ing in October 2019, the group determined that the Department of the Navy has 
gaps in knowledge about the value and limitations of emerging technologies and 
potential adversary capabilities and intentions�
Action. In the near term, the CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will form two 
working groups to identify what our force (All/Many/Few) needs to understand 
about emerging technologies and the capabilities, culture, and intentions of our 
adversaries� The CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will set clear learning out-
comes for these working groups, and then propose curricula and education de-
livery mechanisms to achieve these outcomes� Once this work is completed, the 
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CLO’s Coordinating Group will review two additional high-priority areas: (1) 
leadership and ethics and (2) resource management and acquisitions�
Objective D: Enhance Partnerships through Education
The National Defense Strategy notes the fundamental importance of allies and 
partners in our efforts to advance the national security of the United States� From 
the Revolutionary War to the present day, the Navy and the Marine Corps have 
worked with allies and partners to achieve some of our greatest victories� Our 
history teaches us that interoperability is very difficult to build during wartime, 
and thus, we need to place great emphasis on building that interoperability dur-
ing times of relative peace� Clearly, interoperability requires that weapons systems 
be complementary and that communications systems be linked, but intellectual 
interoperability—the ability to communicate and analyze problems jointly—is 
equally important� One way to enhance our intellectual interoperability is for 
officers to attend the PME programs of our allies and partners and for our allies 
and partners, in turn, to send their officers to attend our PME programs�
Action. In the mid-term, the CLO, in coordination with DCNO N7 and DC 
(CD&I), will develop a plan to increase the number of allied and partner nation 
students attending Naval University System institutions as well as the number of 
Navy and Marine Corps officers attending foreign schools� As this plan is devel-
oped, the CLO will take into account recent Secretary of Defense guidance calling 
for a 50 percent increase in the number of allies training alongside U�S� troops, as 
well as the security needs of our naval forces�
Objective E: Modernize Education Program Delivery
The Navy and the Marine Corps are our nation’s forward-deployed and expe-
ditionary forces—the tip of America’s spear across the globe� Educating a force 
deployed in every ocean and on multiple continents with demanding operational 
commitments presents great challenges� Fortunately, the development of online 
education and the dramatic expansion of executive education, which requires 
only short or intermittent periods in-residence, provide more tools to meet the 
educational needs of our forces� Using these new methods will help us provide 
quality education while minimizing disruption to career paths and reducing 
personnel transfers�
Action. To modernize the delivery of education programs in the near- and mid-
term, the CLO and NUS will: 
• Expand our partnerships with top graduate schools to provide more execu-
tive educational opportunities to our force;
• Ensure that the new Mid-Career Officer Warfighting Curriculum is delivered 
using online and executive formats; and
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• Evaluate existing and any new Naval Postgraduate School and Naval War 
College programs to determine whether they can be offered using new deliv-
ery models�
Objective F: Expand DON Civilian Education Development
In January 2020, the Secretary of the Navy issued a new Human Capital Strat-
egy to be implemented for the Department’s civilian workforce� In this strategy, 
education and learning are elevated as national security enablers for the civilian 
workforce, mirroring the Education for Seapower report findings for uniformed 
members�
Many enterprises and commands have developed discrete education programs 
for their respective workforces, providing opportunities that increase perfor-
mance in evolving and leading business systems, audit and accounting programs, 
and enterprise risk management, among other areas� We will investigate ways 
to build on these successes by implementing additional education programs to 
advance Department of the Navy civilian learning efforts�
Action. In the near-term, the CLO will work with the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)) and establish, by Octo-
ber 1, 2020, a “Secretary’s Executive Fellows Program�” This program will send 
the most highly qualified leaders in our civilian workforce to top-ranked educa-
tional institutions for executive programs leading to master’s degrees in manage-
ment or other areas necessary to support an integrated, effective, and efficient 
naval fighting force� The CLO will also identify potential cohorts of civil servants 
who would benefit from attending the new U�S� Naval Community College�
Objective G: Increase the Number of Officers Pursuing PME
Currently, as the chart below reflecting FY-19 attendance indicates, both the 
Navy and Marine Corps send significant percentages of their total officer corps 
to in-residence and distributed (online and executive) learning opportunities�
Action. Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 calls for the Marine Corps to main-
tain this education commitment� For the Navy, this strategy calls for an increase 
in the percentage of officers pursuing in-residence education to 3�9 percent and 
an increase in the percentage of officers pursuing distributed learning opportu-
nities, such as online and executive courses, to 10 percent by FY-26� Beginning 
in FY-20, the CLO will work with DCNO N7, DCNO N1, and Fleet and Type 
Force % Officers In-Residence
% in Distributed  
Learning
 Navy 2�9% 6�7%
 Marine Corps 4�7% 11�9%
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Commanders to ensure that we make measurable progress toward these goals 
each year� As the NUS improves its ability to provide more distributed and ex-
ecutive learning opportunities, the balance of in-residence and distance learning 
participation will be re-evaluated�
PILLAR 2: INTEGRATE EDUCATION INTO OUR TALENT- 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS
There is a close connection between an individual’s curiosity and aptitude for 
learning and their capacity to lead� As Sailors, Marines, and Department of 
the Navy civilians assume increasing responsibility, they should have access 
to educational opportunities to strengthen their professional capabilities and 
hone their leadership skills� Successfully integrating education into naval talent- 
management frameworks requires that our organization provide more diverse 
learning opportunities for naval leaders and reward those individuals who 
demonstrate learning excellence� Our talent-management systems must also in-
centivize and reward academic experiences and achievement to set institutional 
expectations for continuous learning�
We will enact new policies to encourage and reward the pursuit of profes-
sional military and civilian education� Our new approach will transform our 
performance-evaluation, promotion, and school-selection processes and create 
a culture of intellectual development in our Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian 
workforces�
Objective A: Review Education Selection Boards
Educational selection boards are critical for identifying naval officers who have 
demonstrated aptitude for operational command and would benefit from at-
tendance at service war colleges, international war colleges, or equivalent civil-
ian graduate institutions� The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum requires 
that the Navy and Marine Corps institute selection methods for attending in- 
residence graduate education� In line with this requirement, our services will cre-
ate and/or modify selection boards to identify top-performing officers for further 
educational opportunities�
Reliable, authoritative data is one of the keys to enabling educational selection 
boards to screen officers for education opportunities and our personnel systems 
to detail them to the right billets or assignments� The services have efforts under-
way now to transform the data systems they use to store and process personnel 
data, but these initiatives will take time to reach fruition�
Action. In the near term, we will leverage current administrative screening pro-
cesses to identify talent for educational opportunities� Additionally, the CLO will 
review the adequacy of current selection boards and work through DCNO N7 
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and DC (CD&I) to ensure that ongoing data-transformation efforts incorporate 
requirements to record and process information regarding academic aptitude 
and educational achievement� In the long term, we will change administrative 
screening processes to refine how we assign personnel to educational programs 
and follow-on tours�
Objective B: Update Officer Promotion Precepts
The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum states that the Department’s CLO, in 
collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will recommend to the Secretary 
of the Navy educational requirements for selection to command and the next 
higher pay grade� These requirements will be included in selection board pre-
cepts as orders to the presidents of selection boards in both services� Promotion 
precepts that reward educational and intellectual excellence, and strict adherence 
to their guidance by selection board presidents, represent the fastest and surest 
method for us to move toward our goal: to become a force that values, respects, 
and rewards intellectual preparation for war�
Action. Effective immediately, the CLO will review all precepts pertaining to Of-
ficer promotion boards, command boards, and selection boards for Federal Ex-
ecutive Fellowships, Permanent Military Professors, the Acquisition Workforce, 
and SECNAV’s Tours with Industry and make recommendations to the Secretary 
of the Navy for all educational requirements� Any recommendations to the Secre-
tary of the Navy affecting educational requirements of the Acquisition Workforce 
will be made in coordination with ASN (RD&A)�
Objective C: Integrate Education into Fitness Reports and Evaluations
To become a great learning organization, performance evaluations should assess 
(1) the degree to which officers and enlisted personnel have pursued their own 
education, and (2) the degree to which they have advanced and supported the 
education of the men and women they supervise and command�
The Secretary’s E4S Decision Memorandum requires that the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps make demonstrated learning achievement a key discriminator in 
officer fitness reports and enlisted evaluations� Learning achievements—just like 
leadership, physical fitness, and other performance categories currently graded 
by each reporting senior—should be continually evaluated to ensure progress is 
made along the course of a career�
Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 considers diverse learning achieve-
ments relevant to the proper evaluation of subordinates� Examples of such 
achievements include but are not limited to the following:
• Academic achievement in college or university courses;
• Achievement in Primary and Intermediate Warfighting courses;
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• Achievement in JPME;
• Noteworthy accomplishments in exercises, planning, or wargaming;
• Publication in scholarly or professional journals;
• Excellence as a faculty member; or
• Achievement of appropriate levels of language or computer programming 
proficiency�
Both services are currently pursuing initiatives to revise their performance evalu-
ation systems as part of ongoing efforts to modernize our personnel systems� 
Including educational achievement in these efforts is a high priority�
Action. Prior to April 1, 2020, the CLO and Chief of Naval Personnel (N1) will 
present to the Secretary of the Navy a plan of actions and milestones to incorpo-
rate education into the personnel evaluation system of the Navy� The CLO will 
work with DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), and service personnel leaders to ensure align-
ment to the Secretary’s intent and implement bridging mechanisms, if required, 
until new evaluation systems come on line�
Objective D: Tailor Career Paths to Meet Department of the Navy Needs
Career path management and sensitivity to operational requirements must be 
central to this effort to improve and enhance naval education� In order to ensure
that we maintain the balance between operational requirements and career path 
management, the Department of the Navy must align new education initiatives 
with the needs of the operating forces�
Action. In the near term, the CLO will work with DCNO N7, DC (CD&I), and 
the warfare communities to identify ways to tailor education to complement our 
various community career paths� An implementation plan will be staffed and 
promulgated separately by the end of 2020�
PILLAR 3: STRENGTHEN AND INVEST IN OUR NAVAL  
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
The most successful businesses and nonprofit organizations in the world aspire 
to be “learning organizations�” A great learning organization constantly assesses 
the intellectual capabilities of its workforce, seeking to identify gaps that may pre-
vent optimal performance� These organizations also provide world-class learning 
resources to their teams to close these gaps, with strong feedback loops between 
the workforce, managers, and educators to ensure that educational efforts are 
timely, relevant, and effective�
To become a true learning organization, the Department of the Navy will 
develop and improve the educational infrastructure of our entire organization� 
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We must invest in our learning institutions, our faculty, and the high-performing 
staff who support them� We must also develop a more powerful wargaming 
strategy and create new relationships for intellectual sharing and debate between 
the Fleets and Marine Operating Forces and our cyber, research, and intelligence 
enterprises� Together, these investments will strengthen our Naval University 
System and increase the intellectual preparedness of our Sailors, Marines, and 
civilians�
Objective A: Establish Naval University System Framework and Standards
The primary educational delivery system that undergirds this strategy is the Na-
val University System� The NUS consists of five learning institutions: the Naval 
War College, Marine Corps University, Naval Postgraduate School, United States 
Naval Academy, and the new United States Naval Community College� The NUS 
will be operated on the model of a great state university system: the CLO will 
provide leadership, oversight, and strategic guidance on finance, curriculum, and 
outcomes, but service leadership and individual campuses will retain the inde-
pendence they need to chart their own course to mission fulfillment�
A key focus of this system will be ensuring that each component fulfills a 
complementary role within the learning continuum, integrates fully with others 
in the system as appropriate, and avoids duplication of effort� At this inflection 
point in our history, when demand for quality education is in tension with 
officer inventory and high operational commitments, we need to review our 
current menu of degree and nondegree programs to ensure they align to our 
strategic intent�
The NUS will maintain the highest standards for academic quality and sound 
fiscal management, the hallmarks of a premier academic institution� This will 
include:
• A diverse and high-performing faculty, staff, and leadership team;
• High emphasis on maintaining relevant accreditation;
• A student-faculty ratio in line with peer civilian and military institutions;
• An appropriate number of well-crafted degree and learning programs de-
signed for long-term career development, with fewer specialized programs 
designed to meet only the narrow needs of a particular curriculum sponsor 
for one utilization tour;
• Costs per degree commensurate with those at civilian and military peer 
institutions;
• A graduate network supporting continued learning and mentorship for long-
term career development;
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• Courses and degree programs offered in a mix of learning delivery methods; 
and
• Low overhead costs consistent with sound management, to allow maximum 
resources to flow to the academic program�
Action. In the near term, the CLO will work with DC (CD&I), DCNO N7, and 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller 
(ASN (FM&C)) to develop a long-term budget process for the Naval University 
System�
Action. The CLO, in collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I), will conduct 
a curriculum review in FY-20 and FY-21 at all NUS institutions�
Action. To achieve these high standards, each school within the NUS, in consul-
tation with the CLO, will apply the following best practices in higher education 
for their schools by the start of FY-21:
• Ensure their schools’ mission statements are aligned with this strategy and have 
sufficient clarity to test the appropriateness of continuing current programs or 
adopting new programs or policies;
• Align their schools’ strategic plans to this strategy, including plans for budget, 
staffing, and curriculum development;
• Adopt a plan to ensure that every academic program and department receives 
outside academic peer review and evaluation for quality and outcomes at least 
once every ten years;
• Adopt a thirty-year campus master plan that identifies, at a minimum, space 
for future campus development, projected new building needs, necessary adap-
tations due to climate change, and planned reconstruction and renovation;
• Adopt a clear faculty-development and -support plan;
• Adopt a plan for conducting 360-degree performance reviews for key leaders; 
and 
• Adopt, with guidance from the CLO, an accurate, transparent, and uniform 
comparative metrics performance dashboard that will allow stakeholders to 
measure progress toward strategic goals and evaluate performance outcomes 
compared to institutional peers.
Objective B: Support Naval University System Faculty and Staff
Great professors are the lifeblood of any world-class university system, and thus 
their recruitment, retention, and support should be a top priority� In order to 
maintain the best NUS faculty, we must implement new initiatives that promote 
intellectual exchange and encourage academic excellence�
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Action. By June 30, 2020, the CLO will promulgate a plan to create a number of 
Naval University Distinguished Professorships at each campus to recognize merit 
at the senior professor level and provide appropriate compensation�
Action. In the mid-term, the CLO will work with DCNO N7 and DC (CD&I) to 
explore avenues to attract quality officers with the appropriate skills to serve as 
military faculty without disadvantaging their career potential� Policy changes will 
be recommended to the Secretary of the Navy by the end of 2020�
Action. Institution leaders will jointly develop a plan for the CLO by June 30, 
2020 to provide for faculty exchange and visiting professorships on each campus, 
so we can begin to share ideas across traditional campus and service silos�
Objective C: Integrate and Utilize Naval University System Advisory Boards
The Education for Seapower Advisory Board will provide expert advice to the 
Secretary of the Navy about the Naval University System and execution of this 
strategy� Each campus will also possess an advisory board or subcommittee spe-
cific to its institution to provide the advice necessary for excellent performance 
and maintenance of accreditation�
Action. By June 30, 2020, the CLO, in collaboration with DCNO N7 and DC 
(CD&I), will provide guidance to all institutions and their boards or subcom-
mittees on best practices for use and operation of higher education boards in a 
governmental context�
Objective D: Reinvigorate Naval University System Infrastructure
Three of the four current campuses (Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate 
School, and U�S� Naval Academy) have significant infrastructure renovation 
challenges associated with maintaining aging buildings of major educational, 
historical, and architectural value� Failure to address these challenges will inhibit 
the achievement of optimal educational outcomes�
Action. By June 1, 2020, the CLO and DCNO N7, in coordination with the heads 
of the three institutions, will present a plan to address these challenges to serve as 
a basis for discussion with senior Department leadership�
Action. The creation of a unified NUS may provide opportunities to capture syn-
ergies in areas like information technology and library management� The CLO, in 
consultation with campus leaders, will develop a plan by June 1, 2020, to review 
current operations, identify potential synergy areas, and make recommendations 
for the future�
Objective E: Identify and Implement Wargaming Best Practices
Over the last one hundred years, wargaming has made an indelible impact 
upon how the Navy and Marine Corps have waged war on land and at sea� 
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The Education for Seapower report emphasized the importance of wargaming 
throughout a naval professional’s career to prepare them for future conflict�
Today’s wargaming technologies are growing in capability� Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers and corporate technology partners alike 
have made great progress in developing wargaming systems that fuse decision 
science with problem solving� These developments warrant future investigation 
for integration into our learning continuum�
Action. In the near term, the CLO will convene a working group that is informed 
by NUS wargaming experts and other stakeholders in the private sector and aca-
demia� This group will develop recommendations for incorporation of advanced
wargaming concepts and supporting technology into education programs� The 
working group will present its findings and recommendations to the CLO-CG no 
later than the first quarter of FY-21�
Objective F: Expand the Use of Learning-Management Systems
Major finance, business, and technology corporations use learning-management 
systems to help their workforce to grow intellectually and to assist their managers 
as they seek to identify, deploy, and reward the diverse talents of their workforce� 
Increasingly, these systems are powered by artificial intelligence to provide each 
employee with learning opportunities uniquely tailored to their education level, 
intellectual capability, available time, interests, and work needs� These automated 
systems identify the next specific learning intervention an employee may want 
to pursue to advance and grow, provide multiple educational options for paths 
forward, and measure strengths and outcomes� These systems help members of 
the workforce explore hidden talents and proclivities and develop diverse talents 
to meet the institution’s larger mission� They are also the foundation of a sophis-
ticated talent-management system� Successful intellectual development within 
the system can lead to different job opportunities within the firm and boosts 
retention by providing employees with concrete paths toward their personal and 
career goals�
The Secretary of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy, led by the Assistant Sec-
retary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)), identifies 
the use of learning-management systems as critical to developing a fully empow-
ered 21st-century workforce�
Action. In the near term, the CLO, in coordination with ASN (M&RA), will re-
view department experiments with learning-management systems, and explore 
the potential value of adopting a comprehensive DON learning-management 
system that meets the requirements of the NUS, DON civilian workforce, and the 
services� Recommendations and an implementation plan, if appropriate, will be 
presented to the Secretary of the Navy by January 1, 2021�
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Objective G: Evaluate JPME Programs
This strategy is designed to increase educational opportunities and achievement 
while making naval education align with the sea-going requirements of the Navy 
and Marine Corps team� As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops 
the future model of JPME, the Department of the Navy will provide advice and 
counsel to help improve and modernize the JPME program�
Action. In the near term, the CLO, DCNO N7, and DC (CD&I) will form a work-
ing group with stakeholders to develop JPME reform recommendations for the 
DoD and the DON that align to ongoing OSD and Joint Staff efforts�
Objective H: Establish E4S Metrics and Dashboard
We cannot make real progress unless we have a baseline understanding of what 
key communities know and do not know about critical subject areas and how well 
our institutions are performing� We have made two very preliminary steps in this 
direction� First, the Naval War College has administered an experimental inter-
mediate warfighting knowledge test to a small subset of war college students, re-
vealing significant gaps in necessary knowledge� Second, the CLO’s Coordination 
Group has determined that we possess potentially decisive gaps in knowledge 
about the value and limitations of emerging technologies and the capabilities and 
intentions of key potential adversaries� This represents a small step forward, but 
we need to conduct much more comprehensive assessments, founded on authori-
tative data, in order to successfully implement this education strategy�
Action. To achieve this goal, the CLO will develop an initial assessment plan for 
the force and for each NUS institution no later than end of 2020� Progress to-
ward achieving the objectives outlined in this strategy will be assessed every year 
through a metrical dashboard that compares targets and results, to be reviewed 
by the Secretary of the Navy and the Education for Seapower Advisory Board�
CONCLUSION
Our current Naval University System has many strengths� We possess outstand-
ing military educational institutions with brilliant and dedicated faculty and staff� 
We have a heritage of intellectual excellence that provided an essential margin of 
victory in World War II and laid the foundation for decades of naval dominance 
thereafter� We have created valuable pathways to additional learning experiences 
at civilian universities and through fellowships with outstanding private sector 
and governmental organizations� These strengths provide us with a remarkable 
foundation and legacy as we look forward to an even brighter future�
Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 provides initial direction to our force 
as we work to link how we learn directly to how we fight� As we move forward, 
this strategy will adjust to reflect new realities� As we evolve, we will, however, 
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remain constant in our fundamental commitment to intellectual preparedness 
and warfighting advantage�
War is the harshest auditor of institutions� To deter future conflicts and to win 
those we cannot avoid, we need to operate at or near our full theoretical potential� 
We cannot reach that level of maximum effectiveness without great education for 
our entire force� Out-fighting our opponents will require that we out-think them�
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TEN TAKEAWAYS
The Education for Seapower Report
October 2019 reflection by John Kroger on the Department of the Navy’s 
February 2019 Education for Seapower report
 In February 2019, the Department of the Navy issued its landmark Education for Seapower (E4S) Report, calling for major reform and improvement of our system 
of naval education for commissioned and enlisted Sailors and Marines� The De-
partment of the Navy is beginning to implement the report’s recommendations 
at the direction of Secretary of the Navy Richard V� Spencer, through his memo-
randum to all naval forces� When fully implemented, these changes to our educa-
tion and promotion systems will have a profound impact on our naval services� 
Because of this, it is essential that policy makers, and indeed our entire force, 
understand the report and its conclusions� I recommend that everyone read the 
full E4S report; it is filled with important insights into the nature of seapower 
in the 21st century and the essential contribution of education and intellectual 
development to maintaining naval dominance� Since, however, the main section 
of the report is 71 pages long, I thought it would be useful to summarize its main 
conclusions and recommendations� Accordingly, here is my take on the 10 most 
important takeaways you need to know about the future of Navy and Marine 
Corps education from the E4S report�
1. Education of Our Force Is Vital to National Security 
After exhaustive study of the strategic challenges we face as a nation, the E4S board 
concluded: “The education of our naval leaders is the single most important way 
to prepare the Naval Services, and the Nation, for a dangerous and uncertain fu-
ture�” As retired Admiral James Stavridis observed in the report, “In the end, 21st 
century warfare is brain-on-brain conflict, and we must build our human capital 
and intellectual capacity as surely as we produce the best pure war fighting tech-
nology if we are going to win the nation’s wars and advance its security�” 
2. Our Current Educational Efforts Are Inadequate 
Because our intellectual capital is so vital to our nation’s security, developing that 
capital through education becomes a top priority, at least as important as building 
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platforms and weapons systems� The E4S report concluded that our current sys-
tem of educating Sailors and Marines is “insufficient to create the operational and 
strategic leaders needed for the modern Navy and Marine Corps�” Indeed, the 
report noted that, in some respects, we have gone backwards� “While 98% of flag 
officers had attended the Naval War College on the eve of World War II, today 
only roughly 20% have�”
3. Immediate Action Is Necessary
Unlike a weapons system, we can’t just buy a strategically minded senior noncom-
missioned officer or field-grade staff officer—it takes years of education and the 
right motivation to develop the creativity and critical thinking required to lead 
through an uncertain future� The E4S board concluded that inadequate intel-
lectual development of our force “is THE fundamental problem that must be 
corrected now�” We need to strengthen our capabilities in leadership and ethics, 
strategic education, technology and science, organizational management, logis-
tics, and acquisition� Failure to change and improve, the report noted, would be 
a “strategic blunder�” This will require a major cultural shift, so that every naval 
warfare community and discipline recognizes the full value of education to our 
national security� 
4. We Must Invest in and Support Our Educational Institutions
After studying the Naval War College, U�S� Naval Academy, Naval Postgradu-
ate School, and Marine Corps University, the E4S board concluded that though 
these schools have proud histories and talented faculty, they are “underfunded, 
underprioritized, underutilized, and disconnected from one another, without 
any unifying strategic vision or purpose�” The report noted in particular that 
“[f]aculty are not receiving enough funding to teach effectively, develop profes-
sionally, and conduct research�” To fix these problems, the report calls for the cre-
ation of a unified Naval University System, changes to intellectual property rules 
for faculty, major budget process reforms within the Pentagon, and an increase 
in high-priority funding�
5. We Must Create a Naval Community College for Enlisted Personnel
Our enlisted Marines and Sailors represent a national treasure, both in terms 
of intellect and selfless dedication to service� Yet we do not provide adequate 
educational opportunities that will help them develop their vast capacity to help 
solve the strategic challenges of the future� The report notes that despite many 
programs to support enlisted education, “valuable talent from the largest part of 
the services is not being utilized�” To tap into and develop this talent, the report 
calls for the creation of a Naval Community College offering “rigorous associate 
of science degree programs for naval sciences, with concentration areas such as 
data analytics, organizational behavior, and information systems�” 
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6. We Need 21st Century Education
The E4S report recognizes that residential education delivered over an extended 
period in a traditional campus setting is a very valuable educational tool, but that 
deployments and operational and training needs often make residential educa-
tion difficult to obtain� To address this problem, the report calls for adoption 
of more-flexible education-delivery models, including short executive courses, 
stackable certificates that lead to degrees over time, and better use of available 
technology to deliver education outside the brick-and-mortar classroom� The 
report also calls for two important changes in emphasis in our school curricula: 
coursework leading to “greater understanding of emerging technologies,” and 
“more theoretical education in order to develop true critical thinkers and leaders�” 
7. The Navy Must Adopt School-Selection Standards
Achieving high-quality educational outcomes means much more than retaining 
the best professors or creating challenging curricula� The E4S report noted deep 
concerns about how Navy officers are selected for and perform at graduate pro-
fessional military education schools� “Leaders candidly observed that the Navy 
often sends poorly qualified officers to fill quotas� This practice includes sending 
non–due course officers, junior officers to senior programs, and restricted line 
officers, such as dental officers and chaplains, to fill quotas meant for unrestrict-
ed line officers�” As a result, Navy officers “consistently underperform the officers 
of other services�” To remedy this problem, the report calls for “competitive in-
residence graduate education selection boards” similar to those already adopted 
by the Marine Corps—a process that has already begun in the Navy and is still 
being refined by both services�
8. The Navy Must Change Its Evaluation and Promotion System to Value Education
For education to truly matter to the naval services, excellence in learning must be 
recognized and rewarded� The E4S report concluded that while Marine officers 
and enlisted personnel are required to pursue and complete education course-
work to qualify for promotion, many Navy officers do not, because education is 
not seen as necessary or valuable to career advancement� “Education is currently 
viewed as an obstruction in naval career paths by the majority, an obstruction 
exacerbated by the needs of the personnel assignment system,” and “there are not 
enough incentives for the personnel to continue higher education�” The report 
thus recommends significant changes to how we evaluate and promote officers, 
to insure that career incentives promote, not discourage, educational and intel-
lectual development�
9. Leaders Must Take Responsibility for Education in Their Command
If we want our forces to reach their full strategic and operational potential, our 
officer and enlisted leaders must model a commitment to excellence in lifelong 
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learning� The E4S report notes that although it is critical for leaders in our force 
to pursue their own intellectual development, this alone is not sufficient� In 
addition, our leaders need to “assume responsibility for the education of their 
charges�” This means that leaders at all levels, both commissioned and noncom-
missioned, must help the Marines and Sailors they command identify, obtain, 
and complete the academic coursework we need for our national security�
10. Improving Education Is a Team Effort
Finally, the E4S report makes clear that all of us, individually and collectively, are 
responsible for strengthening the intellectual capabilities of our naval forces� In-
dividual Sailors and Marines must pursue more education and take their academ-
ic performance just as seriously as they do the performance of their operational 
duties� Our leaders must obtain world-class education while taking responsibility 
for the educational advancement of the men and women they lead� Our educa-
tional institutions need to reinvent their curricula and delivery systems so that 
greater educational impact can be achieved for sea services that are by definition 
continually deployed� And the Department of the Navy as a whole must invest 
in our schools and make badly needed reforms to our personnel systems so that 
education becomes a top priority� These reforms are not optional� This is a fight 
we must win if we are to do our duty to protect national security� 
JOHN KROGER
Since 1 October 2019, John Kroger has served as the Department of the Navy’s first 
Chief Learning Officer.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THESE ARE GREAT TIMES to be a part of the Naval Education 
Enterprise! Several recent events have demonstrated that the 
U�S� Navy and Marine Corps are focusing on the education of our Sailors and Ma-
rines with an intensity and commitment that is unprecedented in recent decades� 
In April 2018, the Under Secretary of the Navy directed that a comprehensive 
study of the education mission of both services be undertaken in a process called 
the Education for Seapower (E4S) self-study� The report of the self-study was 
released in February 2019, and the services began implementing a number of 
substantial organizational changes�
On February 5, 2020, the Education for Seapower Strategy 2020 was published� 
It directed that specific actions be taken to address many of the shortcomings 
that were identified in the E4S report� Owing to its importance for the future 
development of our Navy and Marine Corps, this landmark strategy document 
is reprinted in its entirety elsewhere in this issue of the Review. While I highlight 
some of the key points of the strategy below, I encourage our readers to study the 
new guidance in depth�
The skillfully crafted strategy addresses the full range of issues that in the 
past have prevented the naval services from maximizing the efficiencies that 
a broadly educated officer and enlisted workforce can achieve to meet the 
myriad challenges they will face today and in the future� The strategy rests on 
three pillars: creating a continuum of learning for the entire force, integrat-
ing education into all our talent-management frameworks, and investing in 
and otherwise strengthening a Naval University System� These pillars will 
enhance intellectual development in seven critical areas: creative and critical 
analysis; ethical decision-making; strategic thinking; war-fighting excellence; 
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geopolitical awareness; technical and technological competence; and resource 
management and acquisition acuity�
The Navy established two new senior leadership positions to provide guidance 
and oversight to the Naval Education Enterprise� The Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Warfighting Development (OPNAV N7) is now the “sole resource 
sponsor and strategic leader for naval education�” In this new position, Vice Ad-
miral Stuart Munsch, USN, serves as the advocate for educational programs and 
is responsible for aligning all naval education and training efforts to advance war-
fighting advantage� The second newly established position is that of the Navy’s 
Chief Learning Officer (CLO), who is serving as the Secretary of the Navy’s staff 
assistant for naval education� In this role, Mr� John R� Kroger, a veteran of the U�S� 
Marine Corps and past president of Reed College, is responsible for aligning the 
efforts of the five major components of the Naval University System: the Naval 
War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the U�S� Naval Academy, Marine 
Corps University, and the soon-to-be-created Naval Community College� The 
CLO’s vision for Navy education is described succinctly in his article “Ten Take-
aways: The Education for Seapower Report,” which also is reprinted in this issue 
of the Review.
Our full leadership team here at the College is focused on ensuring that our 
programs and initiatives are aligned with our new guidance contained in the 
E4S Strategy. It is not yet clear exactly what impacts the implementation of this 
strategy will have on our efforts, but several key provisions bode well for the in-
stitution� Specifically, we can reasonably anticipate the following developments: 
• We expect to be funded more adequately for program costs such as labor, 
professional development opportunities and travel, and increased research 
and war gaming�
• We expect to see additional resources allocated to maintain and upgrade our 
campus facilities and improve information and educational technologies to 
advance our delivery modalities�
• We expect to have the resources to modernize our classrooms with the latest 
technology to enhance the learning experience further�
• We expect to see an increase in the number and quality of resident-student 
throughput and expansion of our distance and low-residence learning options�
• We anticipate that organizational/cultural changes will be made to the talent-
management system for active-duty officers to enable them to complete 
assignments in teaching and educational leadership roles without a negative 
impact on their professional careers�
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The E4S Strategy promises to be a game changer for our naval forces� Mr� Kroger 
has stated, “It’s somewhat of a shift, I think, from ways people think about the ef-
fectiveness of the armed forces� We’re not talking here about how fast our jets are, 
how powerful our missiles are� We’re talking about the brainpower of our team�”
As we have done since 1884, the Naval War College will lead the way in devel-
oping the intellectual capacity of the men and women who wear the cloth of the 
nation in defense of all that we hold dear�
SHOSHANA S� CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT HEALTH CRISIS
As I write this (in early April 2020), the entire country, and the world at 
large, is dealing with a pandemic� Faced with the need to exercise social 
distancing to reduce the spread of COVID-19, our College shifted to a total 
distance-learning paradigm, and did so in record time yet with minimal 
disruption to our ongoing educational mission� Our in-house experts in 
technology-assisted education from our College of Distance Education and 
our Writing and Teaching Excellence Center led the faculty in transitioning 
rapidly all intermediate- and senior-level courses and face-to-face distance-
education modalities to an online method of teaching� The move to remote 
learning enabled all students to isolate themselves safely in their homes, yet 
still interact in real time with each other and with their seminar modera-
tors� We are committed to continuing our educational programs at a pace 
that will enable our students to graduate as scheduled in June 2020 with 
both their professional certification and the master’s degree on which they 
embarked at the beginning of the academic year� Unfortunately, given on-
going safety concerns, we will not have a traditional graduation ceremony� 
In the face of numerous constraints and challenges, I am proud of, and have 
been inspired by, the agility, teamwork, and creativity displayed by every 
member of our faculty, staff, and student body� I truly believe that we will 
emerge from this crisis stronger, more resilient, and more flexible in how 
we lead our daily lives� Stay safe and well�
S� S� CHATFIELD
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THE RETURN OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION
Cold War Lessons about Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and 
Defense of Sea Lines of Communication
Bradford Dismukes
Great-power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of 
U.S. national security.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES N� MATTIS, 19 JANUARY 2018
 These words of Secretary Mattis are momentous�1 Great-power competition is recognized widely as having been the root cause of the First World War, a 
powerful contributor to the Second World War, and a core element of the Cold 
War�2 Mr� Mattis raises the serious possibility that war with a major opponent lies 
on the horizon� Such a war might be fought for major, even existential, stakes; but 
smaller, indecisive wars among the great powers also could occur, as was the case 
during earlier centuries in Europe�3 
An immediate, tangible expression of the new orientation was the reestablish-
ment of the U�S� Navy’s Second Fleet� When Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral John M� Richardson made the announcement in May 2018, he justified 
the need for the fleet as a response to great-power competition, specifically with 
Russia�4 The fleet’s area of responsibility (AOR) centers on the North Atlantic 
Ocean, whose Cold War lessons from history include the importance of stra-
tegic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and defense of sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs)� These would have constituted two of the original Second Fleet’s three 
principal strategic missions had there been a war with the Soviet Union�5 Strategic 
ASW meant attacking Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to affect the 
superpower nuclear balance; defending SLOCs is a particular form of sea control, 
defined as being able to use the sea when, where, and for the purposes desired� In 
this case, defending SLOCs meant protecting shipping between North America 
and Europe—where unimpeded passage was a sine qua non for the Western 
alliance to succeed in war at the conventional level� Strategic ASW arrived on 
the scene in the mid-1980s; SLOC defense long had been a fixture of U�S� naval 
strategy, born of the searing experience of two world wars and from geostrategic 
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theories dating at least from the first half of the twentieth century�6 SLOC defense 
has been the most enduring single construct in the Navy’s strategic thinking, 
always in the back of the planner’s mind—a kind of default position; as will be 
seen, even strategic ASW was put to its service�
The immediate aim of this article is to contribute to the historical under-
standing of intelligence and planning during the Cold War� The larger aim 
is to draw lessons that may be useful for Navy planning in the new world of 
great-power competition� (Readers whose main interest is less in the history 
of the Cold War are invited to fast-forward to the sections following “Lessons 
for Today�”)
The Cold War is viewed, properly, as a historic success� Yet, paradoxically, sev-
eral of the lessons drawn from the Navy’s experience during it are negative ones— 
namely, what to avoid� That is because Cold War planning for both strategic ASW 
and SLOC defense experienced important failures, first in strategic intelligence, 
then in the way planners used that intelligence� Intelligence errors centered on 
varying levels of success in understanding Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, 
in the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case of strategic ASW� Planning errors 
involved a failure to draw a bright line between the adversary that intelligence 
identified, as realistically as possible, and the one the planner contrived to fight� 
Planners carry multiple responsibilities—not all of which are related to the ad-
versary� The first is to defend their own vulnerabilities, regardless of the strategic 
intentions imputed to the adversary� Planners also are responsible for promoting 
alliance solidarity and protecting Navy interests in interservice competition for 
the defense budget�7 The crucial nexus between intelligence and planning will be 
examined in the concluding sections�
Any effort to understand the Navy’s Cold War history must start with these 
two historically intertwined intelligence failures� In the case of strategic ASW, 
the U�S� Intelligence Community (IC) ultimately was correct� But well over eight 
years elapsed between (1) 1973, when the Soviets assigned their SSBNs a critical 
role in their war plans, and simultaneously assigned their general-purpose-force 
(GPF) navy the mission of defending those SSBNs in sea bastions; and (2) the 
early 1980s, when the IC properly recognized those roles� Shortly after that, Navy 
planners responded with the Maritime Strategy, publicly announced in 1986�8 But 
before the Maritime Strategy (i�e�, between [1] and [2]), naval planning experi-
enced approximately a decade of lost opportunity and misdirected effort�
This lengthy, if little recognized, intelligence failure was linked to a larger 
one� Intelligence about the SLOCs was simply wrong� From the beginning of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was convinced that in a 
World War III the Soviets intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III�” This was 
incorrect� The Soviet navy’s primary mission was not to attack on the high seas 
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of the North Atlantic but to stay close to home to defend the motherland and, 
after 1973, its SSBNs in maritime bastions� Students of the Cold War U�S� Navy 
have known (from the work of Hattendorf and Ford and Rosenberg, published 
in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century) that the top prior-
ity accorded the threat to the SLOCs was a mistake�9 But the focus of these—the 
standard narratives of the period—was on the U�S� maritime strategy of 1981–86, 
and much less on what came before� If anything, the striking, widely recognized 
achievement that the Maritime Strategy represented served to redeem the Navy’s 
previous errors, allowing an attitude of “all’s well that ends well” to prevail�
Many might ask whether attention to the earlier period really is needed� This 
article answers yes, for two reasons� First, these mistakes had major, costly con-
sequences, and you cannot learn from your mistakes by ignoring them� Second, 
if it happened once, it could happen again� And in this case, “once” means again 
and again over decades� When the behavior of a great institution that prides 
itself on intellectual rigor cannot be explained on strictly rational grounds, we 
have to ask why� To ignore this question is to risk unknowingly repeating yes-
terday’s errors today or in the future� This is not a criticism of the Navy’s Cold 
War leaders; they had to make hard choices to deal with a steadily burgeoning 
opponent, in the face of massive uncertainty—unlike the author, who has the 
benefit of hindsight�
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
How did the notion that the Soviet navy’s main mission was anti-SLOC become 
an idée fixe? Before 1974, there was no national intelligence estimate (NIE) on 
the Soviet navy; its capabilities and intentions were what the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) said they were, with the fairly uncritical approval of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency�10 For ONI, the Soviet navy, serving an aggressive 
Communist ideology, was as offensively minded as its senior partner, the Soviet 
army� From this perspective, an inventory at one point approaching four hundred 
submarines—a far larger number than defense alone might seem to justify—
could indicate only offensive intent� Its apparent focus was the SLOCs of NATO 
that connected the continents—representing a vulnerability that two world wars 
had shown to be close to indefensible�
However, these inferences, while highly plausible, were essentially abstract� 
Just about all the concrete evidence pointed in the opposite direction: that attack-
ing the SLOCs was, at best, a secondary priority for Soviet planners� Uncertainty 
always attaches to intelligence� (As intelligence professionals remind their con-
sumers, “If it’s a fact, it isn’t intelligence�”) So the accounting below will identify, 
where possible, the topics about which the IC was reasonably confident and those 
where uncertainty prevailed�11 First we turn to individual pieces of evidence from 
41
Naval War College: Summer 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
standard intelligence sources, held at the time with fairly high confidence, and 
then to open-source analysis of Soviet military writings, about which confidence 
was low or perhaps nonexistent�
Evidence from Standard Intelligence Sources
In the early 1950s, Whiskey-class submarines dominated Soviet building pro-
grams� Norman Polmar has noted that, in the Soviet categorization of the time, 
these boats were intended to provide direct, “regional” defense of the USSR� The 
“oceangoing” Zulu class formed less than 10 percent of the inventory�12 Soviet 
submarine designs in general were not optimized to perform the anti-SLOC 
mission; many classes had only small-capacity torpedo spaces� The standard 
load of conventional torpedoes for a Soviet diesel submarine was a fifty-fifty split 
between ASW and anti–surface ship weapons� The submarine force did not train 
to attack defended, maneuvering convoys�13 Routinely, only a small fraction of 
the Soviet navy’s order of battle deployed beyond home waters� The supporting 
infrastructure and logistics for distant operations were correspondingly weak�14 
No exercises of significant scale with an anti-SLOC theme ever occurred in the 
North Atlantic, or anywhere else�15 
Anticarrier exercises, however, were a constant feature—often using U�S� car-
riers as training targets� These exercises were especially fraught when the Soviets 
employed them during crises in the Third World—the modern-day equivalent 
of training your guns on your adversary�16 An assessment of intent—indeed, of 
Soviet capabilities—drawn from forces, training, operations, and exercises would 
have concluded anticarrier, yes; anti-SLOC, no� (The Soviets did show great in-
terest in ASW, but were unable to develop capabilities to detect and engage their 
adversaries’ much-quieter submarines�)
Evidence from Open Sources
In the 1960s and early ’70s, analysis of Soviet public statements about military 
doctrine and strategy by Herrick, MccGwire, Blechman, and others showed that 
the Soviet navy was committed to defense, mainly preoccupied with protecting 
the homeland and supporting the seaward flanks of the Soviet army�17 An impor-
tant exception was Marshal Vasily D� Sokolovskiy’s authoritative Military Strat-
egy; its 1962 edition added anti-SLOC efforts as an important priority� However, 
the 1968 edition then downgraded that mission to being an “important” task, 
relevant only in the later phases of a broken-back nuclear war�18 In general, when 
the Soviets did discuss SLOCs, they focused on action not on the high seas but 
against ports of debarkation, often emphasizing the efficacy of mines�
In the early 1970s, open-source analysis at the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) delivered a conclusion that further ruled out anti-SLOC intent� The Soviet 
adversary now had radically new strategic priorities: SSBNs, forming a strategic 
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reserve; the rest of its navy was characterized as “pro-SSBN�”19 Structured and 
trained for the mission of bastion defense, the Soviet navy could not be commit-
ted at the same time to a campaign against the North Atlantic SLOCs�20 
It seems nearly certain that the bastions became operational in 1973� That year 
the Delta I–class SSBN, carrying the Soviet navy’s first intercontinental-range mis-
sile, the SS-N-8 Sawfly, entered service�21 For the Soviets, the SS-N-8 was a gift of 
technology that brought a revolutionary new military use of the sea� The SS-N-8 
(and its successors) became the foundation of the Soviet nuclear reserve�22 
It seems inconceivable that the strategic-reserve/bastion-defense missions 
were established any later than 1973� One would have to believe—as few familiar 
with it do—that the Soviet 
general staff lacked thorough-
ness and foresight, that it ini-
tially ignored possible threats 
to its SSBN reserve, and that 
it only later improvised a re-
sponse to a U�S� ASW threat that it perceived sometime after 1973� As Perse has 
shown, starting as early as 1970, statements by successive CNOs and other USN 
officials had given the Soviets strong reason to believe the United States intended 
to attack their SSBNs�23 In addition, the Soviets were well aware, from their day-
to-day operational experience and their own human intelligence, of the acoustic 
advantage that American and other Western submarines enjoyed over their own�24 
Further, 1973 was exactly the time that Soviet navy chief Sergey G� Gorshkov 
was “announcing” the new Soviet strategy in a series of eleven articles (1972–73) 
in Morskoy sbornik, the Soviet navy’s equivalent of the U�S� Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings.25 Expressing ideas as sweeping as those of Sir Julian S� Corbett and 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Gorshkov’s articles described a role for sea power never 
before seen in the modern era� The Soviet navy had become the ultimate guaran-
tor of the Soviet state� When a war moved to the nuclear level, as the Soviets be-
lieved likely, their navy’s missiles would be withheld from initial nuclear strikes� 
They would stand as a force in being to deter (further) nuclear attacks on the 
Soviet Union, deal with defeated enemies and erstwhile allies, and dictate the 
terms of the postwar peace� It was a stunning message of self-importance, self-
congratulation—and defiance of the West� Gorshkov was saying, in effect: We 
have our bastions� We know you are going to attack them� We will defeat you.26 
Unfortunately, for many years the U�S� Navy did not get this message� It did 
not recognize the existence of the bastions until 1980–81, when an extraordinary 
breakthrough in special compartmented intelligence (SCI) confirmed in every 
detail the validity of the conclusions that open-source analysts had been describ-
ing since 1973�27 
Intelligence errors centered on . . . understand-
ing Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, in 
the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case 
of strategic ASW.
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THE RECKONING
In the meantime, in 1974, the first NIE with an exclusive focus on the Soviet 
navy concluded that the Soviets viewed anti-SLOC as a secondary priority, with 
the possible exception of when a war became unexpectedly prolonged� The 
NIE underlined the deep historical roots of this judgment by observing that the 
anti-SLOC mission had exerted no observable influence on Soviet shipbuilding 
programs�28 Because shipbuilding is a process often measured in decades, this 
implies that the anti-SLOC mission never held an important priority for the 
Soviets during the Cold War� This assessment would seem to be borne out by 
Polmar’s observations regarding the Soviets’ categorization of their submarines 
built in the 1950s�
However, the 1974 NIE was silent on the bastions/strategic-reserve missions� 
Indeed, in a discussion of the variety of measures the Soviets might be taking to 
protect their SSBNs, the idea of employing their GPF navy for that purpose was 
simply absent� The IC remained blind to the Soviet navy’s main missions until the 
SCI breakthrough of 1980–81�29 
Office of Naval Intelligence
During this period, ONI fought a rearguard action, petitioning the IC to recon-
sider and reverse the low priority accorded the anti-SLOC mission—to no avail� 
Evidence indicates that ONI continued to pursue this goal even after the (Navy-
derived) SCI breakthrough clearly revealed that bastion defense was the critical 
mission of the GPF navy, one that no other branch of the Soviet armed forces 
could carry out�30 
In 1978, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–authored document—of lesser 
standing than an IC-wide NIE—stated that the GPF navy had been assigned the 
mission of defending SSBNs� However, it did not indicate whether this judgment 
arose from new evidence or simply from a revised reading of the logic of the 
situation, as seen from the Soviet vantage point�31 A second NIE, prepared in 
1982, corrected the IC’s error about the strategic reserve and clearly stated the top 
priority assigned to the GPF navy for its defense�32 Tellingly, nothing uncovered 
in the post-Soviet period has given reason to question the accuracy of the second 
NIE’s conclusions�
The question arises: Why did ONI reject the bastion/strategic-reserve concept 
for so long? Indeed, why did it not investigate it as a secondary hypothesis worthy 
of exploration via upgraded collection priority or concentrated analytical focus? 
One possibility is that the conviction that the Soviet navy would surge forward on 
D-day to attack the SLOCs ruled out contemplation of any other possible strate-
gic role for it� Another is that ONI was affected by a totally incorrect suspicion, 
often encountered within the Navy at large, that conclusions drawn from open 
sources, as CNA’s were, could not be trusted, because the source materials from 
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which they were drawn were riddled with Soviet “disinformation�” Disinforma-
tion was and is a real thing (the word entered the English lexicon in the late 1940s 
from the Soviet/Russian dezinformatsiya)� But while use of disinformation may 
have been widespread in Soviet propaganda, as it is today in Russia, disinforma-
tion never was injected into Soviet doctrinal writings�33 No information that has 
come to light since the fall of the Soviet Union has suggested otherwise�
However, evaluation of factors such as these does not seem to have played an 
important role in ONI’s attitude toward the bastion / strategic reserve� Rather, the 
reality was more prosaic: insights that CNA and others drew from open sources 
simply were ignored� In 2007, Richard L� Haver, a civilian former deputy direc-
tor of ONI, looking back at events thirty years before, put it as follows: “I would 
also say, and to give people their due, there were people like Bob Herrick, Brad 
Dismukes, and Jamie McConnell � � � who were reading what the Russians were 
saying � � � who told us for nearly fifteen years that we had it wrong� And, frankly, 
the system ignored them�”34 
Navy Planners
If ONI “had it wrong,” so, to a lesser degree, did Navy planners, whose senior 
position always gives them the last word� Regardless of contrary conclusions 
emanating from the IC, fixation with an offensive-minded, anti-SLOC en-
emy maintained its hold on Navy thinking� According to Hattendorf, Admiral 
Thomas B� Hayward (CNO 1978–82), on first being briefed about the bastions in 
August 1981, “found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that 
he expressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such 
a [defensive] manner�”35 
However, once the validity of the “new” Soviet strategy was accepted, the Navy 
delivered its riposte with an alacrity rare in large organizations� In January 1986, 
Admiral James D� Watkins (CNO 1982–86) publicly announced the Maritime 
Strategy in the Naval Institute Proceedings�36 His tightly reasoned article described 
a new “war termination” mission for the Navy: by attacking the bastions and put-
ting the strategic reserve at risk, the United States might gain strategic leverage 
over the Soviets before nuclear escalation occurred� In other words, the U�S� Navy 
would prevent its Soviet opponent from achieving its assigned mission, which 
was nothing less than to affect the course and outcome of the war as a whole� 
The Navy itself would take up that role, through achievement of command of 
the (under)sea�
Attention to this extraordinary claim—that the Navy might have made a de-
cisive contribution to the outcome of a World War III—has been muted, for at 
least two reasons� First, the CNO’s article immediately drew sharp criticism from 
advocates of the strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), who 
argued vigorously that threatening Soviet SSBNs was dangerously escalatory�37 
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A second possible reason is that after announcing the war-termination mission 
the article addressed the SLOCs—with a logic that is difficult to follow� On one 
hand, it stated that attacking Western SLOCs would be, for the Soviets, “second-
ary, at least at the war’s start,” 
and protecting the bastions 
was, for the Soviets, a “critical 
� � � role�” On the other hand, 
it stated that by threatening 
Soviet SSBNs the U�S� Navy 
would “force Soviet subma-
rines to retreat into defensive bastions � � � den[ying] � � � the option of a massive, 
early attempt to interdict our [SLOCs]�”38 
In 1986, one could not force an opposing navy to play what has just been de-
scribed as its critical role—the role for which much of it in fact had been created� 
The notion seems particularly inapt when the mission in question was one the 
Soviet navy had been executing for over a dozen years at that point� Nor does it 
seem reasonable to seek to deny the adversary an “early attempt” to execute an 
option described as merely “secondary” in its priorities “at the war’s start�”39 
This criticism is not an idle historical “gotcha�” The idea of threatening the 
reserve to force the Soviets to defend it, and thereby to protect the SLOCs, is 
found even in recent references� In an April 2018 book review in Foreign Af-
fairs, Stephen P� Rosen repeated Admiral Watkins’s formulation�40 This may be 
seen today as just badly told history, but the disjointed connection between the 
two strategic missions has proved enduring� Indeed, SLOC protection held sway 
when the Navy’s Maritime Strategy soon was taken up at the national level� The 
National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Ronald W� 
Reagan in January 1987, did not mention war termination� Its announced intent 
to threaten Soviet “submarines” was justified solely on the grounds that doing so 
would “minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe 
by sea�”41 In this way, “attack the bastions and defend the SLOCs” entered the 
national discourse at the highest level� Thus did a depiction of a Soviet adversary 
that posed a threat to the SLOCs march on into the late 1980s—fifteen years after 
the IC had concluded that such a use of the Soviet navy was unlikely�
An anti-SLOC Soviet adversary may not have comported with reality—but it 
did fit other needs of Navy planners to a T� As noted previously, prudence dic-
tates that planners defend their own vulnerabilities� In the abstract—and in the 
popular mind of Americans at large—the United States had no greater maritime 
vulnerability than the North Atlantic SLOCs� Defense of the SLOCs was centrally 
important in dimensions unrelated to the Soviets: showing solidarity with NATO 
allies—especially the British, whose intelligence leaders shared ONI’s views about 
From the beginning of the Cold War in the 
late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was 
convinced that in a World War III the Soviets 
intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” 
This was incorrect.
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the threat to the SLOCs—and supporting the Navy position in interservice bud-
get rivalries� A Navy shaped to defend Western SLOCs drew staunch U�S� Army 
and Air Force support� And the importance of “getting the troops to Europe” 
hardly faced critical doubt on the Hill�42 So, for Navy planners the idea of an 
anti-SLOC Soviet navy was a perennial winner, one not to be relinquished lightly, 
and indeed to be defended—however unsupportable that defense might become�
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? SLOC DEFENSE— 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
What difference did a misunderstood enemy make for force-employment plans 
and for planning the future force structure? American operational planners were 
planning to employ forces to defend the SLOCs; their defensive script paralleled 
that of their Soviet opposites, resulting in centers of gravity the mutually defen-
sive warring forces foresaw for themselves that were nearly 1,500 miles apart, as 
shown in the figure�
Whatever its overall shape, a Third World War seemed highly unlikely to 
involve a Battle of the Atlantic III�43 Until the Maritime Strategy emerged in the 
The gray diagonals, right, show where Soviet bastion/homeland-defense forces were expected to concentrate; the light gray area indicates where Soviet 
screening forces would seek to deny entry to NATO surface forces. NATO SLOC-defense forces could be expected to concentrate below the GIUK gap 
as shown by the diagonals on the left. 
Source: Adapted from NIE 11-15-82D, p. 17. 
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC III?
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mid-1980s, the two great navies might not even have been “ships that pass in the 
night�” Employment plans for the U�S� Second Fleet, intended to counter Soviet 
submarines flooding south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow� They were es-
sentially pointless, except for possible use in dealing with Soviet “spoilers” sent 
into the Atlantic on a one-way mission to tie up larger American forces on the 
defense�44
Force-structure plans, which aimed at countering an anti-SLOC Soviet navy at 
the time and into the future, are more complicated to assess� This is because the 
aircraft carriers, while immensely potent, played little role in SLOC defense (or 
strategic ASW)�45 And the rest of the Navy’s platforms and systems were inher-
ently multipurpose� ASW and air-defense capabilities developed for one combat 
scenario could perform well in others� Nonetheless, particular investments in 
ships or other systems optimized for convoy defense against massed submarine 
and air attack well may have been misdirected effort� A prominent candidate in 
this regard was the fifty-ship FFG-7, Perry-class frigate program� Billions of dol-
lars invested in it might have been spent better on forces optimized for carrier 
screening, countermine warfare, or other missions, such as attacking the bastions 
or striking ashore�
Some might argue that, despite these errors, U�S� defense efforts nonethe-
less deterred the Soviets from attacking the SLOCs� Such a view does not seem 
logical� There should be little ground for taking satisfaction in deterring an anti-
SLOC “threat” that was essentially abstract� The actual Soviet navy that existed 
during the Cold War had not seriously contemplated attacking the SLOCs; had 
not bought forces for that mission; did not train or exercise to carry it out; and 
was not up to the task, in the highly unlikely event that it tried to accomplish it�
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? STRATEGIC ASW— 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
In the case of strategic ASW, how history will view the consequences of the 
lengthy delay between the Soviets’ adoption of the bastions and the U�S� Navy’s 
development of plans to attack them will depend mainly on whether strategic 
ASW is seen as a bad idea or a good one� For those in the MAD camp or those 
who simply thought the prospects for success in an antibastion campaign were 
close to nil, the delay was an accidental blessing for the nation� From this point 
of view, the lengthy interval was a period during which the nation luckily avoided 
planning to do something that could have led to catastrophe�
For others, the delay in developing plans to threaten the bastions was a great 
strategic opportunity forgone� Consider assessments from two officials deeply 
involved in the decisions of the time� Former Director of Naval Intelligence 
(DNI) Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro said that the Maritime Strategy “had a lot 
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to do with helping end the Cold War�”46 Former Navy Secretary John F� Lehman 
has gone further, crediting the Navy with a major role not just in “ending” but in 
“winning” the Cold War�47 From this point of view, the nation surely would have 
been served better if the bastion defense / strategic reserve had been recognized 
for what it was soon after it appeared in 1973� The Maritime Strategy—with its 
anti-SSBN component—then might have been developed in the mid-1970s; that 
is, under the leadership of Admirals Elmo R� Zumwalt and James L� Holloway 
(CNOs 1970–74 and 1974–78, respectively), to be perfected under Hayward and 
Watkins�
This historical section must conclude with an important question, at best 
partly answered: If bad decisions were made (SLOC defense) and good/bad ones 
delayed (strategic ASW), did it really make a decisive difference in the history 
of the era? After all, the powerful, multipurpose Navy acquired during the Cold 
War did underwrite the nation’s alliances and successfully countered (this author 
believes defeated) the Soviet navy’s unprecedented attempt, in the early 1970s, to 
carry out a peacetime political mission “to protect the state interests of the USSR 
on the seas and oceans�”48 But success in a peacetime political mission says little 
about likely success in the number one task: achieving victory had there been 
war� And it says nothing at all about the uneven quality of the processes through 
which the Cold War Navy was brought into being�
LESSONS FOR TODAY
Our attention now turns to planning for today and for the future, drawing on 
the history just reviewed�49 The article will look, first, at what Cold War history 
may mean for SLOC defense, and then for strategic ASW�50 It will suggest spe-
cific ways in which repetition of the strategic errors of the Cold War might be 
avoided, and offer concluding thoughts about the broader meaning of what has 
been examined�
SLOC Defense Today
Today’s planning for the wartime security of lines of communication in the 
North Atlantic shows a strong continuity with that of the Cold War, expressed 
in historical metaphor redolent of that continuity� The mission statement of the 
new NATO Joint Force Command in Norfolk includes that the command will 
“help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe, 
in a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic�’”51 Recent comments by senior Navy officials 
have made clear that, if there should be a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” it will 
be fought against the Russian navy, which obviously would have to come out to 
fight it�52 
Unfortunately, this line of argument comes dangerously close to echoing the 
errors of the Cold War� The Soviet navy never was coming out to fight, and the 
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smaller, less capable Russian navy is even less likely to do so�53 One presumes 
that the aim of stating, nonetheless, the existence of a possible, even likely, 
concrete Russian threat to the SLOCs reflects non-threat-related objectives: to 
promote alliance solidarity and build political and public support in the United 
States for needed Navy programs� These objectives remain as legitimate as they 
were during the Cold War� However, seeking to promote them by deviating 
from reality-based planning is unlikely to be effective� First, public support may 
be difficult to sustain in the face of criticism that the Navy is distorting reality 
on behalf of the service’s self-interests�54 Second, the time-honored principle 
that the planner above all must defend his own vulnerabilities provides fully 
sufficient grounds for acquiring needed forces and exercising them to maintain 
their readiness�55 The greatest American vulnerability at sea continues to be 
control of the North Atlantic (with regard to SLOCs, undersea cables, and pos-
sible future strategic conventional or nuclear threats to the continental United 
States)� Moreover, that control remains an essential condition for the integrity 
of the alliance�
Most importantly, the emerging strategic situation provides an alternative, of-
fensive strategic use for forces that complements and promotes traditional SLOC 
defense� The rapid globalization of the world economy has made Russia far more 
dependent on the sea than in the past for the growth of its economy, in keeping 
with its aspirations as a great power�56 This suggests that the United States and 
its allies should adopt a blockade strategy in response� Neither Russia nor any 
other nation can use the surface of the world ocean except at the sufferance of 
the United States and its allies�57 In this sense, the West can be said to enjoy global 
command of the sea�
In the case of Russia, its assets at sea are mainly economic in nature: those 
engaged in cabotage, international hauling, general commerce for the merchant 
fleet (the second largest in the world, after the Chinese), and liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and grain exports; a large fishing fleet; and scientific-research ships 
and the like�58 The potential vulnerability of these assets should be exploited—for 
deterrence; for crisis response; or, if war is unavoidable, to fight and terminate 
it successfully� Let us examine briefly two examples of a blockade strategy in ac-
tion—recognizing that blockade is likely to be more effective in “small war” situ-
ations, where the political stakes and the scale of military operations are limited�
First, in peacetime, to buttress deterrence, the West would make clear that 
Russian aggression against a NATO ally will be met with blockade at sea as well 
as with ground and air forces ashore�59 Specifically, whatever the form or timing 
of NATO’s response on land, the United States and its allies immediately would 
deny Russia the use of the world ocean�60 Russia would face a choice between, on 
the one hand, seeking or holding on to territorial or political gains on its western 
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periphery and, on the other hand, forgoing the payoff from the vast investments 
it has made in LNG exports� Second, during a crisis, these sea-denial measures 
might be implemented gradually� It may be possible to calibrate these measures 
to correspond to the intensity 
of Russian threats, including 
ambiguous threats of “hybrid 
warfare,” in both its now-
familiar forms and some per-
haps still to be seen� Through 
marking, shadowing, and the like—without firing a shot—the United States and 
its allies could pose a tangible threat to Russian assets at sea, wherever found�61 
The blockade concept would seem to deserve careful examination as the Navy 
continues to develop plans for the new era� The idea likely has an even richer 
potential against China, which already is heavily dependent on seaborne imports 
of energy, raw materials, and even foodstuffs�62 Navy planning for Second Fleet’s 
AOR obviously must be integrated globally across all AORs� The Maritime Strat-
egy of the mid-1980s might be seen as an exemplar with respect to planning on a 
global scale across all phases of conflict, from peace to war termination and into 
the postwar world�63 Whatever form a twenty-first-century maritime strategy 
may take, it likely should include a blockade component, on behalf of SLOC de-
fense and to exploit its larger potential�
Strategic ASW Today
Strategic ASW is also an obvious candidate methodology for exploiting Western 
sea power today, as it was during the Cold War� This is not merely an abstract 
possibility; the Navy recently let it be known that it contemplates using its sub-
marine force to “deny the bastions”: that is, to attack Russian SSBNs�64 (While it 
would seem reasonable to presume that the stated intention reflects the existence 
of an operational capability to execute it, no such capability was stated specifi-
cally, nor do the remarks that follow here so presume�)
Strategic ASW is a complex subject deserving more extensive exposition than 
space allows�65 But it can be said without qualification that executing the strategic 
ASW mission today would be one of those rare cases in which failure would be 
far better than success� First, success almost certainly would trigger the firing of 
Russian nuclear ASW weapons—to which the United States lacks the capability 
to respond in kind at sea, and in response to which it would have no incentive to 
escalate ashore� Second, it likely would result in nuclear ecological consequences 
of unknown but possibly catastrophic scale� Third—and of the highest possible 
importance—the mortal intercontinental nuclear threat to which successful stra-
tegic ASW would subject the nation would be suffered on behalf of no clear or 
feasible strategic objective�
Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet, 
intended to counter Soviet submarines flood-
ing south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. 
They were essentially pointless.
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The logic of strategic ASW during the Cold War cannot be applied to the new 
strategic situation against Russia� The United States should avoid threatening 
Russian SSBNs in almost all conceivable circumstances� As it did during the Cold 
War, the Navy should take the lead in framing strategy regarding the adversary’s 
SSBNs—paradoxically, no longer to maximize, but today to minimize, the threat 
that U�S� forces may pose� The Navy should seek explicit national-command-
authority approval for the appropriate policy�66 The United States should adjust 
its declaratory policy, its military-to-military diplomacy, and the Navy’s own 
operational behavior accordingly�
In this last respect, Navy developmental and training exercises in the Arctic, 
such as the ICEX series, should be reviewed carefully� Their roots lie deep in the 
Cold War� Propelled mainly by the momentum of technical development, opera-
tional routine, and an established bureaucratic structure, they seem to have been 
continued since the end of the Cold War without conscious attention to their 
strategic effects� But in fact they convey a strong strategic message in the language 
of action: the only possible targets that exist for U�S� under-ice torpedoes today 
are Russian submarines, obviously including SSBNs�67 Faced with this reality, 
Russian planners are likely to prove hard to convince that the United States in-
tends to give their SSBNs a wide berth�68 
Avoiding Yesterday’s Mistakes
It would seem logical to base measures aimed at avoiding yesterday’s mistakes on 
a deep understanding of why those mistakes were made� The author has found 
no satisfactory single explanation, and not one that suggests effective corrective 
measures� Not surprisingly, an intelligence-planning mistake that persisted for 
over forty years had many complicated, interacting causes�69 These must be left 
to others to explore and prioritize�
What does seem certain is that internal Navy self-corrective processes were 
absent or did not kick in with sufficient force� This article will suggest three 
specific process-oriented measures that may hold promise for minimizing the 
chance that today’s planning repeats the Cold War–era mistakes� They are ad-
vanced in a most tentative manner because of the radical differences between the 
Cold War’s binary simplicities and today’s multipolar mix of state and nonstate 
actors, in a milieu of the most rapidly accelerating technological change human-
kind has ever experienced� Let us look first at intelligence, then planning, and 
finally the nexus between the two�
Intelligence. Homespun wisdom long has held that it’s not what you don’t know 
that gets you into trouble; it’s what you’re surest of� Despite its humble origins, 
this maxim suggests a key self-corrective measure: intelligence professionals and 
their consumers should be most skeptical of the conclusions about adversaries 
that the IC holds with the highest confidence and for the longest time� The Cold 
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War experience suggests that a certain bureaucratic inertia attaches to intel-
ligence conclusions at the strategic level� On the intelligence side, analysts and 
the organizations they serve become associated with a particular reading of an 
adversary’s intentions, and so are inclined to resist accepting alternatives� During 
the Cold War this tendency hampered, even prevented, an unblinkered search for 
what the adversary actually intended� Intelligence analysts (and their consumers) 
must remain open to the possibility that the adversary may contemplate novel 
employment concepts, based on alien strategic priorities�
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish internal procedures within 
the IC to critically review and question its own “official truth�” During the Cold 
War Richard K� Betts showed how extraordinarily difficult it was to arrive at valid 
estimates in the first place�70 Independent assessment by outside groups is likely 
to remain the best means to confirm whether the IC’s depiction of the adversary 
is valid� The work of the most accomplished planner is likely to be useless if it is 
based on a spurious understanding of the world�
Planning. That planners always must defend their own vulnerabilities is a truth 
that stands without any reference to a potential adversary� There is an important 
difference between saying “I have a crucial vulnerability and I will defend it” and 
saying “I have a crucial vulnerability, and my adversary intends to attack it�” The 
first is always true; the second was not true during the Cold War, nor is it likely 
true today� This seems counterintuitive, because attacking the enemy’s biggest 
vulnerability is what an American planner would do, and it seemed logical to 
expect that the Soviets/Russians would do the same� But the Soviets did not see 
it that way, and for the United States that meant years of misdirected effort, and 
lost opportunity ensued�
Today, the characterization of adversaries should reflect as closely as pos-
sible reality-based planning� It would seem particularly important to avoid let-
ting an abstract vulnerability such as the North Atlantic SLOCs become reified 
into a concrete Russian threat—no matter how useful such a public depiction 
might be�
The Intel-Planning Nexus. During the Cold War, Navy planners and ONI saw the 
same enemy� Planners never had to hedge against Intel’s uncertainties, because, 
when it came to the Soviet anti-SLOC mission, there were none� Planners saw the 
worst case as the most likely one� Thus the Cold War afforded little experience in the 
important business of hedging against Intel’s inevitable uncertainties; nor did the 
period after the Cold War, because of its chaotic strategic landscape and the focus 
on the amorphous threats that arise when the adversary is defined as “terrorism�”
In the current era, the planning process must be especially cognizant of the 
distinction between Intel’s job and that of the planner� The two intersect when 
defining the terms of reference for studies of future-force requirements� This—the 
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crucial first step in any such study—brings together Intel and planners to define 
study objectives, depict the nature of the adversary, and determine which uncer-
tainties are being hedged against, why, and how�71 The enemy being engaged in a 
study of future-force needs might turn out to have much the same shape as the 
one that is driving today’s force-employment plans—but that conclusion should be 
reached only after thoughtful, explicit, and systematic consideration of the matter�
Broader Lessons from the Cold War
The Cold War experience seems to yield two broader messages as well� First, 
the Soviet bastion/strategic-reserve missions were a product of technological 
innovation: the development of an SSBN carrying missiles of intercontinental 
range� It seems quite likely 
that the next revolution in 
maritime affairs also will arise 
from technological innova-
tion� An obvious candidate in 
this regard continues to be nonacoustic detection of submarines, but many other 
technological developments are possible� Second, analysis of open sources seems 
likely to remain the earliest and best means of insight into an adversary’s strategic 
intent� This implies the need to pay the closest possible attention to public state-
ments by Russian (or Chinese) spokesmen about new technology affecting sea 
power� Statements regarding purely technological matters deserve top priority, 
but statements regarding the practical employment of new technology—so prof-
itably exploited during the Cold War—should not be far behind�
The Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s showed that the Navy—despite the 
errors cataloged in this article—is more than capable of conducting sound, com-
prehensive planning based on a valid understanding of the adversary and of the 
strategic environment� The emerging twenty-first-century version of that strategy 
should combine aggressive offense with judicious restraint: offense, to exploit the 
West’s global command of the sea through blockade, and so to defend the SLOCs 
and gain leverage against a continental adversary; and forbearance regarding the 
strategic ASW mission, execution of which would be a colossal mistake�
The Cold War U�S� Navy, like its predecessor in the first half of the twentieth 
century, was the most powerful the world had ever seen� It cannot be said with 
confidence that, in general over a forty-year period, this came about through ef-
fective intelligence or acutely rational strategic planning� Such shortcomings as 
were experienced in those areas were overcome through massive material invest-
ment, exploitation of technological advantage—and perhaps a measure of good 
fortune� Whether in the twenty-first century—in this new era of great-power 
competition—the Navy can succeed through reliance on superior investment 
The work of the most accomplished planner is 
likely to be useless if it is based on a spurious 
understanding of the world.
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  This article is drawn from remarks delivered 
at a panel discussion held on 7 November 
2017 at the CNA Building, Arlington, Vir-
ginia� While the views expressed are solely 
those of the author, they are indebted to the 
work of his Cold War colleagues James M� 
McConnell and Robert G� Weinland and, for 
contemporary advice and encouragement, to 
Capt� Peter M� Swartz, USN (Ret�), Bruce F� 
Powers, and Thomas E� Anger�
 1� James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary 
Mattis on the National Defense Strategy” 
(speech delivered at the School of Advanced 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ�, 
Washington, DC, 19 January 2018), available 
at dod�defense�gov/� The transcript uses initial 
uppercase for “Great Power�” Mr� Mattis was 
announcing the recent release of the National 
Defense Strategy, the summary of which uses 
the less-specific term interstate competition. 
U�S� Defense Dept�, Summary of the 2018 Na-
tional Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America: Sharpening the American Military’s 
Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: 2018), p� 
1, available at www�defense�gov/�
 2� Injudiciously pursued preparations for major 
war can make such a war more likely; it is 
recognized widely that this was the case with 
World War I� Of the considerable body of lit-
erature on this subject, see Paul M� Kennedy, 
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 
1860–1914 (New York: Humanity Books, 
1988), and more recently, Christopher Clark, 
The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 
1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2013)�
 3� This possibility scarcely can be ruled out, 
given the absence of deep ideological compe-
tition or territorial disputes whose resolu-
tion the parties regard as vital� U�S� military 
planning henceforth should be oriented to 
deal with both a large war—approaching the 
scale of the Cold War—and wars of a much 
smaller scope� The latter, perhaps in a series 
over some years, would put a premium on 
judicious commitment of forces and the fleet-
in-being concept� The presence of China as 
a potential opponent, along with Russia, also 
dictates careful attention to the conservation 
of forces�
 4� Navy Office of Information, “CNO Announc-
es Establishment of U�S� 2nd Fleet,” America’s 
Navy, 5 May 2018, www�navy�mil/�
 5� A third strategic mission—bringing carrier 
tactical aviation (tacair) forward to bear on 
the flanks of the war in Europe or on Soviet 
territory proper—will not be addressed� This 
was an important part of the Navy’s Maritime 
Strategy (see note 8) from the U�S� view-
point� In the author’s opinion, however, the 
Soviets saw carrier tacair as considerably less 
significant than the threat of strategic ASW� 
When the Maritime Strategy is discussed 
herein, assessments will be framed mainly 
with reference to strategic ASW� Two Russian 
writers have offered a different view—that 
the Soviets were more concerned with USN 
strikes from the sea than with the threat the 
Navy posed to their SSBNs� Vladimir Kuzin 
and Sergei Chernyavskii, “Russian Reactions 
to Reagan’s ‘Maritime Strategy,’” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no� 2 (April 2005), pp� 
429–39� But Kuzin and Chernyavskii also say 
that Soviet planners gave a high priority to 
SLOC interdiction as well—a proposition that 
is manifestly untrue� Nonetheless, the pos-
sibility that Navy tacair could have destroyed 
Soviet SSBNs in port and the logistic and 
maintenance infrastructure that supported 
them—and thus contributed to the success 
of the strategic ASW mission—cannot be 
dismissed out of hand� That question, like 
the possibility that Navy attacks on the Soviet 
flanks might have relieved pressure on NATO 
on the central front, simply lies beyond the 
boundaries of this investigation�
 6� The return of great-power competition, after 
a generation of its absence—on top of two 
previous generations colored by the unique 
and technology is an open question� The author respectfully submits that more-
careful and better-integrated intelligence-planning processes—of the kind that 
guided the Maritime Strategy—would improve our chances greatly�
N O T E S
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characteristics of World War II and the Cold 
War—suggests that strategic thinking also 
should return to its primal elements� The 
Dutch American scholar Nicholas John Spyk-
man took into account the second Battle of 
the Atlantic, still very much in progress at the 
time of his writing, to offer counsel on the 
shape of the postwar peace� He saw control of 
the oceans between the United States and the 
“rimlands” of Eurasia as mandatory� Control 
of the rimlands might itself give the United 
States a dominant position in world politics 
and, in any case, would be necessary to con-
tain a single power that might dominate the 
continental “heartland�” Nicholas John Spyk-
man, The Geography of the Peace, ed� Helen 
R� Nicholl (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944)� 
Spykman drew heavily on, and also was a 
critic of, Sir Halford Mackinder� See Halford 
John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Real-
ity: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction  
(New York: Holt, 1919), available at archive 
�org/� The power and persistence of this 
idea were reconfirmed recently by historian 
Robert Kagan� After the Second World War, 
Americans were convinced that “their way of 
life could not be safe in a world where Europe 
and Asia were dominated by hostile autocrat-
ic powers�” Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows 
Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New 
York: Knopf, 2018), p� 124� However unlikely 
it may seem today, the United States, at some 
future point, could withdraw to a “Fortress 
America” protected by two oceanic moats� In 
this case, there would be no SLOCs to defend� 
Nonetheless, as in the centuries before the 
twentieth, American seaborne commerce 
might well require protection�
 7� The complex responsibilities of the planner, 
who must counter the threat that intelligence 
identifies, defend his own vulnerabilities,  
and also cope with non-threat-related 
concerns, such as the Navy’s position in the 
never-ending Defense Department budget 
battle, will be addressed several times in the 
narrative below� The term planner as used 
here refers to Navy officers carrying that 
designation and special study groups and 
others assigned planning functions� Planners 
rarely are anything other than unrestricted 
line officers, supported by long-serving Navy 
civilians, and are always the leaders in mul-
tidisciplinary groups� In the Navy hierarchy, 
the CNO is the chief Navy planner� This 
article does not delve into the organizational 
dynamics of Navy planning� It also refers to 
planners as masculine, reflecting the author’s 
experience during the Cold War—with apolo-
gies to any in more recent times who may 
prefer the his/her locution�
 8� James D� Watkins [Adm�, USN], “The Mari-
time Strategy,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceed-
ings 112/1/995 (January 1986), pp� 1–17� The 
Maritime Strategy had been expressed earlier 
in an extended internal Navy briefing in 1984, 
revised in 1985� John B� Hattendorf and Peter 
M� Swartz, eds�, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 
1980s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 
33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
2008), docs� 2 and 4�
 9� Christopher A� Ford and David A� Rosen-
berg, “The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings 
of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no� 2 (April 2005), pp� 
379–409; this was republished in expanded 
form as The Admirals’ Advantage: U.S. Navy 
Operational Intelligence in World War II 
and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2014)� John B� Hattendorf, The 
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 
1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 2004), chap� 2 (first 
published in a classified version in an unre-
lated but identically named series as Newport 
Paper 6, 1989)�
 10� This article occasionally will use “Intel” as an 
alternative way to refer to ONI�
 11� This is such an important discriminant, so  
let us look at a place—northern Norway—
where uncertainty prevailed then, as it may 
well today� If the Soviets had intended an 
anti-SLOC campaign, they obviously also 
would have wanted to prevent the West  
from using the Norwegian littoral to bring  
its defensive forces to bear as far forward  
as possible: air defense against antiship  
missile–armed, long-range aircraft and, 
more importantly, ASW forces against Soviet 
submarines making the 1,200-mile transit to 
and from the presumed North Atlantic battle 
zone� But how might the Soviets go about 
seizing and occupying a sizable part of Nor-
way? Would they violate Finnish or Swedish 
neutrality? While the IC pronounced its early 
assessment with apparent confidence (i�e�, 
no Soviet initial plans for operations south of 
Finnmark), even its views evolved over time� 
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For many others, Soviet strategic intentions 
on the Northern Flank remained a matter of 
deep uncertainty throughout the Cold War� 
Concern about Russia’s intentions regarding 
NATO’s Far North clearly is alive today� Dur-
ing the Cold War, NIEs of the period 1979–85 
showed an evolving view of Soviet intentions� 
NIE 11-14-79 stated there was “no evidence” 
of Soviet plans to attack through Finland or 
Sweden� Central Intelligence Agency, Warsaw 
Pact Forces Opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, 
vol� 2, The Estimate (31 January 1979), pp� 
IV-31 to IV-32, FOIA Collection, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, avail-
able at www�cia�gov/� Two years later, NIE 
11-14-81 of the same title added, “The Soviets 
probably would be deterred from [moving 
farther south by restricted terrain and] the 
potentially strong NATO resistance�” Central 
Intelligence Agency, Warsaw Pact Forces Op-
posite NATO, NIE 11-14-81 (7 July 1981), pp� 
28–29, FOIA Collection, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Washington, DC, available at www 
�cia�gov/� The 1985 version of this NIE revised 
the estimate, stating that the Soviets would 
attack Norway “from the USSR and through 
Finland to seize the NATO bases or to deny 
their use, and to facilitate Soviet naval opera-
tions in the Norwegian and Barents Seas�” 
Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Strat-
egy and Capabilities for Multi-theater War, 
NIE 11-19-85D (1 June 1985), p� 10, FOIA 
Collection, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Washington, DC, available at www�cia�gov/� 
For examples of dealing with this uncertainty, 
see Robert F� Kernan [Cdr�, USN], “Norway 
and the Northern Flank: Wartime Prospects,” 
Air War College Research Report (defense 
analytical study, Air War College, Maxwell 
AFB, AL, May 1989), and John Lund, Don’t 
Rock the Boat: Reinforcing Norway in Crisis 
and War, RAND Report R-3725-RC (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, July 1989)�
 12� This insight was provided by Norman Polmar� 
Norman Polmar, e-mail to author, 10  
February 2018� The author is indebted to Mr� 
Polmar for raising the question that triggered 
this article: When did the Soviets decide 
to give a low priority to attacking Western 
SLOCs? He posed the question during a 
question-and-answer session (Q&A) at the 
November 2017 conference at CNA cited at 
the beginning of these notes� Polmar recently 
has provided his own answer: that the Soviets 
never intended to attack the SLOCs� Norman 
Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,” 
Naval Submarine League Review (June 2018), 
pp� 140–46� The article adds the intriguing 
evidence that U�S� intelligence officials from 
the late 1940s through the mid-1950s turned 
to ex–World War II German specialists on the 
Soviet navy to understand Soviet purposes� It 
is not known how influential German views 
became, but it is hard to imagine a more 
biased departure point for the first generation 
of ONI’s Soviet analysts� The Germans had 
just had experience not only with their nearly 
successful offense against the North Atlantic 
SLOCs but also with the defense of their 
own Black Sea SLOCs against Soviet attack� 
For them, SLOCs were what modern naval 
warfare was about� See also Norman Polmar, 
“To Understand Russian Submarines, Think 
outside the Box,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, 145/10/1,400 (October 2019)�
 13� Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet At-
tack Submarine Force and Western Sea Lines 
of Communication, SR 79-10038 (National 
Foreign Assessment Center, 1 April 1979), 
doc� no� 0005499486, 1 April 1979, CIA 
Analysis of the Soviet Navy, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Washington, DC [hereafter 
CIA Analysis], available at www�cia�gov/�
 14� “Comments on Navy Review of Revised 
OSR SLOC Paper,” memorandum, doc� no� 
0005533608, 25 January 1979, CIA Analysis; 
“Soviet Fleet Logistics: Capabilities and Limi-
tations,” doc� no� 0005532898, 1 August 1976, 
CIA Analysis�
 15� There should have been no uncertainty about 
this point� The Soviet navy simply never 
practiced performance of the top mission the 
U�S� Navy ascribed to it� The Soviets’ largest-
ever exercise, the global-scale OKEAN in 
1975, did involve simulated attacks on small 
numbers of Soviet merchant ships, which 
some construed to be an anti-SLOC scenario� 
Watson and Walton, both serving intelligence 
officers, limited their interpretation of those 
maneuvers to the Soviets “seemingly” attack-
ing SLOCs� B� W� Watson [Lt� Cdr�, USN] and 
M� A� Walton [Lt� Cdr�, USN], “Okean-75,” 
U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings, 102/7/881 
(July 1976)� The CIA saw the merchant ships 
involved as simulating Western amphibious 
ships heading toward a landing on the Soviet 
littoral or on the Soviet army’s maritime 
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flanks� “Comments on Navy Review of Re-
vised OSR SLOC Paper�”
 16� See Stephen S� Roberts, “Superpower Naval 
Confrontations,” in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, 
ed� Bradford Dismukes and James M� McCon- 
nell (New York: Pergamon, 1979), chap� 2� 
Specific examples from the October War are 
in Elmo R� Zumwalt Jr�, On Watch: A Memoir 
(New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), p� 
301ff�
 17� Robert W� Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: 
Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968); Michael 
M� MccGwire, “Naval Power and Soviet 
Oceans Policy,” in Soviet Oceans Develop-
ment, ed� John Hardt and Herman Franssen 
(Washington, DC: U�S� Government Printing 
Office, 1976), a study by the National Ocean 
Policy Study staff for the Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce; Barry M� Blechman, The 
Changing Soviet Navy (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1973)� Herrick was a 
USN intelligence officer� His book was drawn 
from research begun at Columbia University’s 
School of Russian Studies� The publisher in-
serted a “Publisher’s Preface” (pp� xi–xii) that 
questioned the book’s findings that the Soviet 
navy “is still basically a defensive military 
force�”
 18� See Robert G� Weinland et al�, Admiral 
Gorshkov’s “Navies in War and Peace” (n�p�: 
Progressive Publishers, n�d�), a reprint of 
CNA Research Contribution 257 of the 
same name (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, December 1974)� The reference to 
Sokolovskiy is from the contribution by James 
M� McConnell, p� 81� Also of interest is James 
M� McConnell, with Susan Clark and Mary 
Fitzgerald, “Analyzing the Soviet Press—Spot 
Report No� 1: The Irrelevance Today of So-
kolovskiy’s Book Military Strategy,” Research 
Memorandum CRM 35-85, May 1985, avail-
able at cna�org/�
 19� Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, chap� 2, provides an 
extended discussion of CNA’s work� (Because 
much of the author’s work and that of other 
CNA analysts of the period remains classified, 
citations are necessarily to Hattendorf�) Brad-
ford Dismukes, “Evolving Wartime Missions 
of the Soviet General Purpose Force Navy,” 
Center for Naval Analyses 001061-73, June 
1973, cited in Hattendorf, The Evolution of 
the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, p� 24; James 
M� McConnell, “Strategy and Missions of the 
Soviet Navy in the Year 2000,” in Problems of 
Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First 
Century, ed� James L� George (Washington, 
DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1978), which provides a 
delayed restatement of McConnell’s earlier 
classified and unclassified publications�
 20� In preparing this article, the author encoun-
tered considerable curiosity about the meth-
odologies that CNA’s open-source analysts 
used, particularly how they yielded accurate 
insights about Soviet strategic intent years 
before standard sources of intelligence did so� 
Because of their relevance to this narrative, 
I have posted a discussion of this subject on 
my blog� Bradford Dismukes, “CNA’s Open 
Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings,” 
Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century US 
Naval Strategy (blog), 9 January 2020,  
cliosmusings�blog/�
 21� The Delta I continued in service until 2005 
and spawned the Delta II, Delta III, and Delta 
IV, some of which reportedly are still in ser-
vice� Wikipedia, s�v� “Delta-class submarines,” 
en�wikipedia�org/�
 22� Road- and rail-mobile intercontinental  
ballistic missiles have roots in the earliest days 
of Soviet intercontinental rocketry� Fully oper-
ational systems—the SS-24 Scalpel and SS-25 
Sickle—were fielded by 1987� Nikolai Sokov, 
“Russia: History of Soviet/Russian ICBMs,” 
Humus, win�progettohumus�it/� (Dr� Sokov, 
currently affiliated with the Martin Center for 
Non-proliferation Studies, Middlebury Insti-
tute for International Studies at Monterey, Cal-
ifornia, was a researcher in the 1980s and early 
’90s with the Soviet Institute for the Study of 
the USA and Canada in Moscow�) MccGwire 
argued that these could have served as the 
nuclear reserve, or at least part of it, making 
its sea-based component less critical� Michael 
M� MccGwire, “The Changing Role of the So-
viet Navy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, 
no� 7 (September 1987)� However, land-based 
missiles fell under the purview of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces (SRFs)� The SRFs, for reasons 
described in Dismukes, “CNA’s Open Source 
Analysis of Soviet Military Writings,” were 
not designated in Soviet military writings as 
providing reserve capabilities� In any case, the 
Soviets continued to build growing numbers 
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of SSBNs of ever greater capability, as have 
their Russian successors�
 23� John Perse, “U�S� Declaratory Policy on Soviet 
SSBN Security: 1970 to 1985,” Research 
Memorandum CRM 84-29, 1986, available at 
cna�org/�
 24� The most infamous Soviet intelligence 
penetration exposing information on Navy 
operational capabilities was the John Walker 
case� See John Prados, “The Navy’s Biggest 
Betrayal,” Naval History 24, no� 3 (June 2010)�
 25� Sergey G� Gorshkov [FAdm�, Soviet navy], 
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, 
“Navies in War and Peace,” Morskoy sbornik. 
There were eleven monthly installments (with 
two missing), starting with no� 2 in 1972�
 26� This is the author’s interpretation� Gorsh-
kov has generated an ample literature in the 
West� The Naval Institute Press has published 
translations of his works and several interpre-
tive books about him, the latest and most 
definitive being Norman Polmar, Thomas 
A� Brooks, and George E� Fedoroff, Admiral 
Goshkov: The Man Who Challenged the U.S. 
Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2019)�
 27� Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, p� 32� The story of how 
this USN-born breakthrough came about has 
been described widely in the public press� It 
is a remarkable tale of valor, technical skill, 
and operational proficiency in its own right� 
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, with 
Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: 
The Untold Story of American Submarine 
Espionage (Washington, DC: PublicAffairs, 
1998)�
 28� Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval 
Policy and Programs, NIE 11-15-74 (23 
December 1974), pp� 14, 22, FOIA Collection, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 
DC, available at www�cia�gov/�
 29� The phenomenology of the intelligence world 
means that something does not exist until it is 
observed and duly reported� But when a new 
thing does appear, the IC usually tries to trace 
down its origins to determine whether and 
how it might have been detected earlier� If 
the IC has done this in the case of the Soviet 
navy’s bastions /strategic reserve, it has not 
been reported publicly yet�
 30� Letter from DNI Rear Adm� Sumner  
Shapiro, referenced in “Comments on  
Navy Review of Revised OSR SLOC  
Paper�” The letter itself is not provided�  
Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S.  
Navy’s Maritime Strategy, p� 34, observes  
that “[a]t the same time, ONI set out to get 
the intelligence community to produce a 
National Intelligence estimate which would 
endorse the ONI analysis of Soviet force 
employment concepts [i�e�, assigning a 
high priority to the anti-SLOC mission]� In 
November 1981, the Intelligence community 
completed an interagency Intelligence mem-
orandum on ‘SOVIET INTENTIONS AND 
CAPABILITIES FOR INTERDICTING SEA 
LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN A WAR 
WITH NATO’ [uppercase in the original]�” 
This document reconfirmed the “secondary” 
priority accorded to the anti-SLOC mission�
 31� Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet At-
tack Submarine Force and Western Sea Lines 
of Communication. The author is grateful to 
Steven Wills for this citation�
 32� Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval 
Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, 
NIE 11-15-82D (2 February 1983), FOIA 
Collection, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Washington, DC, available at www�cia�gov/� 
CNA’s interpretations played no role in the 
formulation of this NIE� However, the author 
has been given to understand by former DNI 
Rear Adm� Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret�), that 
they were, in his generous phrase, “invaluable” 
as an aid to SCI analysts “connecting the dots” 
from incoming intelligence to draw broad 
conclusions about their meaning� Thomas 
Brooks, e-mail to author, 10 September 2018�
 33� Dismukes, “CNA’s Open Source Analysis of 
Soviet Military Writings�”
 34� Richard L� Haver, “How Submarine Intelli-
gence Collection Made a Difference” (lecture 
hosted by the Naval Submarine League, Naval 
Historical Foundation, and Naval Historical 
Center, U�S� Navy Memorial, Washington, 
DC, 11 April 2007)� Transcript pages un-
numbered; Mr� Haver’s remarks came during 
a Q&A at the seminar’s conclusion�
 35� Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, pp� 32–33� Hattendorf 
further recounts the considerable effort 
that ONI had to expend to convince 
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skeptical USN planners and operators of the 
veracity of the bastion/strategic-reserve mis-
sions� As a CNA briefer on these topics from 
1975 to ’81, the author encountered disbelief 
among a few Navy Staff planners that such 
alien strategic concepts even could exist�
 36� Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy�”
 37� See, for example, John J� Mearsheimer, “A 
Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy 
and Deterrence in Europe,” International 
Security 11, no� 2 (Fall 1986), pp� 3–57� For a 
second critique and a cogent rebuttal thereto, 
respectively, see Barry Posen, “US Maritime 
Strategy: A Dangerous Game,” and Roger 
W� Barnett, “US Maritime Strategy: Safe and 
Sound,” both Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
43, no� 7 (September 1987)� While on active 
duty, Captain Barnett had been one of the 
principal drafters of the final version of the 
Maritime Strategy. A general critique is in 
Donald C� Daniel, Anti-submarine Warfare 
and Superpower Strategic Stability (Urbana: 
Univ� of Illinois Press, 1986)�
 38� Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy�” Emphasis 
added�
 39� Ibid�
 40� Stephen P� Rosen, “Future Fights: Planning 
for the Next War,” review of The Future of 
War, by Lawrence Freedman, Foreign Affairs 
97, no� 2 (March/April 2018), pp� 162–67�
 41� The National Security Strategy of the United 
States (Washington, DC: White House, Janu-
ary 1987), p� 30, available at nssarchive 
�us/� Although the mission clearly received 
the commander in chief ’s imprimatur in 
1987, it never again appeared in subsequent 
presidential national security strategy 
documents� While there is little doubt the 
mission was approved at the highest levels, 
publicly available information does not in-
dicate how it did or did not pass through the 
standard Joint Chiefs of Staff or Office of the 
Secretary of Defense planning processes� It 
is hoped that emerging evidence can permit 
future historians to illuminate fully these 
uncertainties regarding a top mission of the 
submarine service of the U�S� Navy—often 
called the “silent service,” or sometimes 
the “service within a service�” The author 
is indebted to Rear Adm� Thomas Brooks, 
USN (Ret�), and Capt� Peter Swartz, USN 
(Ret�), for enlightening e-mail exchanges 
(conducted January–March 2019) on these 
matters, reflecting their own hands-on ex-
perience� Of course, they are not responsible 
for the author’s interpretations�
 42� Although the Navy’s critics might argue 
otherwise, there is nothing illegitimate about 
seeking to bolster alliance solidarity, nor 
about answering the demands of inside-the-
Pentagon policy processes� The point here is 
that a faulty version of the anti-SLOC threat 
was being used�
 43� Note that this says nothing about a “Battle 
of the Norwegian Sea” pitting NATO sea 
power in support of the Northern Flank 
against Soviet sea-denial forces, nor a similar 
“Battle for Denmark and the Danish Straits�” 
As observed in note 11, the 1979 NIE saw 
the initial Soviet threat to Norway as be-
ing limited to Finnmark, while later NIEs 
revised upward the scale of Soviet intentions 
and commitment of forces against Norway� 
Addressing Denmark, an NIE of 1981 (NIE 
11-14-81, p� 26) concluded that Jutland would 
be threatened from the south by Warsaw Pact 
ground forces thrusting westward toward 
Hamburg and the Channel ports—the critical 
terminals for the Atlantic SLOCs�
 44� The NIEs of 1974 and 1982 on the Soviet 
navy both indicated that the Soviets might 
send submarines into the Atlantic in hopes 
of finding and attacking American SSBNs, 
particularly as they entered or exited their 
home ports� And indeed, Soviet writers 
always emphasized the high desirability of 
preventing American SSBNs from launching 
their missiles� But, as noted, the Soviets were 
well aware of the acoustic disadvantage their 
submarines faced� At the least, it is uncertain 
that they would have committed important 
submarine assets to a mission they seemed 
unlikely to be able to execute�
 45� The exception is the ship type designated 
CVS, a carrier configured for ASW, which 
saw duty mainly in the North Atlantic, in the 
1960s and ’70s�
 46� Interview with Rear Admiral Shapiro, 8 
January 2000, in Ford and Rosenberg,  
“The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings  
of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy,” p� 402 and 
note 128�
 47� John Lehman, introduction to Oceans  
Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea (New 
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York: W� W� Norton, 2018)� Mr� Lehman also 
raises the possibility (p� 273) that the Soviet 
SSBN-protection zone might grow southward 
over time and so pose a threat to NATO SLOCs�
 48� James McConnell, citing Soviet spokesmen, 
in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, ed� Dismukes and 
McConnell, p� 6�
 49� Attention is confined to plans for the employ-
ment of forces currently in operation or 
entering service in due course� Acquisition of 
new forces or capabilities is not addressed�
 50� Although the focus is on the Cold War, the 
aim of this article—returning to primal 
strategic principles—dictates that attention 
also encompass earlier eras� To do otherwise 
would mean excluding from consideration 
such historic strategic-employment concepts 
as the fleet in being, which dates from the late 
eighteenth century� See, for example, John 
B� Hattendorf, “The Idea of a ‘Fleet in Being’ 
in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College 
Review 67, no� 1 (Winter 2014), pp� 43–60� 
Another example is economic blockade� For 
a magisterial treatment, see Geoffrey Till, 
Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 4th ed� (London: Routledge, 2018), pp� 
241, 375–83�
 51� North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Brussels 
Summit Declaration,” press release (2018) 074, 
11 July 2018, www�nato�int/� This release states 
that a to-be-established “Joint Force Com- 
mand [in] Norfolk [will] focus on protecting 
the transatlantic lines of communication�” Ear- 
lier announcements had stated that the Nor- 
folk command was being “created to help track 
submarines and protect shipping lanes across 
the ocean�” Aaron Mehta, “US, Germany Likely 
Home to New NATO Commands,” Defense 
News, 14 February 2018, www�defensenews 
�com/� The author thanks Capt� Peter Swartz, 
USN (Ret�), for these citations�
 52� Recent characterizations of strategic  
requirements in the North Atlantic have 
implied that Russia intends to attack the sea-
lanes� Regarding the major Northern Flank 
exercise TRIDENT JUNCTION in October– 
November 2018, Adm� James Stavridis, USN, 
stated beforehand that “there will be a U�S� 
Carrier Strike Group � � � operating in the  
� � � waters of the Greenland–Iceland–United 
Kingdom ‘gap,’ the body of water that NATO 
would have to control to cut off Russian naval 
forces in the event of a war�” James Stavridis 
[Adm�, USN (Ret�)], “NATO Is in the Middle 
of an Expensive and Dangerous Military 
Exercise� Here’s Why Those War Games Are 
Worth It,” Time, 29 October 2018, p� 1, avail-
able at time�com/� Former CNO Adm� Gary 
Roughead has indicated that “[t]he reactiva-
tion of the U�S� Second Fleet on August 24, 
2018, is a prudent and timely recognition 
of again having to deal with an increasingly 
capable and assertive near-peer Russian navy 
in the operational space of the Atlantic Ocean 
and its critical sea-lanes linking the United 
States to its NATO allies�” Gary Roughead 
[Adm�, USN (Ret�)], “The Trident Returns: 
Reactivating the U�S� Second Fleet and 
Revitalizing Anti-submarine Warfare in the 
Atlantic,” Center for Strategic and Internation-
al Studies, 26 October 2018, csis�org/�
 53� Beyond this history, the logic of the strategic 
situation also militates against a Russian deci-
sion to attack at sea� The most likely scenario 
for a NATO-Russia war—an article 5 defense 
of a NATO Baltic member—means Russia 
would enjoy local military superiority on the 
ground and would have no reason to expand 
the war to the sea, where it is inferior to its 
adversaries�
 54� It seems improbable that the Navy could keep 
two sets of strategic “books,” an internal, 
private one reflecting a valid understanding 
of the threat Russia posed and a public affairs 
version in which that threat is exaggerated�
 55� It is a given that if the United States and its 
allies were to let their capabilities to control 
the waters of the North Atlantic atrophy, they 
might indeed be inviting attack� That does 
not mean, however, that the Russians are 
otherwise poised to pose such a threat�
 56� This is a crucial assumption� The specific 
degree of Russian dependence on use of 
the sea for international and internal (e�g�, 
the Northern Sea Route) commerce needs 
to be established through careful analysis� 
Blockade was rarely, if at all, mentioned in 
Navy expressions of strategic purpose during 
and after the Cold War and essentially has 
been ignored in the post–post–Cold War 
years� Access via the sea by the United States 
to the world’s raw materials and trade is one 
of the objects of overcoming an opponent’s 
antiaccess/area-denial defenses� But the idea 
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of preventing another nation from engaging 
in such commercial activities did not appear 
in any of the seven documents that Tangredi 
recently reviewed as expressions of current 
Navy strategic thinking� Sam J� Tangredi, 
“Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U�S� 
Navy Strategic Vision in 2019,” Naval War 
College Review 72, no� 2 (Spring 2019), pp� 
129–65� Till notes that both the attacking and 
defense of merchant shipping have disap-
peared from the planning of most other 
nations as well� Till, Seapower, p� 245�
 57� This characterization is based on a broad 
reading of relative capabilities� To the au-
thor, the advantage in numbers and quality 
of the West’s globally mobile forces versus 
those of Russia (or China) seems evident 
today and likely to grow as U�S� building 
programs bear fruit and NATO defense 
budgets increase� Of course, this matter also 
would need careful analysis� For elabora-
tion on the blockade concept, see Bradford 
Dismukes, “Global Blockade vs� Russia,” 17 
April 2020, and “Global Blockade vs� China,” 
18 April 2020, both Clio’s Musings: History 
and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), 
cliosmusings�blog/�
 58� Russia’s new LNG carriers are part of a  
multibillion-ruble program to exploit the 
nation’s vast reserves of natural gas� Key 
elements of the program are the Yamal LNG 
project in the Arctic and the Sakhalin II LNG 
project in the Pacific� Andrew E� Kramer, 
“Polar Thaw Opens Shortcut for Russian 
Natural Gas,” New York Times, 24 July 2013, 
p� 1; Henry Foy, “Russia Ships First Gas from 
$27bn Arctic Project,” Financial Times, 8 
December 2017, available at ft�com/�
 59� Most assessments of the ability of NATO 
ground forces to come through the Suwałki 
gap to aid a threatened Baltic member 
are fairly unfavorable� See Nikolai Sukov, 
“How NATO Could Solve the Suwalki Gap 
Challenge,” National Interest, 1 May 2019� 
Bringing NATO sea power to bear through a 
counterthreat of blockade would make use of 
forces that already exist�
 60� Note that a blockade would threaten neither 
Russian territory nor the regime, and thus 
the approach is in keeping with NATO’s 
self-definition as a defensive alliance� It 
would not be a substitute for action ashore 
but instead would be its asymmetrical 
complement—showing that NATO is an 
alliance of navies as much as of armies and 
land-based air�
 61� An ideal capability for this and later phases 
of conflict would be a propulsion-disabling 
(PD) weapon, a small torpedo-like device that 
would deprive a ship of its mobility without 
sinking it or causing significant casualties� A 
brief outline of the PD concept can be found 
in the author’s “Propulsion Disablers: Op-
portunity and Threat,” Clio’s Musings: History 
and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), 16 
April 2020, cliosmusings�blog/� PDs are likely 
to have even more appeal to our adversaries, 
and when they appear they will pose a major 
threat to U�S� and other Western surface ships�
 62� “China’s Economy Might Be Nearly a  
Seventh Smaller Than Reported,” The  
Economist, 7 March 2019, economist�com/; 
“China’s Top Commodity Imports & Exports,” 
Commodity�com�
 63� Hattendorf and Swartz, U.S. Naval Strategy in 
the 1980s.
 64� Jeffrey Barker (remarks delivered at a forum 
entitled “The Arctic and U�S� National 
Security,” Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 4 
December 2018)� Mr� Barker is deputy branch 
head for policy and posture in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations (Op 515B)� 
The forum was streamed in real time, and 
the record is available from the center as a 
webcast� Mr� Barker’s remarks were not a 
part of his prepared presentation� In part 1 
of the webcast, starting at 2:09:39, during a 
Q&A, Mr� Barker observed that the purpose 
of bastion denial was “[s]o that the Russians 
don’t have bastions to operate from defend-
ing the homeland�” And “what we [the Navy] 
are doing [strategic ASW] aligns with the 
National Security Strategy�” First reported by 
Richard R� Burgess, “Navy Must Be Agile but 
Sustainable,” Seapower, 4 December 2018, 
seapowermagazine�org/� It is not known how 
authoritative Mr� Barker’s remarks were; 
presumably they reflected the thinking of 
officials in at least some parts of the Navy� 
Strategic ASW apparently has an enduring at-
tractiveness� In 2019, it was advanced as wor-
thy of “careful consideration” by the United 
States and NATO allies, along with a number 
of other “principles” guiding strategy in the 
North Atlantic in the twenty-first century� 
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Magnus Nordenmann, The New Battle for 
the Atlantic (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2019), p� 201� The book’s contents—in-
cluding the reference to strategic ASW—were 
quoted extensively in subsequent online 
commentary by Adm� James G� Foggo, USN, 
at the time Commander in Chief, U�S� Naval 
Forces Europe / Naval Forces Africa and 
Commander, Allied Joint Force Command 
Naples� James G� Foggo, “The Fourth Battle 
of the Atlantic, the Nordics, and the Direct 
Defense Challenge,” Second Line of Defense, 
17 August 2019, SLDinfo�com/�
 65� For a brief assessment of the mission today, 
see the author’s “Strategic ASW in 2020—a 
Stunningly Bad Idea,” Clio’s Musings: History 
and 21st Century US Naval Strategy (blog), 17 
February 2020, cliosmusings�blog/�
 66� As observed in note 41, during the Cold 
War it was not clear whether or how this was 
done� It does not seem desirable that deci-
sions regarding a matter of this gravity to the 
nation should be made by one of the military 
services�
 67� Official explanations of the need for such 
exercises include quite plausible strategic 
objectives, such as protecting shipping lanes 
(seldom absent, as has been seen, when the 
Navy speaks of its strategic purposes) and 
the American exclusive economic zone in the 
Arctic� ASW, the mission of greatest interest 
to the Russians, is not mentioned� “ICEX 
2018 Briefing Book,” 8 March 2018, pp� 1–12, 
available at navylive�dodlive�mil/�
 68� The inventory of sixty-plus of the world’s 
quietest nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) 
comprises a fleet in being that seems guaran-
teed to keep the Russian navy in a defensive 
posture, whether or not U�S� SSNs execute 
the strategic ASW mission� (For elaboration 
on the possible contemporary meanings of a 
fleet in being, see the author’s “Fleet in Being: 
The 17th Century Calls Out to the 21st,”  
Clio’s Musings: History and 21st Century  
US Naval Strategy [blog], 6 February 2020,  
cliosmusings�blog/�) Whether, when, and how 
to exploit this undersea advantage on behalf 
of cooperative, as well as competitive, engage-
ment with Russia should be the subject of 
further analysis� For a creative example in this 
regard, see Vince Manzo, Nuclear Arms Con-
trol without a Treaty? Risks and Options after 
New START, IRM2019-U-019494 (Arlington, 
VA: CNA, March 2019)�
 69� Polmar, “Why 2000 or Even 400 Submarines,” 
provides a plausible listing� More recently, see 
Brian Hayes [Lt�, USNR], “Naval Intelligence, 
the CIA, and the Soviet-Russian Threat: The 
Cold War and Beyond,” U.S. Naval Institute 
(blog), 5 July 2019, blog�usni�org/� Hayes adds 
explanations at the psychological level of hu-
man perception�
 70� Richard K� Betts, “Analysis, War and Deci-
sion: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevi-
table,” World Politics 31, no� 1 (October 1978), 
pp� 61–89� According to Betts (e-mail to au-
thor, 14 September 2019), the definitive treat-
ment is his Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge 
and Power in National Security (New York: 
Columbia Univ� Press, 2007), chap� 2�
 71� Although this process has occurred countless 
times in the past and remains a staple of 
planning today, to the author’s knowledge 
little attention appears to have gone into 
systematizing it� It might be useful to survey, 
say, a dozen senior directors of recent force-
structure studies to learn what commonali-
ties and differences have marked the way in 
which study terms of reference have handled 
hedging at the intelligence-planning nexus� 
During the Cold War, as noted, this problem 
never arose—for the worst reasons� 
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Naval War College Review, Summer 2020, Vol. 73, No. 3
 As the Trump administration assumed the reins of power in 2017 with the promise of a maritime revival, it took command of a USN surface fleet pri-
marily consisting of vessels designed during the Cold War� This fact is not sur-
prising, since ships’ life cycles can span many decades� The leadership of the Navy 
believes, perhaps rightly, that its Cold War–era surface fleet may be ill equipped 
to deal with myriad future threats on the high seas over the rest of a century that 
will be marked by near-peer competition� The new century promises a range of 
new hardware and technologies combining with different maritime strategies, 
operations, and tactics that could challenge U�S� primacy on the world’s oceans� 
For example, both China and Russia actively are pursuing maritime strategies 
involving the extensive use of land-based precision-strike complexes that feature 
long-range, accurate munitions and a new generation of digital sensors� China 
in particular has developed a new suite of “gray-zone” tactics that seek to test the 
limits of how states apply force on the high seas� These different strategies and 
tactics are integrating new weapons and technolo-
gies, ranging across accurate, long-range missiles 
launched from land, sea, and air; emerging cyber 
capabilities that potentially can disable critical 
parts of naval ships; small-boat swarms that can 
complicate countermeasures and targeting; and 
new systems yet to be fielded that integrate artificial 
intelligence, robotics, and modern manufacturing 
processes such as three-dimensional printing� 
65
Naval War College: Summer 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
As Admiral John M� Richardson emphasized repeatedly when he was U�S� 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Navy believes it may be falling behind its 
opponents at sea� Underlying Richardson’s disquiet was the assumption that time 
and fate are not necessarily on the Navy’s side—a view that American political 
leaders echoed consistently� After nearly two decades of antijihadist campaigns, 
there is a belief that in the digital age adversaries are adapting more quickly than 
the U�S� Navy, so it needs to innovate now—and fast—to keep pace with, let alone 
preserve any advantage over, its rivals� Richardson clearly believed that the Navy 
is entering a new adapt-react cycle with adversaries such as Russia and China, 
which informed his call for a twenty-first-century fleet redesign�1 The new cycle 
coincides with a shift in U�S� security strategy away from irregular warfare and 
terrorism back to the geopolitical competition reminiscent of earlier eras�2 
Admiral Richardson’s call for a reinvigorated fleet would not mean much 
without high-level political support, especially in Congress� Perhaps not coin-
cidentally, a number of recent studies (some of which the Navy funded) have 
recommended that the Navy increase the size of its surface fleet�3 Perhaps more 
importantly, there appears to be strong political support in Congress for the idea 
that the Navy should get bigger�4 Thus, at least three important sources of energy 
are in place with which to revitalize a twenty-first-century fleet: (1) a general 
recognition that adversaries are adapting quickly to challenge the United States 
on the high seas; (2) internal Navy emphasis on overhauling and expanding the 
fleet; and (3) political support to make available the funds necessary to pay for 
it� Even three such ingredients, however, do not ensure the success of the kind of 
naval revival the U�S� Navy has made previously at various points in its history� 
Most importantly, the Navy needs programs that will take a redesigned twenty-
first-century fleet from the drawing board to the production line�5 
As the Navy stands on the threshold of the largest naval buildup since the hal-
cyon John Lehman days in the Reagan administration, the irony of this situation 
is painfully apparent� Just as a consensus has emerged among stakeholders in the 
Department of Defense, the White House, and Congress that the Navy needs to 
increase its fleet from 308 to 355 ships, the Navy must address serious shortcom-
ings in its capacity to conceive, develop, and build ships fit for battle�6 Recent 
programs such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), the Zumwalt-class guided- 
missile destroyer, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier all have highlighted the 
Navy’s failure to produce innovative, affordable ships in the quantity and of the 
quality needed to configure a larger, redesigned fleet� Unless the Navy can address 
mistakes made in these programs it will have difficulty innovating as Richardson 
has suggested—with potentially disastrous consequences� This article argues 
that the Navy needs to examine critically its largely failed attempts at innovation 
during the post-1990s era if it is to meet its twenty-first-century challenges� 
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The article particularly focuses on the naval innovation cycle of the modern era, 
an era that flowed from the 1990s� This period featured the so-called revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) and the absence of near-peer competitors on the high seas 
in the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War� Despite massive investments and the water-
fall of 1990s digital technologies, most observers would agree that the Navy has 
not been successful at generalizing innovations into a new fleet design� Attempts to 
introduce three important ship classes (the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and 
the Ford-class carrier) have been nothing short of disastrous� The Navy intended 
that these ships would be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet, but each 
ship class foundered, for a variety of reasons� The Navy gave up on purchasing its 
planned complement of LCSs and now is planning on decommissioning the first 
four ships in the class a decade early (opting for a new frigate instead); it stopped 
construction altogether on the Zumwalt-class destroyer; and the Ford-class carrier 
program remains mired in technical problems, schedule delays, and cost overruns� 
This article addresses the U�S� Navy’s initial attempt to assemble a twenty-
first-century fleet� Starting, as it did, with the world’s largest and most combat-
effective navy, the United States, in its efforts to design, build, and field a fleet, 
provides the world’s best case study by which to examine the intersection of 
innovation, maritime strategy, and fleet design�7 The article nests the ongoing 
efforts to assemble a twenty-first-century fleet within cycles of naval innovation 
and maritime strategy over a period that, for purposes of this analysis, began in 
the 1880s and extends to the present� 
This article explores the reasons why the post-1990s innovation cycle failed 
to move the Navy successfully in the direction for which Admiral Richard-
son advocated� Identifying and addressing the causes of failure in the latest 
innovation cycle are critical if the Navy hopes to design and build a twenty-
first-century fleet successfully� If the problems of the post-1990s innovation 
cycle are not resolved the same mistakes likely will be repeated, catapulting 
the U�S� Navy into a dark future amid great-power competition; the Navy will 
be designing the future fleet continuously even as the present fleet continues 
its slow, expensive erosion� The result will be a future fleet design that remains 
an alluring, but ultimately a cursed, chimera—always offering a promise that 
cannot be realized, because of the array of impediments identified in this 
article� 
INNOVATION CYCLES—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Admiral Richardson’s call to focus on the future fleet is not new, but rather is a 
time-honored tradition for all militaries seeking to position themselves favorably 
to meet future strategic uncertainties� The Navy envisioned a redesigned twenty-
first-century fleet long before Richardson arrived on the scene� Ideas derived 
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in the 1990s called for development of a host of innovative platforms stuffed full 
of new technologies and advanced capabilities that were to form the basis of the 
twenty-first-century fleet� 
This article does not argue that the Navy has not introduced new operational 
concepts or integrated new, innovative capabilities into the fleet since the 1990s—
far from it� The Navy has digitized the existing fleet, adding new radars, sensors, 
communications equipment, and weapons to its existing ships, all of which have 
improved operational awareness and given crews afloat, as well as in the air, 
more-accurate, longer-range missiles to strike targets ashore and at sea� Looking 
to the future, it currently is experimenting with new operational concepts such as 
distributed maritime operations; launching programs to explore the possibilities 
that remotely piloted vessels offer; and introducing an array of new, digital-age 
technologies into the fleet that are meant to help win the next war on the high 
seas� Be that as it may, it still is hard to argue that the post-1990s innovation cycle 
has delivered fully on its promise of a twenty-first-century fleet design that looks 
dramatically different from that of the Cold War era� 
One can argue that there have been three major cycles of naval innovation, 
spanning the late nineteenth, the twentieth, and now the twenty-first centuries� 
These cycles had many characteristics in common: continuous and iterative 
changes to organizational structures to accommodate new equipment and new 
operational concepts; the integration of new technologies to improve capabilities; 
different platforms and new weapons; and the operational concepts behind these 
systems, which in turn drove manning and training so as to integrate all the above 
into an effective operational force� 
The glue binding these cycles together was the myriad organizations capable 
of generalizing the ideas and producing them in repeatable form—bureaucracies 
that successfully managed, and even directed, the innovation cycles�8 Indeed, a 
characteristic of the support bureaucracy is that it also changed during the in-
novation cycles, becoming ever more task specialized so it could manage the 
increasingly complex systems being fielded during the twentieth century� This 
task specialization has produced its own unintended consequences, as will be 
discussed later� 
The first cycle saw the rise of the new Navy in the 1880s, with a transition to 
the big-gun dreadnought and the airplane and aircraft carriers of World War II—a 
fifty-year endeavor� The second cycle extended through the end of the Cold War, 
featuring nuclear weapons and reactors, radars and other electronics, and long-
range missiles—a forty-year effort� Today we are in the midst of the third cycle, 
which began in the early 1990s under the rubric of the RMA�9 Defining these 
cycles as discrete, definable phenomena is a bit of scholarly artifice, since all the 
cycles overlapped in detail and were related to one another even as the geostrategic 
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circumstances surrounding the cycles shifted over time� For example, the field-
ing of the Aegis guided-missile cruisers in the 1980s represented a continuation 
of efforts to equip carrier battle groups with air-defense systems that could hit 
targets with greater accuracy and at far greater ranges in the face of Soviet tactics 
than initially had been the case when carrier battle groups were conceived during 
World War II� Another factor binding the cycles is the inherent nature of fleets 
themselves; they are composed of surface ships, submarines, and airplanes as the 
principal platforms� In the case of ships, their life cycles, stretching over many de-
cades, ensured that ships built to battle the Soviet fleet on the high seas continued 
patrolling the world’s oceans in the post–Cold War era; therefore, they performed 
a variety of different missions created by a new strategic environment, one of 
post-1991 strategic dominance and of post-2001 strikes against jihadi insurgents� 
Nonetheless, segregating these distinctive eras is useful for illustrative purposes 
to address the phenomenon of designing a twenty-first-century fleet—an activity 
that itself resulted from twentieth-century innovation cycles�10 
It is no coincidence that these three innovation cycles correspond to different 
eras of maritime strategy: the period of naval rivalry in the imperial age that began 
in the late nineteenth century and extended through the end of World War II; the 
Cold War, which pitted the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union on 
the high seas; and the post-1990 era that, until recently, saw the United States in 
its celebrated unipolar moment� During the 1990s, for example, the Cold War–era 
carrier battle group gradually was abandoned and carriers often operated essen-
tially independently, since such vessels faced no real threats on or under the water 
or from the skies� That has changed in the twenty-first century as states such as 
North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia aggressively have developed precision-strike 
complexes with land-based sensors and long-range ballistic missiles�11 A conclu-
sion of this article is that the conceptual drift in maritime strategy in the third 
cycle profoundly shaped the Navy’s initial attempts to design and build a twenty-
first-century fleet� 
Each of these innovation cycles introduced new capabilities and operating con-
cepts into the fleet� It is easy to forget, however, that each of the cycles was fueled 
by one important common denominator: money, as an expression of policy and 
legislative will� Without money, none of the innovation cycles could have been 
brought to fruition—another timeless truism, which speaks to enduring realities 
about how defense and arms work in American politics and the record of the U�S� 
Navy in modern history� A regrettable and potentially devastating feature of the 
modern era’s innovation cycle is a cost growth of ships, aircraft, and projectiles 
that is unsustainable, even given a U�S� defense budget that in 2018 was almost 
larger than the defense expenditures of the rest of the world combined� In addi-
tion to programmatic ship-construction problems, significant cost growth has 
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characterized virtually every major procurement program the Navy has under-
taken in the period� In short, the post–Cold War innovation cycle ran aground in 
the minefield of unacceptably high costs—even in a time when the defense budget 
topped $700 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2018�12 
The exemplar of this phenomenon is the $406 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
program, currently estimated to be the most expensive weapons program in 
American history�13 Regrettably, the experience of the F-35 has proved emblematic 
for the Navy’s twenty-first-century fleet-design aspirations� The cost growth of 
air and sea platforms initially conceived in the 1990s has all but ensured that the 
Navy will be unable to field large numbers of the new Ford-class aircraft carriers, 
San Antonio–class amphibious transport dock LPD-17 ships, and Virginia- and 
Columbia-class submarines—all of which, like the LCS and DDX, were intended 
to be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet� The Navy’s newly conceived 
FFG(X) guided-missile frigate is anticipated to cost nearly one billion dollars per 
vessel�14 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Navy would need 
an increase in its shipbuilding budget averaging 60 percent annually for the next 
thirty years to reach its desired end state of a fleet of 355 ships between 2035 and 
2047—which is significantly more than Congress has appropriated for shipbuild-
ing at any time over the last thirty years�15 An undeniable feature of the post–Cold 
War innovation cycle is that the Navy is pricing itself out of business with under-
funded shipbuilding plans—at a time when Russia and China are expanding the 
sizes of their respective fleets�16 
THE STRATEGY-INNOVATION NEXUS 
A purposeful adapt-react interaction between and among rivals drove the inno-
vation cycles of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the Navy sought 
to lead its allies and keep ahead of its enemies� Cycles of action and reaction be-
tween adversaries are not new; indeed, they are a timeless feature of international 
politics� Early international relations theorists of the realist school noted that 
states seek armaments both to defend themselves and because they see them as 
a way to influence friends and adversaries�17 Like land and air forces, the navies 
of developed states inherently are nested within this larger phenomenon� Navy 
fleets historically have been deemed a vital, even a foundational, part of national 
power�18 This underlying tension of international politics produces a timeless rule 
applicable to these interactions: as nations arm themselves, they create insecurity 
in both friends and rivals, who then feel compelled to take corresponding actions, 
resulting in arms races�19 
Innovation by antagonists in arms races is a central feature of the phenom-
enon, as each participant strives to counter the capabilities of the other�20 Navies 
around the world went through such an adapt-react cycle in the dreadnought era� 
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It happened again in the aircraft carrier era in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury—a cycle in which the U�S� Navy undeniably came out on top of its enemies�21 
Importantly, these two adapt-react cycles occurred during an era (approximately 
1880–1990) in which strong navies were thought of as synonymous with national 
power� 
The experiences of World War II confirmed already-held beliefs about the 
importance of strong navies as instruments of national power and the strong 
influence that arms races had on the nature of the forces fielded on the high seas� 
During World War II, two types of maritime conflict unfolded, both of which 
were central to the Allied victory� In the Battle of the Atlantic, navies served in 
a more purely maritime role, in a context in which control over the seas enabled 
the application of force on land�22 Allied navies successfully overcame the U-boat 
challenge, moved the Army (and the Army Air Forces) across the Atlantic to 
Great Britain (as well as supplies to the Soviet Union and across the Mediterra-
nean to North Africa), and then managed to deliver the Army across the channel 
into Europe� In the Pacific theater, navies sailed close to shorelines to land troops 
and deliver fire directly onto the enemy, and they engaged in naval combat at sea 
among surface ships, as naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan had suggested they 
would�23 The Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 was the largest sea battle in his-
tory, and it came on the heels of significant sea-based battles in the Coral Sea, at 
Midway, and elsewhere that have gained prominent places in the historical annals 
of the war in the Pacific� In both theaters, Atlantic and Pacific, navies correctly 
were seen as instrumental to the Allies’ ultimate victory in the greatest maritime 
campaign in history�24 
After World War II, the Cold War featured its own adapt-react cycle, in which 
the United States and its allies on one side and Soviet-bloc countries on the other 
moved through various attempts to gain and maintain the upper hand� As an ex-
ample of the cycle, the Soviet submarine buildup during the Cold War spurred the 
U�S� Navy to develop a formidable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability that 
incorporated ships, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, and a fixed sonar network 
on the ocean floor, not to mention several classes of nuclear attack submarines�25 
For both adversaries, a host of innovations appeared during the cycle� In the Cold 
War, the United States developed shipborne missile-launch systems (including 
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at sea), in combination with radar, both to 
defend the fleet from new generations of Soviet aircraft and missiles and to attack 
targets at long range with sea-launched cruise missiles�26 Perhaps most significantly, 
the Navy deployed strategic nuclear missiles on submarines, stabilizing nuclear 
deterrence and the balance of terror� Importantly, these arms-race and innovation 
cycles depended on the ability of large institutions to produce generalizable innova-
tion—new capabilities that were introduced into the fleet on a widespread basis� 
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During the Cold War, the U�S� Navy’s missions expanded to focus on deterrence 
and supporting overseas military operations in Korea and Vietnam� In addition 
to these missions it fulfilled and interactions it had with adversaries, interservice 
rivalries represented another shaping factor in the Cold War innovation cycle� 
While the newly created Air Force received principal responsibility for deliver-
ing the strategic nuclear deterrent, the Navy decisively clawed back an important 
part of that mission through the Polaris and later the Trident submarine ballistic-
missile programs, beginning in the early 1960s�27 In this period, the Navy served 
as an important instrument of U�S� national power exercised under the strategy 
of containment� During the Cold War, the Navy operated at sea on a continuous 
and global basis, which established a concept of operations that continues to this 
day� In the 1980s, Navy Secretary John F� Lehman Jr� famously conceived of the 
Maritime Strategy to give the Navy an offensive strategic role in a potential war 
with the Soviet Union� The Maritime Strategy sought to take the war to the Kola 
Peninsula and the Soviet Pacific bases, to secure NATO’s northern flank in Scan-
dinavia and secure Japan, and to bottle up the Soviet navy with its submarine fleet 
in its northern bastions�28 Lehman’s concept simply repackaged a version of the 
Navy’s maritime contributions during the Pacific War, updating them by applying 
the same ideas to a European war with the Soviet Union� 
As had been the case in the era prior to and during World War II, Cold War 
assessments of adversary capabilities drove the Navy’s innovation efforts, with 
the bureaucracy operationalizing them into weapon-system requirements� Those 
assessments called for continuous iterative improvements in weapons, operating 
platforms, and operating concepts that were focused principally on defeating the 
adversary, both via direct confrontation at sea and by applying maritime power 
to support a land war� Despite civil-military tension and legislative rancor, the 
Defense Department bureaucracy operationalized these requirements success-
fully, for the most part, which ensured that Navy ships were equipped with newer, 
better radars; more-accurate, longer-range missiles; successively better jet aircraft; 
shipborne helicopters; and, for submarines, the capability to stay submerged for 
longer periods, resulting in greater stealth�29 With the support of Congress, the 
Navy procured, fielded, and—importantly—generalized throughout the fleet 
weapons, platforms, and technologies that were new, improved, or both� This 
description is not intended to romanticize a bygone era in any way; its intent 
simply is to emphasize that the bureaucracy successfully operationalized change, 
adaptation, and innovation that were linked to strategy, in the form of programs 
that delivered systems to the fleet� 
However, the strategy-innovation nexus that had functioned with a certain 
logic during the first two cycles entered a new period in the post-1990 era, with 
important consequences for the processes that had worked successfully in the first 
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two cycles� Following the first Gulf War in 1991 and a brief period of a “peace divi-
dend,” the Defense Department and its allies in Congress and industry success-
fully fought off attempts to reduce dramatically the defense budget and the size 
of the military departments� New planning and operational scenarios emerged in 
response to threats from “rogue states” such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; this 
preserved force structures, missions, budgets, and programs� Attention focused 
particularly on such threats as the proliferation of chemical and biological weap-
ons as well as long-range missiles—threats that came not from near-peer competi-
tors but from weak states that chafed under a U�S�-led global order� As the 1990s 
progressed, the Defense Department moved away from specific war planning and 
eventually divorced the development of new weapons and operating concepts 
from those our enemies were developing� Instead, “capabilities portfolios” were 
emphasized, with risk trade-offs between the portfolios, to guide decision-making 
on what to develop and buy�30 This way of planning provided civilian decision 
makers with tools with which to evaluate the military departments’ choices on 
how to spend their money�31 
BUREAUCRACY AND INNOVATION 
To be successful, all innovation cycles in any military organization depend on 
bureaucracy—an organizational structure created to produce repeatable and 
predictable outputs, among other purposes� Bureaucracy has a well-deserved 
reputation for being resistant to change; in fact, it could be argued that bu-
reaucracy is designed to prevent change� For military organizations, repeatable 
output is a foundation of military effectiveness� Military organizations therefore 
are reluctant to abandon output, in the form of a practice in the field that has 
proved its worth� Conversely, however, it is equally the case that bureaucracy is 
instrumental to the process of change and innovation in military institutions� The 
tension between accepted practice and change sits at the heart of all questions of 
military innovation� 
A truism for all modern militaries is that bureaucracy effectively functions as a 
translation agent in the innovation process; it takes the ideas for change, then devel-
ops a kind of source code that allows each idea to be generalized in the ways initially 
envisioned� It falls to bureaucracy to manage the process of innovation and change� 
The bureaucracy’s source code for innovation comes in the form of research-and-
development (R&D) programs that mature into weapons-procurement programs 
and fielded systems, or as guidance that can change operational practice� To be 
completely successful, however, innovation cycles must reach the point of general-
izability, so the change can be adopted on an affordable, organization-wide basis� 
For all military organizations, including navies, the idea of generalizability is 
arguably the critical feature of efforts to innovate and produce new systems, new 
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operational routines, or both�32 As noted in the previous sections, during the 
Cold War the Navy successfully fielded new systems, built new organizations, 
and implemented new operational praxes� Many factors spurred the successful 
innovation cycle; one was a leadership that saw the potential of new systems, such 
as the nuclear-powered reactor for submarine propulsion, sea-launched ballistic 
and cruise missiles, radars capable of tracking multiple targets simultaneously, and 
missile-defense launch systems integrated on ships� These successful innovations 
also flowed from assessments of adversary capability, internal advocates within the 
organization who sought to develop a new theory of victory, a changing strategic 
environment that translated into a demand for new missions and capabilities, 
and interservice rivalries—whose existence is never to be gainsaid—that spurred 
organizations to propose new ideas and systems to preserve their missions and 
budgets�33 
Also worth noting is that during the Cold War the strategic and operational 
tasks facing the Navy and its force structure were relatively consistent with the uses 
of naval forces that had evolved over the course of the twentieth century� When 
the Soviet Union dissolved, however, the U�S� Navy found itself without a competi-
tor on the high seas� In the 1990s, the Navy realized it had to think about what it 
wanted its fleet to look like in the twenty-first century—a future that it would have 
to conceive of well before it could field a new fleet to operate in it� 
So during the ’90s the Navy began to plan to field a twenty-first-century 
fleet—for us today, the fleet of the present� In the ’90s the Navy envisioned a 
twenty-first-century fleet that would push the boundaries of its previous ship 
designs and incorporate a host of new capabilities enabled by the digital revolu-
tion� The Navy clearly wanted a twenty-first-century fleet that would incorporate 
the newest, most advanced technologies and operational concepts, which would 
preserve its leadership position well into the future� The digital revolution of 
the 1990s offered the Navy smaller, faster microprocessors that created a new 
generation of sensors and more-accurate, longer-range weapons and better 
intelligence capacities; real-time communications enabled via the Internet; en-
hanced situational awareness that promised to pierce the fog of movements at 
sea; and missile-defense systems to protect ships and shore-based installations� 
The hopefulness of the era of the RMA was not lost on the Navy (or the other 
military departments), which aggressively moved to operationalize its vision� 
Plans for a variety of new ship classes emerged during the period: the LPD-17 San 
Antonio–class amphibious transport dock, the SSN-774 Virginia-class nuclear 
attack submarine, two different variants of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer 
(Flights I and II), the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Ford-class carrier� 
What follows focuses on three of these programs: the LCS, the Zumwalt class, and 
the Ford class� 
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The Twenty-First-Century Fleet: Program “Highlights” 
This section briefly details the history of three ship-construction programs: the 
LCS, the DDX, and the Ford-class CVN� All were products of the 1990s-era in-
novation cycle� 
Both the LCS and DDX grew out of decisions the Navy made in 2001 to reorient 
an R&D program started in 1994 called the SC-21 program (from Surface Com-
batant for the 21st Century)� The SC-21 program itself grew out of studies dating 
to the late 1980s that called for ships that could operate in the Norwegian Sea dur-
ing a potential war with the Soviet Union� The main idea was to develop a robust 
ship capable of attacking targets on land� The 1990s research programs focused 
on a number of vessel options, in sizes ranging up to forty thousand tons� One of 
its most celebrated proposals was the arsenal ship: a thirty-thousand-ton vessel 
stuffed with hundreds of cruise missiles and a vertical launch system� Then-CNO 
Admiral Jeremy M� Boorda championed the concept� Research efforts continued 
throughout the 1990s and up to the 2001 decision to proceed with two programs: 
the LCS and the DDX�34 
The LCS Program. The LCS program began in 2001; initial procurement occurred 
in 2005; yet as of mid-2019, the LCS has not been deployed to the field in support 
of combatant command requirements, owing to persistent technical problems�35 
The Navy intended to use the LCS as a smaller, multimission vessel that could take 
advantage of “plug and play” modules to perform a variety of different missions: 
ASW, mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare against smaller vessels� 
Other relevant missions included maritime-security and maritime-partnering 
operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and support to special operations 
forces� By mid-2018, thirty-five vessels had been procured from a program that 
initially was projected to produce over fifty� The program’s orders were divided 
between two contractors (Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics) that provided 
different hull designs�36 
Virtually every aspect of the LCS has drawn the ire of critics, from both inside 
and outside government: costs grew (from initial estimates of $220 million per 
vessel to $478 million); early versions of the ships suffered from construction 
problems; and development of the modules to support the three mission areas 
(ASW, MCM, and surface warfare) has been plagued by repeated and costly delays� 
In July 2018, the Pentagon’s inspector general stated that the Navy had declared 
the MCM module to be operational without demonstrating that it had fixed the 
known problems with it�37 The Navy subsequently abandoned the idea of swap-
ping out the mission modules and instead will equip each vessel with just one of 
the modules� Repeatedly the Navy has been forced to delay deployment plans for 
the vessels because of these technical problems� There also are persistent concerns 
about whether the ship is adequately armed—many doubt it can survive in combat� 
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In December 2016, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J� 
Michael Gilmore, told lawmakers that the LCS had not demonstrated “effective 
warfighting capability in any of its originally envisioned missions: surface warfare 
(SUW); mine countermeasures (MCM); anti-submarine warfare (ASW)�”38 
A year earlier, then–Secretary of Defense Ashton B� Carter ordered the Navy 
to reduce its program from fifty-two to forty vessels and to select a single con-
tractor to construct future vessels� Carter acerbically noted in his missive to the 
Navy: “For the last several years, the Department of the Navy has overemphasized 
resources used to incrementally increase total ship numbers at the expense of 
critically-needed investments in areas where our adversaries are not standing 
still, such as strike, ship survivability, electronic warfare, and other capabilities�”39 
Carter’s criticisms followed a similar brouhaha in 2014 in which then–Secretary of 
Defense Charles T� Hagel ordered the Navy to add armament to the LCS� The then 
Senate Armed Services Committee chairman (and former naval aviator) John S� 
McCain III (R-AZ) also was a frequent and scathing critic of the LCS from its earli-
est stages, repeatedly citing “fundamental shortcomings” in the whole program�40 
The program displayed a number of embarrassing technical problems, including 
hull cracks in the ship’s aluminum superstructure and a faulty propulsion system� 
Various vessels had to be towed back to port and, in one case, driven all the way 
across the Pacific Ocean for repairs�41 
In FY19, the Navy decided to stop procurement of the LCS and instead shift to 
procurement of a new frigate in FY20� In December 2019, the Navy announced 
that it proposed to retire the first four ships in the LCS class from service more 
than a decade early to save money�42 Current plans call for the Navy to build twenty 
of the new frigates�43 
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer. The story of the DDG-1000 program 
bears some similarity to that of the LCS—except that in some ways it is worse� The 
Navy initially conceived of the ship as the most technologically advanced ever to 
be built, one that would substitute for several ship classes, including destroyers 
and guided-missile cruisers� It originally was designed to support troops ashore 
with long-range, accurate fires, although since then the Navy has shifted the ship’s 
mission to one focusing on surface-fire support at sea� The first two ships were 
procured in FY06 and FY07� 
But less than three years after launching the program the Navy terminated 
the DDG-1000 program at three ships, proposing instead to purchase more Cold 
War–era DDG-51 Arleigh Burke–class destroyers� The Navy intended the DDG-
1000 to be a stealth ship, with a small-to-nonexistent radar cross section—the Na-
vy’s version of the Air Force’s F-117 stealth fighter� However, instead of becoming 
the basis (along with the LCS) for the twenty-first-century fleet, the DDG-1000 
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effectively became an expensive technology demonstrator platform� The Navy un-
derestimated the costs of the program by 47 percent, seeing its initial $8�9 billion 
per-ship estimate in FY09 grow to $13�1 billion in FY20�44 
The stealth ship was to run as quietly as a submarine; provide greatly improved 
battlespace awareness through new sensors; and deliver precise, long-range fires, 
via advanced, ship-based guns, to support troops ashore� The promise seemed sub-
stantial, boasting a first-of-its-kind integrated power system that would be powered 
by a new electric-drive propulsion system that would feed new, power-dependent, 
directed-energy and laser weapons� The ship’s modular Linux-based computing 
system, with six million lines of software code, was the first onboard computing 
environment with its own Internet system� The advanced gun system was to de-
liver precision, accurate fires with 155 mm long-range, land-attack projectiles at 
shore-based targets over a hundred miles away, drawing on an advanced, integrated 
combat system� The DDG-1000 was to have been supported by a crew of just under 
a hundred, as opposed to the 275 required to operate a Burke-class destroyer; the 
Navy subsequently walked back that initial claim to a crew size of 175�45 
The DDG-1000 reportedly does in fact have the radar cross section of a fishing 
boat� However, almost none of the other promised capabilities has yet been real-
ized, and, like the LCS, the ship has suffered persistent technical problems� 
The Ford-Class Carrier. Perhaps the centerpiece of the twenty-first-century fleet 
developed during the 1990s was a new generation of aircraft carriers, known as 
the Ford class, to replace the aging Nimitz-class fleet that began entering service 
in 1975� While it was based on the Nimitz-class hull, the Ford class sought to in-
corporate a number of important improvements that would enable the ships to 
launch more aircraft sorties (a bigger flight deck, additional electrical power for 
the ship’s systems) while lowering the number of sailors required to operate the 
ship by several hundred, which promised to reduce operating costs� The first ship, 
Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), was commissioned in July 2017 after procurement costs 
of approximately $13 billion� At least four carriers are to be procured; the Navy 
has estimated that the last ship in the class, CVN 81, will cost in excess of $15 bil-
lion� The first three ships in the class have seen their costs grow by an average of 
21 percent over initial estimates� The Navy has exceeded Congress’s cost caps on 
every ship in the program�46 
Three major new systems are being integrated into the Ford class: a new 
aircraft-catapult system called the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a new 
aircraft-arresting system called the Advanced Arresting Gear, and a new radar 
known as dual-band radar� According to the Pentagon’s Office of the Director for 
Operational Test and Evaluation, all three systems have been plagued by schedule 
delays, cost growth, and reliability problems—which calls into question the ship’s 
ability to perform as advertised in combat�47 The office noted the following: 
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Poor or unknown reliability of the newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons 
elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect the ability 
of CVN 78 to generate sorties, make the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create 
limitations during routine operations� The poor or unknown reliability of these criti-
cal subsystems is the most significant risk to CVN 78� Based on current reliability 
estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight 
operations expected during wartime�48 
Frequent Ford-class critic and then–Senate Armed Services Committee chair-
man John McCain characterized the program as “one of the most spectacular 
acquisition debacles in recent memory�”49 
As McCain noted (and the Government Accountability Office echoed), the 
entire twenty-first-century Navy shipbuilding program, as highlighted in the case 
of the Ford class, suffered from a number of easily identifiable maladies:50 
• unrealistic business cases that invariably understated costs and underesti-
mated the difficulties of production that relied on unproven technologies, 
resulting in schedule delays 
• concurrent design and construction, without adequate testing 
• lack of testing (and a reluctance to test) to demonstrate advertised capabilities 
• new systems that were rushed into production despite the fact that they did 
not work 
• a bewildering mix of different organizations that were responsible for differ-
ent parts of the program, which made overall management accountability all 
but impossible51 
Teething pains are to be expected with any new platform or weapon system, 
particularly in the case of complex systems such as surface ships� Each of these 
three programs, however, fell prey to the same maladies that McCain noted� 
In short, the innovation process meant to operationalize these systems came 
unglued� The Navy actually recognized this; it curtailed the DDG-1000 program 
at three ships and canceled the LCS program halfway through its planned produc-
tion run, and the Ford class still faces significant hurdles to deliver on its promise� 
Explaining the Perfect Storm 
The innovation cycle of the 1990s produced these three flawed platforms, which 
represented the Navy’s initial attempt to conceptualize its twenty-first-century 
fleet� In the cases of the DDG-1000 and the LCS in particular, nothing quite 
like these platforms had been attempted ever before� Both represented aggres-
sive efforts at innovation that could have led to new generations of platforms 
that might have started the Navy down the path to its sought-after redesigned 
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twenty-first-century fleet� The Ford class represented more of an adaptation than 
an innovation (although several brand-new systems, such as the electric catapult, 
were introduced)� Suffice it to say, if the Navy had succeeded in generalizing these 
platforms as initially envisioned, Admiral Richardson might not have felt com-
pelled to call for a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet� Identifying what went 
wrong with these programs in this innovation cycle is important if the Navy is 
to avoid repeating the mistakes of this first attempt to reconceptualize its fleet� 
Importantly, a lack of neither money nor political support doomed the pro-
grams; in fact, the situation was quite the opposite� Management within the Navy 
and the Pentagon, supported by their providers in Congress, kept hoping for 
success and threw ever-increasing amounts of money at the problematic systems� 
While it is true that the country and the Defense Department budget increasingly 
became focused on commitments associated with the post-9/11 irregular wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy’s requests for funding for its twenty-first-century 
fleet were met, even as costs ballooned and production delays mounted�52 
Choices made after the 1990s represent only part of the story� Just as important 
were choices not made that could have produced different innovation pathways� 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Navy’s choices were shaped by institutional identity, 
institutional preferences, and intrabureaucratic communities (aviators, surface 
warfare officers, and submariners) that drove investment priorities in the innova-
tion cycle� For example, the attempt to build an invisible ship was not simply a 
matter of coincidence but instead reflected the preferences of the Navy’s power-
ful surface warfare community, which reside at the heart of the Navy’s strategic 
essence� The idea of an invisible/radar-deflecting ship represented an important 
attempt at innovation and appeared attractive for lots of obvious reasons� Such a 
capability certainly would give the United States an edge on the high seas over its 
adversaries, much as the Air Force’s development of its stealth fighter and bomber 
gave it similar advantages� The point here is that this choice of developing a stealth 
ship also was influenced by powerful institutional preferences� 
The preference for a manned aircraft may provide an even better example of 
innovation pathways not chosen�53 The 1990s delivered the era of unmanned 
systems now on display on a daily basis over America’s global battlefields—an in-
novation choice that the U�S� Air Force has embraced� In contrast, commitment 
to the F-35 represented the naval aviation community’s preference for a manned 
platform—which preserved the career track and influence of the community 
within the wider institution� 
Instead of developing a stealth ship, the Navy instead could have chosen to 
develop a stealth drone carrying multiple munitions launched off differently de-
signed ships� Such an investment almost certainly would have posed an engineer-
ing problem that was easier and cheaper to solve than building the stealth ship, the 
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Ford-class carrier, and the F-35� Instead, the Navy’s strike culture and commitment 
to carrier aviation clearly drove its investment strategy in favor of the F-35 aircraft 
and the Ford-class carrier� 
As institutional preferences drove the investment strategy, no outside coun-
tervailing force emerged across the civil-military divide to force a different set of 
choices on the Navy� Just as important, no intraorganizational advocates emerged 
in the period to challenge accepted institutional orthodoxies with a different the-
ory of victory that might have changed the organization’s investment priorities�54 
The point here is not to make a normative argument regarding the relative merits 
of manned versus unmanned systems; it is simply to observe that institutional 
preferences limited debate encompassing alternative theories of victory that could 
have produced different innovation pathways� 
When comparing the post-1990s cycle with those that preceded it, the obvious 
conclusion is that, in the cases of these three systems, the bureaucracy proved itself 
unable to generalize the innovations into executable programs� Bureaucracy could 
not fix the shared programmatic flaw that resulted from the disparity between the 
speed of technological change and that of the Navy’s plodding acquisition system� 
It was clear that systems that in some cases took a decade or more to develop and 
field would find themselves out of date when they arrived in the fleet�55 Program 
managers and their supervisors understandably were reluctant to nail down sys-
tem requirements definitively, preferring instead to develop and build systems 
simultaneously so that, theoretically, the latest technological advances could be 
integrated into their platforms� But at least with regard to these three platforms, 
that approach proved disastrous� 
For its part, industry obliged customer preferences, then demanded ever-
increasing amounts of money to fix the flawed systems� A shrinking shipbuilding 
industrial base contributed to the debacles by limiting competition and alterna-
tives as program schedules slipped and costs mounted�56 For example, Huntington 
Ingalls Industries, headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, is today the only 
shipyard in the United States capable of building aircraft carriers such as the Ford 
class� 
In its quest to generalize the innovation, bureaucracy did adapt successfully to 
the ever-increasing complexity of the envisioned systems� Bureaucracy invariably 
brought about the task specialization within myriad organizations that was nec-
essary to build technical and management expertise in particular programmatic 
areas�57 However, that adaptation did not produce generalizable innovation but 
instead ever-more-complex organizations that complicated program oversight 
and execution� As the ship classes became more complicated technically, program 
responsibilities became diffused across myriad organizations� The creation of dif-
ferent task-specialized organizations created span-of-control problems that made 
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it difficult to synchronize and coordinate different program elements� In each of 
the three shipbuilding programs, vitally important systems grew disconnected 
from production schedules� Instead of one coherent program, ship construction 
became a process in which multiple specialized offices each managed different 
project elements� Senator McCain complained repeatedly about the many orga-
nizations that routinely appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
for hearings about the Navy’s shipbuilding program� As he noted, it meant that 
no single organization or person had overall responsibility for the program, and 
hence no accountability could be assigned� An exasperated McCain often com-
plained that nobody lost his job because nobody was held accountable�58 The 
bureaucratic enterprise meant to generalize the innovation had become too vast 
and complicated as a result of the demands the Navy placed on it� It provided only 
what the customer actually asked for� 
The bureaucracy’s struggles to generalize the innovation were known widely, 
by all the organizations in the chain of command� Management and oversight 
within the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and 
Congress all failed to correct the sideward spiral of each program; instead these 
entities spent even more money, in the belief that the Navy would fix the problems� 
Principal-agent relations can explain part of the behavior of the various oversight 
layers and entities, but at the end of the day, as McCain emphasized, the entire 
management and oversight system—stretching from the Navy all the way to the 
halls of Congress—bore responsibility for the expensive acquisition disasters�59 
Another feature of the 1990s innovation cycle is that the platforms were con-
ceived initially during the 1990s—a period of conceptual drift in U�S� strategy 
following the Cold War� It is not that the Navy was not busy during the 1990s; 
far from it� It spent the decade chasing after pirates in various places, conduct-
ing humanitarian relief operations, enforcing the trade embargo against Saddam 
Hussein in the Persian Gulf, and helping to police the skies over Iraq in Operation 
SOUTHERN WATCH� The Navy promulgated a bevy of new documents designed 
to convince stakeholders of its continued relevance—and need for money—
pointing to its support of land forces and a host of other global constabulary mis-
sions�60 Importantly, over the decade, the Navy saw its fleet shrink by 40 percent, 
from 526 to 318 ships, and its personnel end strength decline from 570,000 to 
370,000�61 
While the Defense Department successfully beat back attempts at generalized 
disarmament, which had occurred in Europe, there was no way to gloss over the 
lack of strategic consensus driving the arm-train-equip enterprise for the military 
departments over the decade� Scenarios involving much weaker, so-called rogue 
states eventually were substituted for the threat from the Soviet Union as a reason 
to preserve programs and budgets� After the 1990–91 Gulf War and its swift and 
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purportedly decisive victory, the RMA offered obvious advantages, and the mili-
tary departments understandably seized on its promise to guarantee their superi-
ority over potential rivals� The RMA framed war as an engineering problem that 
could be solved through clever targeting with better, more-accurate, and longer-
range weapons supported by an ever-improving sensor suite that cleared away 
the fog of war as if by magic� The RMA offered the prospect of victory through 
target destruction via a new generation of digital sensors and long-range, accurate 
munitions—a mind-set that implicitly encouraged the Navy and the other services 
to bet on the next technological leap before definitively nailing down their system 
requirements� Weapon-system requirements gradually became divorced from 
specific enemy threats and instead migrated to anodyne portfolios of capabilities�62 
The conceptual drift in national strategy fell squarely into the Navy’s lap� The 
1990s saw questions implicitly raised about the strategic value of sea power that 
challenged foundational assumptions that navies were an instrumental compo-
nent of national power� In World War II, navies enabled land forces by shipping 
men and their equipment to the fight� In the post-1990s era, however, America’s 
land forces, instead of storming ashore, mostly flew in chartered commercial air-
liners to airports in countries near the combat areas� While carrier aviation indeed 
supported troops and operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality was 
(and remains) that most combat-related air missions could be launched more ef-
ficiently from land-based airfields in or near the war zones�63 The Navy insisted on 
supporting troops ashore and went to absurd lengths to deliver, such as launching 
planes off the coast of Pakistan and sending them, via multiple aerial refuelings, 
to linger in lengthy orbits over Afghanistan to support ground troops (making 
for missions that Navy pilots described as “eight hours of boredom and twenty 
seconds of terror”)�64 
The institutional preference for—even insistence on—conducting manned 
strike operations ashore also profoundly shaped the decision to proceed with the 
new generation of Ford-class carriers, which in certain respects were meant to be 
the “supercarriers” of the twenty-first century� The Navy never considered viable 
alternatives to the Ford-class platform� Congress forced the Navy to study the idea 
of building more, smaller, cheaper carriers, as potential platforms for strike mis-
sions—an idea in which the Navy appears uninterested for the present�65 There is 
little doubt that the Navy remains slow off the mark to adopt unmanned systems, 
having missed a golden opportunity during the post-1990s innovation cycle to 
get ahead of its competitors� This constituted an enormous opportunity cost of 
a road not taken� As strategy scholar James J� Wirtz pointedly observed, “One 
wonders exactly what, if anything, will be flying from those Ford-class carriers 
in 2063 or whether or not they will be at sea at all� One also wonders why the 
Navy plans to maintain and grow its fleet of aircraft carriers even though piloted 
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combat aircraft are headed for obsolescence� After all, in 2063 aviators may not 
be allowed to drive themselves to an airport� Would humans really still be at the 
controls of a combat aircraft?”66 
The reluctance to embrace unmanned systems represents a critical missed 
opportunity of the post-1990s innovation cycle, but it is unsurprising in an in-
stitution whose identity is grounded strongly in its carrier aviation community� 
One can only hope that the Ford-class carriers and their F-35 aircraft do not turn 
into versions of the Iowa-class battleships of the last century, which were obsolete 
even as they arrived� 
Perhaps more basically, the Navy and its benefactors were unwilling to con-
front the uncomfortable reality of the post-1990s era: that unthreatened interna-
tional trade routes did not need navies to protect them; and that, in any case, they 
were growing so full of twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) traffic that no single 
actor could disrupt those routes significantly�67 Seaborne support for U�S� military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a mere trickle added to existing 
traffic on the vast global seaborne highways� The net effect of this undeniable 
feature of a globalizing world undermined traditional twentieth-century notions 
of the direct linkage between America’s economic strength through trade and the 
Navy’s protection of trade routes� 
As in the Cold War era before it, in the 1990s the strategic backdrop framed 
the innovation cycle of the era� Yet given that the Navy of the 1990s lacked a 
near-peer competitor and faced pressure to shrink, it is not surprising that the 
innovation cycle took on a different character than had been the case during the 
Cold War� The service realized it had to do more with less, and understandably 
it viewed RMA-era technology as a way to square the circle� Absent the require-
ment to establish sea control to protect trade routes or to do battle on the high 
seas, the Navy gradually migrated to the idea that a central purpose of the fleet 
was to support operations ashore through strikes, in addition to close-to-shore 
maritime operations conducted to preserve freedom of maneuver� An original 
purpose of the DDG-1000 was to fire at targets ashore in support of troops, with 
the idea that the ships would have to sail relatively close to shore to do so� In 
2017, the Navy shifted the emphasis to shooting at other surface ships� The LCS 
focused on support operations close to shore to deal with enemy vessel swarms 
and mines, among other things� 
Unfortunately, even as the Navy struggled to operationalize these two innova-
tive new platforms, the strategic environment changed� The irony is that, while 
the United States focused on the inconclusive, irregular land wars in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan—in which indirect fire from Navy ships frankly was not rel-
evant—competitors emerged (or returned) with new capabilities to challenge the 
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Navy both at sea and in operations close to shore, via development of land-based 
antiship missiles that could overwhelm the fleet’s antimissile defenses� 
It is clear that the post-1990s innovation effort was shaped and disrupted by 
many different factors: 
• Bureaucratic and programmatic difficulties in bringing ideas from the draw-
ing board into being as actual systems that could be delivered to the fleet 
• An ever-widening chasm between ponderous ship-development and acquisi-
tion cycles and the pace of change in technologies 
• Management failures within the Navy that prevented the innovation cycle 
from moving at a predictable, affordable pace to deliver systems that worked 
as advertised 
• Failure of oversight bodies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
White House, and Congress to force the Navy into corrective actions that 
might have kept the innovation cycle on track 
• A lack of strategic consensus on the role of America’s armed forces, which 
left the Navy to its own devices in connecting its systems to a clearly defined 
maritime strategy or a compelling rationale for its existence; in the absence of 
a clearly defined strategy, the Navy gravitated to strike operations, including 
direct support of ground forces, missing the opportunity to explore whether 
cheaper unmanned systems could perform the same missions for less money 
• The shaping of the cycle by excessive cost growth at every step, which en-
sured (and still ensures) that budgets simply will not support the purchase 
of the proposed numbers of new ships, representing a disconnect of monu-
mental proportions and a failure to ground the innovation cycle in a coherent 
linkage of ends, ways, and means 
Action-reaction cycles remain a timeless feature within militaries—at least 
for those intent on staying ahead of their adversaries� The Navy faces significant 
hurdles to ensuring that the conceptual and systemic flaws that produced these 
three platforms during the 1990s are not repeated� In addition to these flaws, 
hanging over Richardson’s call for a redesigned fleet is the critical issue of money� 
Naval innovation cycles need money, and lots of it, and it is not clear that there is 
enough of it to go around, even in the United States�68 
All is not lost, however� Out of the ashes of the 1990s cycle can spring innova-
tive ideas, technologies, and concepts of operations that can be generalized for 
a redesigned fleet� Perhaps the technologies of the DDG-1000 can be adapted 
usefully and applied in different and more-workable ways on new platforms� The 
same holds true for the LCS� The Navy must sift through these ashes carefully to 
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/1
 RU S S E L L  7 9
glean the ideas and practices it should use as the basis for a redesigned fleet� This 
must start as an inherently intellectual exercise, which in itself requires the institu-
tion to be capable of conducting critical self-evaluation before it takes corrective 
action� 
Moreover, political and military leaders need to articulate clearly a set of stra-
tegic priorities that the bureaucracy and other stakeholders in the process can op-
erationalize into weapon systems� Admiral Richardson’s call to arms that focused 
the Navy on overcoming its enemies in war on the high seas indeed may have a 
galvanizing effect, producing a shortened, more sensible innovation cycle that the 
bureaucracy can generalize, leading to the sought-after, redesigned, twenty-first-
century fleet� 
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Naval War College Review, Summer 2020, Vol. 73, No. 3
 The U�S�-Japan alliance is the most important bilateral relationship in the world for international peace and security, yet it operates within two very 
different national legal systems� For decades, the alliance between Japan and 
the United States has underwritten political and economic development in East 
Asia, generating confidence and stability that impact the global system�1 Richard 
L� Armitage and Joseph S� Nye Jr� have described Japan accurately as “the most 
capable U�S� ally in the most important part of the world�”2 Situated astride the 
confluence of China, North Korea, and Russia, Japan makes a greater contribu-
tion to international peace and security than any nation other than the United 
States�3 In particular, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is the most 
professional, advanced, and capable conventional naval partner of the U�S� Navy�4
While the two states share values of dignity and human rights, individual and 
economic freedom, and a state system governed by the rule of law, they have dif-
ferent languages, cultures, and legal systems� These legal systems take distinct ap-
proaches to authorizing military operations and implementing the inherent right 
of self-defense under international law, and they vindicate these rights through 
dissimilar legal doctrines, decision-making pro-
cesses, and national command authorities�
This article explores how Japan and the United 
States manage and pursue the authorization for 
employment of military forces and the conduct 
of operations within their respective legal systems 
and how the two approaches converge within the 
alliance structure� Further, the article compares 
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how the United States and Japan develop and implement the international law 
of self-defense, and in particular explores how this concept is expressed within 
Japan’s unique and complex legal regime� While the two allies share strategic in-
terests and an integrated vision of regional security, understanding their separate 
legal systems can facilitate combined operations and help the two allies work 
together more efficiently�5 Making this process more transparent helps to inform 
American and Japanese decision makers and operational planners, reassures 
neighboring states that the alliance is strong and the two states are synchronized, 
and thereby dissuades potential adversaries�
This article proceeds as follows� First, we examine the relationship between the 
United States and Japan and the bilateral defense treaty that binds them� Second, 
we identify the key differences between the national security laws of the two 
countries� While U�S� forces conduct operations at the command of the president 
through executive power under Article II of the U�S� Constitution, each operation 
the JMSDF conducts requires a specific, underlying law, since military operations 
are considered administrative actions by the government� Third, we explore the 
legal basis for self-defense in the face of armed attack, as applied within the two 
systems� While the U�S� president as commander in chief has a relatively simple 
legal basis for initiating self-defense actions, Japan must set in motion precise 
procedural and legislative processes before it can exercise the right of individual 
or collective self-defense� Finally, this article identifies how the United States and 
Japan lawfully may contend with threats short of war, or what Japan first termed 
the gray zone. While the United States responds to such challenges within the 
paradigm of self-defense, including unit self-defense, Japanese military action 
must be authorized under Japanese municipal law, not as self-defense but as a 
“use of weapons,” a related concept that is separate from national self-defense�
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The two pillars of Japan’s national security policy are national self-help and col-
lective self-defense with its treaty ally, the United States� The two approaches 
these pillars represent are reflected in the original and the current bilateral se-
curity treaties; the premises and purposes of the two treaties diverge widely� The 
first U�S�-Japan security treaty was signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco 
on the same day that Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco (or the Treaty of 
Peace with Japan), which officially ended the Allied postwar occupation and 
returned sovereignty to Japan� Under article 1 of the 1951 security treaty, the 
United States accepted the responsibility to deploy armed forces to Japan to “con-
tribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and 
to the security of Japan�” The treaty recognized that Japan was unable to exercise 
its inherent right of self-defense because of postwar disarmament� The United 
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States, therefore, was solely responsible for defending Japan from external threats, 
as well as large-scale riots or internal disturbances, which at the time potentially 
included action by former imperial military forces�6 
Treaty Obligations
The second bilateral treaty was signed on 19 January 1960 by Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi (grandfather of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) and U�S� Secretary 
of State Christian A� Herter� This agreement is still in force� The new treaty con-
firmed that Japan was entitled to the right of self-defense and that the United 
States and Japan shared a common interest in international peace and the security 
of the Far East�7 
This treaty is composed of ten articles that set forth three principal obliga-
tions: (1) self-help and mutual aid, (2) mutual defense, and (3) the provision of 
bases in Japan for U�S� forces� First, article 3 requires the parties to develop and 
maintain the capacity to resist armed attack, “individually and in cooperation 
with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, 
subject to their constitutional provisions�”8 This obligation originally arose from 
the Vandenberg Resolution, which the U�S� Congress passed in June 1948� Sena-
tor Arthur H� Vandenberg (R-MI) crafted the resolution as the United States was 
joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to clarify U�S� security 
policy� The resolution insisted on incorporation of the principle of self-help 
and mutual aid into the NATO agreement to prevent free riding by European 
allies, which would impose an excessive burden on the United States� Self-help 
and mutual aid means that “the participants must be prepared fully to carry out 
their obligations under the Charter [of the United Nations], resolutely to defend 
their liberties against attack from any source, and efficiently to develop their 
maximum defense potential by coordination of their military forces�” Therefore, 
NATO members have an obligation to develop and maintain their defense capa-
bilities, regardless of the effectiveness of the U�S� nuclear umbrella� The resolution 
was designed to save the Europeans from the moral hazard posed by free and 
unlimited defense provided by the United States and to insulate the United States 
from “open ended or unlimited commitments�”9 This sense also made its way into 
the U�S�-Japan agreement, and is codified in article 3 as the legal basis for Japan’s 
defense budget� Japan spends just over 1 percent of its gross domestic product on 
national defense�10 
Second, the 1960 treaty commits each state to mutual defense� Article 5 rec-
ognizes that an armed attack against either party in “the territories under the 
administration of Japan” would endanger the security of both parties� Therefore, 
Japan has a legal obligation to prepare and act to counter threats to territories 
it governs� The geographic scope of this provision always has included outlying 
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Japanese territories, such as the Senkaku Islands, as “territories under the admin-
istration of Japan�” In 1996, for example, the United States stated explicitly that 
the bilateral security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and presumably to any 
other territory under the administration of Japan, such as Okinotorishima�11 Im-
portantly, however, the treaty does not obligate Japan to exercise mutual defense 
to protect areas outside its territory or those under its administration�
Third, Japan has a legal obligation to provide bases in Japan for the use of 
American forces, and it has done so� For example, the U�S� Seventh Fleet flag-
ship, USS Blue Ridge, is forward-deployed to Yokosuka, along with Task Force 
(TF) 70, an aircraft carrier strike group led by USS Ronald Reagan, and TF 76, 
an expeditionary strike group with warships forward-deployed to Sasebo and 
a headquarters element located at White Beach, Okinawa�12 Article 6 ensures 
that U�S� forces may use facilities and training areas in Japan for the purpose of 
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the Far East�13 This provision provides the legal basis for Japan 
to grant U�S� forces the use of military facilities and training areas� Rules on the 
status of U�S� forces in Japan, such as criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed 
by U�S� servicemembers, fall under a separate agreement, the U�S�-Japan Status 
of Forces Agreement�14 
The 2015 “Guidelines”
While the 1960 treaty sets the general terms of the relationship and bilateral 
obligations, more-detailed policies are contained in the “Guidelines for Japan-
U�S� Defense Cooperation�” This document has been formulated three times: in 
1978, 1997, and 2015� The latest iteration emphasizes five areas of cooperation: 
(1) seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; (2) synergy across 
the two governments’ national security policies; (3) a whole-of-government alli-
ance that leverages interagency coordination; (4) cooperation with regional and 
other partners, as well as international organizations; and (5) recognition of the 
global nature of the U�S�-Japan alliance, which produces security benefits that 
reverberate worldwide� These guidelines were written to be consistent with each 
nation’s constitution and national laws, as well as international law�15 
The guidelines are not legally binding, but they contain policy on alliance co-
ordination mechanisms, bilateral planning for contingencies, ballistic-missile de-
fense, cooperation abroad, and cooperation on outer space and cyberspace� The 
document is critical for shaping Japan’s laws concerning defense cooperation, be-
cause it includes some specific goals that are impossible to achieve without pro-
gressive legislation� For example, the 2015 iteration states that “the [Japan] Self-
Defense Forces [JSDF] and the U�S� Armed Forces will provide mutual protection 
of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the 
defense of Japan � � � including during training and exercises�”16 In response to this 
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mandate, Japan reformulated the legal basis for the JSDF to protect U�S� weapons 
and assets in peacetime, a function that earlier laws did not cover�17 
PARALLEL APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
There are fundamental differences between the American and Japanese ap-
proaches to national defense� While the operations of the U�S� armed forces 
emanate from the executive power in the form of an execute order (EXORD) 
issued by the Secretary of Defense, the operations of the JSDF flow from the 
government’s administrative actions� For this reason, U�S� military operations 
are implemented flexibly, whereas JSDF operations require specific statutory 
authorization�
The President’s War Powers
In the United States, the president exercises the “vast share of responsibility” for 
the conduct of foreign relations and national security�18 Article II, Section 1, of 
the U�S� Constitution states as follows: “The executive Power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States of America�” The president also is designated 
by Section 2 as commander in chief of the Army and the Navy� These powers 
allow the president “to direct the movements of the naval and military forces 
placed by law at his command�”19 This remit includes the authority to direct U�S� 
military forces in engagements necessary to advance American national inter-
ests abroad�20  Even in the absence of specific prior congressional approval, the 
president’s power to employ military force abroad derives from his constitutional 
responsibility as commander in chief�
This authority is confirmed by long-standing practice�21 In defending the 
authority of President George Washington, for example, to issue the 1793 Neu-
trality Proclamation during the French Revolution, Alexander Hamilton wrote 
that the president’s “executive power” in Article II of the Constitution and his 
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” included the power uni-
laterally to proclaim neutrality in armed conflict�22 This custom was followed by 
his contemporaries—Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe—and 
more-recent American leaders have expanded presidential powers even further�
It was when President John Adams was criticized for extraditing Thomas Nash, 
alias Jonathan Robbins, to Great Britain (to stand trial for a murder committed 
on a British ship) that John Marshall as a member of the House of Representatives 
in 1800 argued that the president had the authority to do so because he was the 
“sole organ” of the nation in foreign affairs�23 In 1936, the U�S� Supreme Court 
repeated this characterization of presidential power in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.24 In that case, the court ruled that the president has plenary 
powers in foreign affairs, which has led to the axiom “Curtiss Wright and the 
president is always right!” The president’s virtually unlimited authority in foreign 
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affairs became an article of faith, with Senator J� William Fulbright stating in 1961 
that it was “clear and unalterable” that the president enjoyed “pre-eminent re-
sponsibility” in managing U�S� foreign relations�25 Contemporary presidents have 
continued to hew to this position� In October 2016, for example, President Barack 
Obama used his constitutional authority to direct U�S� military strikes against 
radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen�26 Likewise, in April 2018 
President Donald Trump ordered U�S� forces to attack chemical weapons sites 
in Syria, without congressional approval�27 Trump followed up with a strike in 
Baghdad on 3 January 2020 that killed Qassem Soleimani, commander of the 
Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps�28 
Efforts by Congress to limit presidential powers have been controversial� The 
War Powers Act, passed—over President Richard Nixon’s veto—on 7 November 
1973, states that the president, as commander in chief, possesses constitutional 
powers to introduce U�S� armed forces into hostilities or into situations where 
hostilities are imminent, but only pursuant to one of three conditions: (1) a decla-
ration of war by the U�S� Congress; (2) specific statutory authorization by the U�S� 
Congress; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, 
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces�29 The act requires the president 
to consult with Congress before introducing U�S� armed forces into hostilities, 
and to report such military intervention within forty-eight hours to the Speaker 
of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate� The president also 
is required to terminate any employment of the armed forces within sixty days 
after the report unless the operations are validated through congressional au-
thorization�30 All U�S� presidents, however, have rejected as unconstitutional this 
and other attempted congressional limitations on their freedom of action, and 
the War Powers Act remains contentious� In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
appeared to defer to the executive power of the president, placing “significant 
weight” on a division of authority weighted toward the president�31 Throughout 
the debates over presidential power, Congress has acquiesced, and the president 
continues to act unilaterally�32 
The Diet’s Use-of-Force Powers
The Japanese system is more complicated� While the legal basis for U�S� military 
operations derives from the executive power of the president, the JSDF may act 
only pursuant to authorization by the national Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature� 
It is unlawful for the prime minister to order a deployment of the JSDF without 
a specific authorizing law�33 This arrangement reflects the war-renunciation 
clause of the constitution (article 9), which reads as follows: “Aspiring sincerely 
to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes� 
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“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained� The right of bel-
ligerency of the state will not be recognized�”34 
The Japanese government interprets article 9 as banning the maintenance of 
armed forces whose purpose is to threaten or use force as a means of settling in-
ternational disputes, but preserving the nation’s inherent right of self-defense� It 
is constitutional for Japan to maintain the JSDF, to the minimum extent required 
to ensure self-defense�35 Because the constitution does not permit maintaining 
armed forces and a war potential, it does not specify or provide for command and 
control (C2) of operations of the armed forces� There is no executive power or 
authority analogous to that of the commander in chief, so C2 functions are based 
on article 72 of the constitution, which states that the prime minister represents 
the cabinet and submits bills to the Diet for the “exercise of control and supervi-
sion over various administrative branches�”36 Consequently, C2 of the JSDF is 
conducted through administrative orders to a general administrative branch, on 
the basis of existing laws�37 In sum, this unique constitutional framework means 
that Japan must contend with any armed attack, or the threat of an armed at-
tack, through the nation’s emergency-management apparatus and administrative 
control process� Unlike the U�S� Constitution, the Japanese constitution does not 
confer executive power on a single political leader�
NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN RESPONSE TO ARMED ATTACK
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat or use 
of force in international relations� The inherent right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense is reflected in article 51, and may be invoked “if armed attack 
occurs�”38 The meaning of armed attack as a matter of international law is debat-
able�39 In the 1980s-era case between Nicaragua and the United States (referred to 
as the Paramilitary Activities Case), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dis-
tinguished the most grave forms of the use of force from other, less grave forms� 
Only the former constitute an armed attack and therefore are subject to action 
in self-defense�40 Consequently, the ICJ and most scholars suggest there lies a 
gap between an unlawful use of force in article 2(4) and the right of self-defense 
against an armed attack in article 51�41 On the basis of the Paramilitary Activities 
decision, Japan believes that the gap theory accurately describes the test for the 
lawful exercise of self-defense in international law� The United States, in contrast, 
has rejected the idea of a gap, and reserves the right to use force in self-defense 
even against less grave forms of aggression�42 In the American view, the United 
States may respond with force against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile 
intent if it believes it constitutes an armed attack�43 
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In addition to the difference of interpretation of an armed attack, there is a 
difference between Japan and the United States in the process that triggers the 
right of self-defense� While the U�S� president can deploy and tactically maneuver 
U�S� armed forces through an EXORD issued by the Secretary of Defense at any 
time before, during, or after a crisis or armed attack, Japan must obtain a cabinet 
decision and Diet approval to conduct such operations�
The U.S. AUMF and Executive Orders
The United States recognizes three circumstances in which states may employ 
military force in international politics� First, states may use force pursuant to the 
authority of the UN Security Council, acting under the authority of chapter VII 
of the UN Charter� Second, force may be used in self-defense, in accordance with 
article 51; but again, the United States takes a rather elastic view that most states 
do not share� And third, force may be used with the consent of the territorial state 
in which force is exercised, such as when a state requests assistance in suppressing 
a rebellion�44 Regardless of which basis is invoked, for the United States the use 
of force overseas must satisfy at least one of two legal conditions: congressional 
approval of the use of force, typically through an authorization for use of military 
force (AUMF); or presidential action under his own authority�
An example of the first case occurred when, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 
Congress passed an AUMF that authorized the president to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” against nations and terrorist organizations that had conducted 
the attacks and those who aided them in doing so or harbored them�45 Presidents 
Obama and Trump relied on this AUMF as the legal basis for conducting military 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and in East 
Africa and Libya�46 In the second case, the president may use force unilaterally, re-
gardless of authorization from Congress, pursuant to his power as commander in 
chief� Examples include the bombing in Libya (1986); the intervention in Panama 
(1989); troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 
1994 and 2004); air patrols and air strikes in Bosnia (1993–95); and a bombing 
campaign in Yugoslavia (1999)�47 In short, the United States relies on presidential 
action, albeit sometimes in parallel with specific congressional authorization� 
Congress has attempted to limit this second type of military operations under the 
aforementioned War Powers Act�
Japan’s Three Principles and Three Situations
Because of its constitution, Japan operates within a restrictive national defense 
policy� Generally, force may be employed only in the event of an armed attack—as 
the Nicaragua decision has shaped that term—and then using only the minimum 
force necessary� The United States, in contrast, holds that it may use force to repel 
all illegal threats to the nation or U�S� forces�48 Importantly, Japan defines armed 
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attack strictly as the “organized and premeditated use of force against Japan�”49 
The criteria “organized” and “premeditated” are not perfunctory and must be 
satisfied; sporadic and occasional combat or accidental or unauthorized action 
by foreign armed forces may not always constitute armed attack, in the Japanese 
view� Japan must assess whether an attacker had a clear intention to attack before 
it makes a determination that the aggressor actually conducted an armed attack� 
Consequently, Japan maintains only limited military capabilities necessary for 
minimum self-defense�
Three principles clarify the meaning of minimum self-defense in Japan� First, 
a minimum level of force may be used in self-defense to resist an armed attack 
against Japan once it occurs, or when an armed attack against a foreign country 
that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result threatens Japan’s 
survival and poses a clear danger that might fundamentally overturn the Japanese 
people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness� The principle that Japan 
can use force in self-defense in the face of an armed attack against a “country in 
a close relationship with Japan” clearly references the United States� Second, a 
minimum level of force may be employed in self-defense when there is no other 
appropriate means available to repel an attack and such force is necessary to en-
sure the survival of the nation of Japan and protect its people� Third, when force 
is used it must be the minimum necessary to defend Japan or another country in 
a close relationship with Japan�50 
The JSDF will use force for self-defense when an armed attack against Japan 
occurs, but Japan may exercise the right of self-defense only in special or desig-
nated situations, and with the approval of the Diet� The three types of situations, 
or specific scenarios, are (1) an anticipated armed-attack situation; (2) an armed-
attack situation; and (3) a survival-threatening situation. There is no lawful basis 
for the JSDF to mobilize and use force unless the Diet declares one of these situ-
ations to exist�
Anticipated Armed-Attack Situation. Japan lawfully may deploy JSDF units when 
an armed attack has yet to occur but threatening circumstances are alarming and 
a future armed attack is anticipated�51 Although in this circumstance an attack 
is said to be anticipated, that term differs from the idea in the international law 
of jus ad bellum that states may use force in “anticipatory self-defense” to strike 
against a gathering threat�52 The theory of anticipatory self-defense is based on 
the response of a state facing a threat, when the aggressor has taken concrete steps 
toward the initiation of an attack, thereby justifying the exercise of the right of 
self-defense on the part of the defending state� By contrast, in the case of antici-
pated armed-attack situations, armed aggression is expected, but the aggressor 
has not taken any tangible steps toward conducting an attack� The government of 
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Japan determines the existence of an anticipated armed-attack situation through 
a cabinet decision, with approval by the Diet�53 
In such a case, the JSDF can redeploy self-defense forces to new locations and 
order them to execute duties as a legal obligation to ready the force to act im-
mediately should an armed attack occur�54 Under this legal authority, the JSDF 
also may construct facilities for operations in the planned area to prepare to 
counter an attack, and it may provide logistics support for U�S� armed forces that 
would be responding to the armed attack, in accordance with the current U�S�-
Japan security treaty� Examples of support the JSDF may provide to U�S� forces 
include supplies; transportation; communications; military repair, depot, and 
maintenance facilities; medical services; construction and operation of seaports 
and airports; and access to military bases for accommodations, storage, facili-
ties, and training�55 The JSDF even may supply ammunition to U�S� forces, but it 
cannot deliver missiles, mines, torpedoes, nuclear warheads, chaff, or chemical 
weapons�56 Under this scenario, the JSDF also may recall reserve personnel to 
active duty�57
Armed-Attack Situation. In this second situation a foreign power has conducted 
an armed attack against Japan or there is an imminent danger of such an attack� 
Assessment of this situation is performed ad hoc� The government then promul-
gates what is called a “basic response plan,” which requires a cabinet decision and 
Diet approval�58 After such approval, the prime minister may order the JSDF to 
conduct a defense operation, which may include the use of force�59 Under article 
88 of the JSDF law, in this situation the JSDF may employ “necessary force to 
defend [the] country�” Although Diet determination of the basic response plan—
which includes recognition of the existence of an armed-attack situation and the 
intended response to it—normally is a precondition for the use of force, in an 
emergency the prime minister can ask for Diet approval after the operation al-
ready has been ordered�60 
Under the order of a defense operation, the JSDF acquires additional authori-
ties besides the use of force� For example, the minister of defense can exercise C2 
of Japan Coast Guard (JCG) forces as part of the national response� The JSDF can 
requisition hospitals, vehicle maintenance facilities, shipyards, and port facilities, 
and even may seize private property and homes�61 Further, to prevent a neutral 
state’s vessels from transporting foreign military supplies (limited war contra-
band, such as weapons or ammunition) toward enemy states in an area where an 
armed attack against Japan is occurring, the JSDF can conduct naval operations 
to control and interdict international shipping, including directing foreign-
flagged vessels into port for inspection�62 Such an operation is distinct from the 
peacetime right of approach and visit�63 It also is somewhat different from the 
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belligerent right of visit and search during time of war, since an inspection team 
conducting a boarding during a defense operation is not authorized to destroy a 
ship carrying contraband goods�64 
Survival-Threatening Situation for Collective Self-defense. This third scenario 
involves collective self-defense, of a sort�65 From the institution of the first bilat-
eral security treaty until 2015, Japan held the position that the bar for exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense is higher than the threshold for the minimum 
exercise of self-defense� The latter is permitted by the constitution, whereas Japan 
possesses the right of collective self-defense as a matter of international law�66 On 
19 September 2015, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party passed new legislation that reinterpreted the Japanese constitu-
tion to permit certain carefully prescribed operations for collective self-defense� 
The new law entered into force on 29 March 2016�
A survival-threatening situation for collective self-defense exists after an 
armed attack occurs against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with 
Japan, and as a result Japan’s survival is threatened� While the Japanese govern-
ment has not clarified the specific application of this provision, generally this 
concept envisions an attack against the United States or U�S� forces�67 Such an 
attack would be regarded as posing a clear danger to Japan, with the potential 
fundamentally to overturn the rights of the Japanese people to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness� This new approach was explained in a cabinet decision 
as follows:
[A]s a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the 
Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against 
Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a 
close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and 
poses a clear danger to overturn in a fundamental way people’s right to life, liberty, 
and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to 
repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the 
minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Consti-
tution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Govern-
ment’s view to date�68 
The cabinet must certify that these conditions exist and gain Diet approval 
to formulate a basic response plan�69 Unlike emergency circumstances that give 
rise to the armed-attack situation, the cabinet decision and Diet approval for the 
survival-threatening situation of collective self-defense may not be made after the 
assessment; however, the prime minister may order a defense operation, under 
which the JSDF can exercise the use of force�70 This approach reflects the right of 
collective self-defense in international law�71 In Japan’s case, however, the JSDF’s 
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exercise of collective self-defense is limited to situations in which Japan’s survival 
is threatened, and the sole purpose is to protect Japan�72
More broadly, even though collective self-defense is recognized as a principle 
of international law, Japan cannot exercise its full scale or scope because of its 
constitutional limitations� For example, although the Gulf War was conducted 
under the auspices of the UN Security Council as a lawful operation in collective 
self-defense, Japan could not participate in large-scale air strikes or take actions 
against enemy forces, because such engagement in hostilities would have been 
deemed unconstitutional, since the operations did not bear directly on the sur-
vival of Japan�73
TACTICAL SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR
Japanese law does not provide authority to act in tactical situations short of war� 
Yoram Dinstein refers to operations short of war as tactical, small-scale, armed 
attacks in situ, and the employment of counterforce in defense�74 For the United 
States, such situations may exist even when there is neither a specific AUMF nor 
an executive order authorizing actions in response to small-scale armed attack; 
the president acts pursuant to his powers as commander in chief� Under such 
circumstances, while U�S� forces confronting these limited attacks may exercise 
individual or unit self-defense, the JSDF responds in accordance with laws that 
permit the use of weapons, since none of the three situations discussed previ-
ously provides authority to act in such scenarios� The statutes that authorize use 
of weapons are law-enforcement statutes; they include the Law for Protection of 
SDF’s Weapons and Other Equipment, the Law for Protection of the Weapons 
and Other Equipment of the Units of the U�S� Forces and the Armed Forces of 
Other Countries, and the Law for Guarding Facilities�75 
First we will describe the U�S� approach, then contrast it with that of Japan� The 
U�S� system is simpler and more flexible than Japan’s�
U.S. Rules of Engagement for Unit Self-defense
The U�S� decision-making system employs a flexible approach to responding to 
low-level attacks� American commanders have a right—indeed, an obligation—
to protect their units from any threats by exercising unit self-defense� The U�S� 
Standing Rules of Engagement, for example, states as follows:
Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit 
self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent� Unless a unit 
commander directs otherwise, as detailed below, military members may exercise 
individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent� 
When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense 
should be considered a subset of unit self-defense� As such, unit commanders may 
limit individual self-defense by members of their unit� Both unit and individual self-
defense include defense of other U�S� military forces in the vicinity�76
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The exercise of unit self-defense is deemed an expression of the inherent 
right of national self-defense, as recognized by article 51 of the UN Charter and 
customary international law� Consequently, unit self-defense is derived from cus-
tomary international law, and it may be extended to protect units and individuals 
from other nations, which then would be authorized by the applicable rules of 
engagement (ROEs)�77 
Law Enforcement and the Use of Weapons by Japan
In contrast to U�S� practice, the Japanese response applies a law-enforcement 
approach in all situations short of war� The same cautionary rules for the use 
of force apply as when responding to the actions of common felons, and other 
criminal matters� Even though it is the JSDF conducting operations, the legal 
basis for doing so lies in law enforcement, not national self-defense� This is so 
mainly owing to Japan’s strict definition of armed attack and the country’s strict 
procedures for authorizing the use of force� Japan refers to these law-enforcement 
acts as the use of weapons, to distinguish them from the use of force under the 
exercise of the right of self-defense� Since the use of weapons in these situations 
is deemed to be merely acts of law enforcement, Diet approval is not required� 
The JSDF has authority to use weapons under this law-enforcement paradigm in 
three specific situations, as detailed below�
Protecting JSDF Weapons and Equipment. While the JSDF cannot use force ex-
cept when the prime minister issues a defense operation order on the basis of 
the existence of certain situations, under certain other conditions it actually may 
employ weapons to protect JSDF property, including weapons and munitions, 
ships and aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and fuel� Members of 
the JSDF who are specifically on duty to protect these assets may use weapons to 
the extent reasonably necessary, in accordance with the requirement of propor-
tionality, under the right of individual self-defense� The situation requires that it 
be impossible to protect the weapons by other means, such as withdrawal�78 In 
Japan’s system, such a use of weapons is different from the exercise of self-defense 
under international law or unit self-defense in the U�S� conception�
The penal code authorizes the exercise of “individual self-defense” and “aver-
sion of a present danger” in cases involving the use of weapons to protect weap-
ons in urgent situations�79 The JSDF’s right to use weapons ceases if the objects 
whose protection is intended are destroyed completely or the attackers abort the 
attack and break off contact� That is, the right to use weapons is a rather nar-
rowly construed law-enforcement measure; for instance, it does not even permit 
pursuit of the attackers� In national self-defense and unit self-defense, defensive 
action may continue until the threat has disappeared completely, even after 
the attack is interrupted and the aggressors begin to flee� In the case of a use of 
weapons, however, defensive rights must be proportional to the threat, narrowly 
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circumscribed to the immediate zone of attack, and include only limited rights 
of protection�
Japan’s Use of Weapons to Protect U.S. and Other Foreign Assets. To protect for-
eign weapons, equipment, or other assets, the JSDF required additional legal au-
thority� Section 2 of article 95 of the JSDF law authorizes the use of weapons to 
protect U�S� and other foreign armed forces’ weapons and other assets if they 
actually are engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in coop-
eration with the JSDF, including peacetime activities such as joint exercises and 
training� The use of weapons is authorized only in situations in which reasonable 
grounds for action exist, and only to the extent reasonably necessary� Important-
ly, this protection is provided during routine peacetime operations and does not 
require the Diet to issue a specific national defense authorization on the basis of 
one of the aforementioned situations�
To distinguish the use of weapons from the use of force by other countries, 
the JSDF will not conduct this protection in an area of hostilities� Therefore, Ja-
pan does not regard this protection as either a use of force or an act of collective 
self-defense against an armed attack� The use of weapons shall not cause harm to 
persons, except in a case of individual self-defense or “averting present danger�”80 
Furthermore, this option may be exercised only after the JSDF receives a request 
from U�S� or other foreign armed forces�
Use of Weapons to Guard Facilities. Military facilities may be protected by yet 
a third type of authority for the use of weapons�81 While every ministry has the 
administrative right to operate facilities and guard its installations, this author-
ity by itself does not permit the use of lethal weapons to protect them� The JSDF, 
however, has additional legal authorization, under the statute on guarding facili-
ties, to use weapons to protect its installations�82 
This law applies only to JSDF facilities in Japan and persons in those facilities, 
including personnel who are not members of the JSDF, and does not apply to 
JSDF members outside these facilities� The JSDF personnel assigned to guard or 
patrol duties on these installations may use weapons when reasonable grounds 
exist to protect themselves or others, and to the extent reasonably necessary� This 
law provides law-enforcement authority, and the use of weapons shall not cause 
harm to persons except for the two exceptions specified in the penal code (self-
defense and averting present danger)� Likewise, the JSDF must cease its use of 
weapons if the attackers halt the attack and withdraw�83 
FILLING GAPS IN JAPANESE LAW
While U�S� forces operate flexibly—by executive order, and without consider-
ing gaps between the gravest forms of the use of force and other, less grave 
104
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/1
 K R A S K A  &  S A I T O  9 9
forms—Japan requires specific laws that direct the JSDF to conduct operations 
in response to threats that constitute the gravest forms of the use of force (i�e�, 
armed attack)� Japan then is permitted to respond under the right of national 
self-defense� 
Owing to the stricter definition of armed attack in Japan, however, the country 
must consider whether an attack is organized and reflects the belligerent inten-
tion of an aggressor state or quasi state (e�g�, Hezbollah) to qualify as an armed 
attack� This threshold is high, and the JSDF may act only under specific laws 
discussed in the preceding “Tactical Situations Short of War” section on the use 
of weapons to respond to threats that lie below the threshold of armed attack� 
This section explores the JSDF laws enacted to fill these gaps in the use-of-force 
architecture, including maritime-security operations (MSOs) and destruction 
measures against inbound ballistic missiles�
Maritime Security Operations in Response to Gray-Zone Challenges
In peacetime, the JCG is responsible for confronting ships that violate Japanese 
law in the territorial waters of Japan; the JMSDF does not have such authority� 
However, if the challenge overwhelms the capabilities of the JCG, the JMSDF may 
respond under provisions providing for the ordering of an MSO�84 
The JMSDF has authority to conduct MSOs, with this authority deriving from 
the Coast Guard Law, so the exercise of this authority is deemed to be neces-
sary for law enforcement�85 Applicable sections of the statute include article 16 
(request of cooperation for citizen and ship), article 17 (query, order to submit 
documents, order to stop ship, and ship visit), and article 18 (measures of dis-
placement, expulsion, takedown, and stopping a vessel)� There are three types 
of MSOs: operations against merchant shipping, operations against foreign war-
ships that have sovereign immunity from Japan’s jurisdiction, and operations 
against submerged submarines� For example, in November 2004, the JMSDF 
observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating in Japa-
nese territorial waters near the Sakishima Islands� In response, an MSO order 
was issued and JMSDF warships and aircraft tracked the submarine until it left 
the territorial sea�86 
During MSOs of the first type, the JMSDF may take measures against civilian 
merchant ships to determine whether they are violating Japan’s domestic law, in 
three circumstances� First, the JMSDF may confirm a violation, at which point it 
hands the merchant ship off to the JCG, which has judicial authority to investi-
gate and charge suspected criminals� Second, even if a ship has not violated the 
law, the JMSDF may expel it from Japan’s territorial waters if the vessel is believed 
to pose a threat to or contribute to a deterioration of public order in the territo-
rial sea�87 Third, the JMSDF may use weapons against civilian ships if necessary 
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for unit self-defense and to overcome resistance, but the use of these weapons to 
harm people is limited to “averting present danger�”88 
In the three circumstances discussed above, the use of weapons is limited to 
that extent reasonably necessary in the circumstances� Weapons may be used, 
for example, if a foreign ship ignores an order to stop or attempts to resist the 
JMSDF� In such a scenario, the minister of defense must certify that the following 
four conditions are met: (1) An alleged civilian ship is a foreign-flagged vessel, is 
conducting noninnocent passage in Japan’s territorial sea, and has no justification 
for its actions� (2) If the ship is left unchallenged, it is highly likely the harmful 
conduct will be repeated in the future� (3) There is a suspicion that the presence 
of the ship is in preparation for conducting some “serious and heinous” (felony) 
crime� (4) It is impossible to prevent these criminal acts simply by obtaining in-
formation from, stopping, and visiting the suspect ship� In addition to the defense 
minister’s certification, there is an additional condition: (5) The commanding 
officer of the JMSDF warship must believe there is no alternative to firing at the 
ship to stop it�89 
In the second type of MSO, the procedures may be used against a foreign war-
ship that is in the territorial sea but not conducting innocent passage� This ap-
plication of authority is different from that used against a civilian ship, because a 
warship has sovereign immunity from foreign jurisdiction� Therefore, the JMSDF 
may not use force to compel compliance on the part of the foreign warship but 
instead must request that it comply, requiring it to leave the territorial sea� In 
such a case, Japan operates in accordance with article 30 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires foreign warships 
not in innocent passage to “leave the territorial sea immediately�”90 
In the third type of MSO, submerged submarines operating in Japan’s ter-
ritorial sea are in violation of innocent passage and pose yet another scenario 
that requires countermeasures� Under UNCLOS, a foreign submarine in the 
territorial sea is required to transit on the surface and show its flag�91 The JCG is 
not equipped to respond to the threat of submerged submarines, so the JMSDF 
may conduct MSOs in such circumstances� Although MSOs normally require 
a cabinet decision and the approval of the prime minister, these formalities are 
dispensed with in the case of a submerged submarine; the prime minister may 
approve this type of MSO without awaiting a decision of the cabinet�92 The 
JMSDF may track and report underwater contacts until the prime minister 
issues an MSO, which authorizes the JMSDF to request any submerged subma-
rine to surface� Even if the submarine continues to navigate submerged in the 
territorial sea, force (the use of weapons) may not be employed to repel it until 
an MSO is issued�93 
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Ballistic-Missile Defense
Japan and the United States also differ in how they approach authority to conduct 
ballistic-missile-defense operations� The U�S� president has authority to respond 
to and destroy inbound ballistic missiles that threaten the United States�94 In 
Japan, the JSDF can use force in such a scenario only after the Diet makes the de-
termination of an armed-attack situation or survival-threatening situation and the 
prime minister initiates an order for the JSDF to commence defense operations� 
If a ballistic missile is launched against Japan under this situation, the JSDF has 
authority to intercept it in flight; however, the elapsed time between the launch of 
a missile by North Korea and its impact on Japan might be just four minutes, so 
requiring the procedures discussed above would not be practical�95 North Korea 
often has launched ballistic missiles under the guise of placing a satellite into 
orbit� Given the ambiguity involved in each such launch, Japan’s government has 
no time to approve the determination of an armed-attack situation or survival-
threatening situation, or to deem that the launch constitutes the gravest form of 
the use of force, or to interpret the action as an armed attack, any of which could 
trigger the national right of self-defense�
To address this dilemma, the Japanese government enacted the Law Concern-
ing Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles to provide separate legal 
subauthority to counter the threat of ballistic missiles�96 This law applies when 
the intention of the nation launching a rocket into outer space is unknown, the 
timing of the launch is unknown, and the object to be launched into space is not 
known but may be harmful if it strikes Japan� Under the category of “destruc-
tion measures against ballistic missiles,” the JSDF may use advanced weapons 
for ballistic-missile defense, including the Standard Missile–3s installed on 
JMSDF Aegis destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability–3s� 
These measures constitute another form of the use of weapons and not the use of 
force� Ironically, this means that Japan uses what is essentially a law-enforcement 
authority to respond to time-critical threats from ballistic missiles, rockets for 
artificial satellites, and other objects in flight (except aircraft) flying toward Ja-
pan that may cause serious damage to citizens and properties�97 Importantly, this 
law targets only missiles incoming to Japanese territory; it does not cover the 
interception of ballistic missiles bound for the United States or other countries� 
While this authority might be used to counter inbound hypersonic glide vehicles, 
antiballistic-missile technology may be ineffective against them�
Public-Security Operations
In the United States, the National Guard of each state may respond to a collapse 
of public order or security that police forces cannot handle� In contrast, the Posse 
Comitatus Act restricts the U�S� Army from engaging in law enforcement within 
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the United States�98 But since Japan does not possess a National Guard or an 
equivalent militia force, the JSDF would respond in such situations�
In Japan, there are two legal bases for the JSDF to conduct operations to secure 
the public safety� The prime minister, with the consent of the Diet, may order a 
public-security operation when it is deemed that the public security cannot be 
maintained by law enforcement alone, including because of indirect aggression, 
such as an insurgency�99 The prime minister also may order a public-security op-
eration if a prefectural governor requests such, to maintain the peace in serious 
situations�100 In both cases, the JSDF is authorized to exercise police functions and 
use weapons to prevent, control, and quell riots and to guard high-priority offi-
cials, without the necessity to consider questions of self-defense under article 36 
or averting present danger under article 37 of the Penal Code, which are beyond 
the purview of the policy�101
JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
While historically the maintenance of international peace, more generally con-
sidered, was beyond the purview of the U�S�-Japan alliance, in recent years Japan 
has taken steps to contribute more fully to global society� Section V�B� of the 2015 
“Guidelines” sets forth the global importance of the U�S�-Japan alliance and the 
need for greater cooperation with regional and other partners�102 After the 2015 
version of “Guidelines” was adopted, Japan enacted several laws to authorize the 
JSDF to conduct operations related, and contributing more broadly, to the main-
tenance of international peace and security�
For these purposes, three statutory bases exist� First, Japan may conduct op-
erations to support U�S� forces and those of other foreign countries� Second, the 
JSDF may initiate maritime operations to enforce UN Security Council sanctions 
effectively� Third, the JSDF may engage in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)� 
When operating under one of these three authorities, the JSDF may be required 
to comply with special limitations imposed on its operations� To facilitate in-
teroperability, it is imperative for U�S� forces and other partner nations operating 
with the JSDF to understand the scope of those limitations�
Situations That Influence Japan’s Peace and Security
In limited situations, Japan may support U�S� forces engaged in operations 
aimed at containing or unwinding local or regional conflicts� Japan’s constitu-
tion allows the JSDF to operate to promote peace in Japan, so the supported 
operations must have some nexus to Japan’s security� In these operations, the 
JSDF is permitted to act in situations or scenarios deemed to have an “impor-
tant influence on Japan’s peace and security” but that fall below the threshold of 
an armed-attack situation in national self-defense or a survival-threatening situ-
ation under collective self-defense� The law defines “situations that influence 
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Japan’s peace and security” as those that, if left unattended, could result in a 
direct armed attack on Japan, with important consequences for Japan’s peace 
and security� In such situations, the JSDF can support U�S� and other foreign 
armed forces engaged in operations that contribute to the objectives of the 
bilateral security treaty and promote the goals of the UN Charter� Importantly, 
there is no geographic limitation to this authority, so Japan could decide that 
a situation that occurred outside the region could influence Japan’s peace and 
security, such as a NATO contingency in Europe� The Diet must approve a find-
ing in advance that this type of situation exists, although ex post facto approval 
is allowed in an emergency�103 
The law to authorize operations in response to “situations that influence Ja-
pan’s peace and security” covers provision of military logistics, search-and-rescue 
(SAR) capabilities, ship-inspection operations, and other necessary measures� 
Japan differentiates ship-inspection operations from maritime-interception op-
erations, as discussed in the next section� The JSDF also may provide supplies; 
repair and maintenance services; communications; medical services; airport, 
seaport, and other transportation services; base activities (lodging, storage, and 
military use of facilities); and training services� While the provision of weapons 
is not included within the scope of this authority, the supplying of combat-related 
ammunition and the refueling and maintenance of aircraft are included� These 
measures may be undertaken in other countries, with the consent of the foreign 
states involved�104 
Ship-Inspection Operations
In an armed-conflict situation, the JMSDF may conduct the belligerent right of 
visit and search to determine the character of ships and cargo, locate contraband, 
and identify potential military targets� Such operations are conducted pursuant 
to Japan’s right to use force in national self-defense� In such cases, Japan also may 
regulate neutral shipping�105
The belligerent right of visit and search during armed conflict at sea is dis-
tinguished from peacetime ship-inspection operations (SIOs), which may be 
conducted to secure effective compliance with economic sanctions� The JMSDF 
may conduct an SIO under the domestic legal authority of an important influence 
situation, pursuant to the International Peace Support Act and to enforcing UN 
Security Council resolutions, or through obtaining the consent of the flag state�106
Compared with SIOs, maritime-interception operations (MIOs) encompass a 
broader range of activities at sea, including querying the master of a vessel; order-
ing it to stop; boarding, inspecting, and searching it; and even seizing the vessel 
and cargo� In addition to exercising its belligerent rights under the law of naval 
warfare, Japan may conduct MIOs pursuant to flag-state and master’s consent, as 
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enforcement measures against stateless vessels, when exercising the right of self-
defense, and as a condition of port entry�107 MIOs also may be used to enforce 
Security Council mandates, including diversion into port for inspection, while 
SIOs are limited to requesting a change of destination�108 While in an MIO the 
firing of warning shots is permitted as a communications signal to a noncompli-
ant vessel, in an SIO warning shots are not permitted� Because MIOs and SIOs 
are so different, the separate geographic areas in which they apply are specified�
Peacekeeping Operations
Japan has considered deploying JSDF units in support of PKOs to signify that 
the country has shouldered the role of responsible stakeholder in the community 
of nations�109 The JSDF may conduct international peace-cooperation activities 
not directly related to Japan’s security under two laws: the International Peace 
Cooperation Act (IPCA) and the International Peace Support Act (IPSA)� Both 
require Diet approval, in two-year increments�
The IPCA provides the legal basis for the JSDF to contribute to UN PKOs, 
international humanitarian-relief operations, and international election ob-
servations�110 When such JSDF deployments are made, they are subject to five 
conditions: (1) The JSDF will not participate unless an agreement on a cease-fire 
has been reached among the parties to an armed conflict� (2–3) Consent for the 
conduct of UN PKOs, as well as Japan’s participation in such operations, shall 
have been obtained from the host country and the parties to the conflict� (4) The 
operations shall maintain strict impartiality and not favor any of the parties in the 
conflict� (5) The International Peace Cooperation Corps of Japan may suspend 
operations if these rules are not followed�111 
IPCA operations must be based on resolutions of the UN General Assem-
bly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council; or requested by 
UN organs established by the General Assembly or specialized agencies, funds, 
and programs, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; 
or otherwise specified by an order from the cabinet, regional organizations as 
prescribed in article 52 of the UN Charter, or organs established by multilateral 
treaties� The missions must be undertaken at the request of the countries in the 
area in which they are conducted�112 
JSDF personnel who are engaged in duties under the IPCA may use their 
weapons to the extent considered necessary and proper in light of the situation� 
This standard is determined according to the following formula:
1� When there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means 
other than the use of weapons will protect against physical harm or death 
of (a) themselves (the JSDF personnel in question); (b) other JSDF person-
nel operating with them; or (c) personnel of Japan’s International Peace 
110
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/1
 K R A S K A  &  S A I T O  1 0 5
Cooperation Corps working in the line of duty or who have come under 
the protection of JSDF personnel
2� When there are attacks against JSDF personnel jointly stationed with 
foreign personnel, such as foreign armed forces’ units, and there are 
reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign 
personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other 
personnel stationed together
3� With regard to JSDF personnel engaged in so-called safety-ensuring 
operations and JSDF personnel engaged in kaketsuke-keigo operations 
(the protection of individuals in response to an urgent request), when 
there are reasonable grounds for determining that there exist no 
appropriate means of overcoming such situations except for the use of 
weapons to protect their own lives, bodies, or assets or those of other 
individuals, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties113
The use of weapons under the IPCA shall not cause harm to persons except 
for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting 
present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan�
The IPSA provides a second legal basis for the JSDF to participate in 
international-cooperation activities�114 While the IPCA covers PKOs, the IPSA cov-
ers logistics support, SAR activities, and SIOs� These operations may be conducted 
in accordance with resolutions of the UN General Assembly or Security Council� 
Since such operations, as conducted by the JSDF, do not constitute an exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense, deployed units must avoid integration with 
the operations of the armed forces of foreign states during this type of mission�115 
Therefore, the JSDF does not conduct such support activities in combat zones�
Use of weapons under the IPSA is more limited than under the rules set forth 
in the IPCA� While the rules for the use of weapons are similar under the two 
statutes, under the IPSA safety-ensuring operations and kaketsuke-keigo are not 
authorized� In the event of an attack within a military installation or camp, JSDF 
personnel may use weapons when there are no alternative locations within the 
vicinity to ensure the safety of JSDF units and other personnel� As with the IPCA, 
the use of weapons pursuant to the IPSA shall not cause harm to persons except 
for cases falling under article 36 (individual self-defense) or article 37 (averting 
present danger) of the Penal Code of Japan�
The bilateral U�S�-Japan security partnership is the most important alliance 
in the most important part of the world� It upholds the values that undergird 
international peace and stability in East Asia� The two powerful democracies, 
however, operate within distinct national legal systems and their interpretations 
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of international law sometimes differ� The U�S� Constitution affords the president 
virtually unlimited authority to respond to foreign threats, deploy forces, and use 
force to defend U�S� interests, whereas the prime minister of Japan typically must 
seek a specific legal basis for every JSDF action� The Japanese approach requires 
time to coordinate the action with the Diet and gain the approval of key lawmak-
ers, which opens a vulnerability that an adversary might exploit during a time 
of crisis� While Japan may exercise the right of collective self-defense in limited 
situations—when faced with existential threats to its security—without first go-
ing through the Diet, the American approach is much less restrictive�
Compared with the United States, Japan defines armed attack and use of force 
more strictly� It allows the JSDF to use force, but in narrowly prescribed situa-
tions, and then only after adhering to strict intergovernmental processes� Japan 
also recognizes a gap between an armed attack and the right of self-defense in 
international law, while the United States does not� The United States, therefore, 
may resort to the use of force against a hostile act or even a demonstration of 
hostile intent� These differences in interpretations of international law and con-
stitutional structures have produced distinct legislation and authority for the 
JSDF and U�S� armed forces�
The current security environment is most likely to highlight these differences 
in three situations� First, the role of the U�S�-Japan alliance is changing from one 
focused purely on defense of Japan toward an alliance that contributes more 
broadly to international peace and security in East Asia� The 2015 U�S�-Japan 
Guidelines, for example, have embraced this broader vision and make it clear that 
the alliance is important for regional security and the protection of the global 
commons� Because of this shift, the JSDF will be required to conduct combined 
operations with U�S� forces in a manner not contemplated in the 1950s or ’60s� 
On such occasions, the two countries’ distinct interpretations of international 
law and their different ROEs will have to be integrated into operational force 
planning�
Second, the United States and Japan are encountering gray-zone challenges 
that add an additional layer of complexity, as they fall between clearly articu-
lated legal doctrines of peacetime law enforcement and the use of force during 
armed conflict� For Japan, Chinese encroachment on the Senkaku Islands is the 
greatest among these threats� With regard to Japan’s legal system, the concept 
of the gray zone encompasses scenarios that arise before the Diet makes the 
determination of an armed-attack situation, which means the JSDF cannot use 
force in national self-defense; instead, Japan must respond to such situations by 
applying law-enforcement rules on the use of force, which include restriction of 
the use of force to that necessary and reasonable under the circumstances, and 
only as a last resort�
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The United States and Japan will act jointly in a global commons that is 
threatened by states’ use of advanced technology to weaken the bilateral alliance� 
Threats in the cyber domain and outer space can keep the two allies off balance 
and confused, while the conventional land, air, and sea domains are affected by 
disruptive new methods and means of war that upset traditional legal paradigms, 
such as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence� While states and scholars 
grapple with these emerging threats through efforts such as the Tallinn Manual in 
cyberspace and the forthcoming Woomera Manual in outer space, the JSDF and 
U�S� armed forces can gain an edge by ensuring greater interoperability and syn-
chronizing their understanding of the law of naval operations�116 The revision of 
the San Remo Manual also is indicative of emerging threats, such as autonomous, 
distributed naval forces, and the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College and 
the U�S� Naval War College have aligned their efforts in this regard�117 Given the 
difficulty in obtaining agreement on international law in these areas, the United 
States and Japan can serve as thought leaders to shape the progressive develop-
ment of international law�
Although the two allies share similar values favoring a free and open interna-
tional order, their histories, cultures, and political systems diverge� The differ-
ences do not affect the importance of the U�S�-Japan alliance or its commitment 
to respond to security threats large and small� Therefore, the allies should invest 
more effort into improving legal interoperability and ensuring synchronization 
of integrated operational force planning, to be better positioned to respond to 
contingencies arising in East Asia� This article provides a point of departure to 
achieve greater alliance cohesion�
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CONDITIONAL SURRENDER
Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945
Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira
Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate col-
lapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to 
the total extinction of human civilization.
EMPEROR HIROHITO, 15 AUGUST 1945
 With the statement above, Emperor Hirohito announced to his people that Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, bringing to 
an end the savage fighting in the Pacific� Two weeks later aboard the battleship 
USS Missouri, as General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester W� Nimitz, and 
a host of other senior Allied leaders looked on stoically, the Japanese military 
and civilian leadership signed the Instrument of Surrender officially terminating 
hostilities� The three and a half years of fighting between the United States and 
Japan had been particularly ruthless and bloody, with an estimated 110,000 U�S� 
military personnel killed in the Pacific theater� Casualty figures for Japan were 
staggering, with over two million military personnel and civilians killed, while 
entire sections of major Japanese cities had been reduced to ashes�1
Although the United States remained focused throughout the war on planning 
and executing campaigns and operations to defeat both Germany and Japan, it 
also spent critical time planning how best to terminate the conflict—on terms 
favorable to American interests� Although by August 1945 the United States had 
established military ascendancy, casualties had continued to mount with each 
successive operation� The unprecedentedly grim numbers of casualties for com-
batants and civilians combined that were projected for an invasion of Japan easily 
would surpass those of previous campaigns, so it was essential to avoid them if at 
all possible� Furthermore, Allied statesmen hoped that all the war’s military and 
civilian casualties would not have been in vain but would lead to a postwar world 
free of German and Japanese militarism, and authoritarianism in general� How 
and why this global conflict reached its conclusion in the Pacific as it did, and the 
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nature of that conclusion as seen from the perspective of both the United States 
and Japan, will be the subject of this article�
This study focuses on the military aspects of conflict termination but does not 
ignore the higher-level, political influence on terminating military operations� In 
general, a combatant seeks to terminate hostilities so as to make peace on terms 
that are aligned with its national interests over the long term� In the Pacific in 
1945, the question of the future of the emperor was a key facet of both military 
and political aspects of termination; agreeing to a compromise of unconditional 
surrender that allowed continuation of a role for the emperor influenced Japan’s 
decision to surrender and helped set conditions for the longer-term development 
of democracy in Japan, as well as the stability of U�S�-Japanese relations�
Conflict termination is the formal end of major combat operations�2 The pro-
cess of terminating a conflict can be more difficult than initiating combat actions� 
Often civilian and military leaders must address numerous complex challenges 
if they are to terminate conflict and create conditions conducive to successful 
postconflict operations� In other words, starting a war is much easier than end-
ing one�3 How the critical transition from high-intensity conflict to termination 
of hostilities and then to postconflict operations is accomplished has a direct 
impact on whether operational victory can be transformed into strategic success� 
Consequently, political and military leaders face key planning considerations in 
terminating conflict�
The challenge of conflict termination is not simply to accomplish the dis-
continuation of hostilities at any particular point in time but to transition from 
combat to postconflict operations effectively� In essence, successful conflict ter-
mination should set the conditions for successful stability operations and lead 
directly to the achievement of the strategic objective� Normally, the strategic 
leadership of the victorious side in a conflict sets the terms and conditions of 
termination, but—as with everything else in war—the enemy certainly has a 
role� The cessation of hostilities cannot be a unilateral process, as ultimately the 
losing side decides when to terminate conflict� In World War II, both Germany 
and Japan continued to fight long after any reasonable expectation of attaining 
their objectives had vanished� In short, conflict termination can be a disorderly 
process� Setting the stage for a continued military and civilian presence after the 
termination of major combat operations is critical to any long-term success in a 
region� In other words, theater- and operational-level planning should not focus 
on ending hostilities at the expense of what comes next�
Despite the combatants’ strategic and operational focus on achieving military 
victory, the process of considering how to terminate the U�S�-Japanese conflict in 
the Pacific did not begin in 1945 but as early as mid-1943, after the United States 
had assaulted Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands� Notwithstanding 
120
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/1
 S H U S T E R  &  S H I M O DA I R A  1 1 5
the intense fighting between the combatants up to that point, with even larger and 
more-costly operations to follow, the strategic political and military leadership 
on both sides began to see the inevitability of a U�S� victory over Japan� Conse-
quently, each combatant began to study how to bring the war to an end on terms 
favorable to its own national interests� The United States pushed relentlessly for 
unconditional surrender, while Japan sought to force a negotiated settlement�
In planning for the termination of hostilities and the transition to postconflict 
operations, U�S� strategic planners feared the worst: revenge, retaliation, and in-
surgency�4 Fighting in the Pacific was particularly brutal, perhaps matched in its 
utter ruthlessness and racial overtones only by the four years of carnage between 
Germany and the Soviet Union� Yet the outcome of Japan’s defeat ended up hav-
ing a much different postscript: a peaceful transition to a new world order and 
the development of strong relations between the former enemies�
An examination of conflict termination in the Pacific in 1945 reveals three 
major themes: (1) its shaping by America’s relentless offensive operations aimed 
at defeating Japanese military power and obtaining political leverage; (2) a 
comprehensive U�S� understanding of the operational environment that helped 
frame detailed planning and termination criteria; and (3) the Japanese emperor’s 
ultimate embrace of the peace faction, upon realizing the futility of continued 
fighting� In the end, the victory came about through a conditional surrender that 
set the conditions for a smooth transition to postwar stability in Japan�
EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 1943–45:  
THE RELENTLESS PUSH TO THE END
The essence of conflict termination is “political leverage borne of battlefield suc-
cess,” and the Pacific theater in World War II provides the perfect illustration of 
this truth�5 The United States, after declaring that it sought nothing less than the 
unconditional surrender of Japan (and Germany), dedicated its offensive capabil-
ities to destroying the Japanese armed forces to a point at which the United States 
could enforce its will over the defeated nation� For its part, Japan aimed to inflict 
high casualties on U�S� forces to precipitate a conditional peace� Consequently, 
even after the final outcome became obvious to all, Allied offensive operations 
and strikes continued—right up until the final seconds of the war� In fact, both 
sides’ continued fierce fighting in ongoing operations and their planning of fu-
ture operations for the remainder of 1945 and beyond were characterized by an 
acceptance of the likelihood of staggering casualties, to position themselves bet-
ter to support their national interests�
Although the United States had stated clearly its strategic priority in the overall 
war effort as the defeat of Germany, it never lost sight of the ultimate strategic ob-
jective in the Pacific: the defeat of Japan� Only destruction of the Japanese armed 
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forces could prevent Japanese aggression in the Pacific and restore U�S� national 
interests in the region� From President Franklin D� Roosevelt’s initial December 
1941 call for “absolute victory” to the more comprehensive January 1943 decla-
ration of the goal of “unconditional surrender,” the United States transitioned 
from an initial strategic defensive into an all-out offensive to destroy Japan’s war-
making capability and enforce its will on a defeated enemy�
At a higher level, America’s desired end state is more difficult to determine 
than the concise declaration of “unconditional surrender” communicates� Dis-
cernible from the war aims listed in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 
and other strategic-level policy statements, the desired end state of the Allies 
amounted to the restoration of Japanese-occupied territories, the creation of 
conditions that would prevent Japanese aggression against peace and security, 
and the emergence in Japan of a government that respected the international 
world order�6 
By the start of 1943, the tide of war in the Pacific had turned decidedly in 
favor of the United States� American forces had halted Japanese advances in New 
Guinea and extended their own lines of operation along its coast, while gaining a 
critical base of operations on Guadalcanal� Toward the end of January 1943, at the 
Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston 
S� Churchill agreed that the Allies would seek a more definitive strategic objective 
in both Europe and the Pacific: the unconditional surrender of both Germany 
and Japan� The two leaders were determined to bring peace “to the world only 
by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power,” with “the simple for-
mula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender 
by Germany, Italy, and Japan�” Instead of destroying the “populace” of the enemy 
nations, they advocated destroying the “philosophy” that was based on “conquest 
and subjugation�”7 In other words, the strategic objective had two major elements, 
military and political, that amounted to the destruction of enemy armed forces 
and the development of democratic governments that aligned with the Allies’ 
national interests�
Planning at the theater and operational levels of war had a significant impact 
on termination of the conflict in the Pacific on terms favorable to U�S� national 
interests� In essence, planning is where battlefield success begins� The overall 
strategic plan for the defeat of Japan was to advance westward and northwest-
ward, along two main axes of advance from the central and southwest Pacific, 
respectively, with the two campaigns conducted at a mutually supportive distance 
from each other� Campaign plans developed by the planning staffs of the two 
major theater commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, employed 
U�S� forces in a series of logical steps toward the ultimate objective: the Japanese 
mainland� MacArthur’s forces in the Southwest Pacific Area would advance 
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northwest from New Guinea to the Philippine Islands, while Nimitz’s forces in the 
Pacific Ocean Areas would advance west through the Solomon, Gilbert, Marshall, 
and Mariana Islands before supporting MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines in 
October 1944� Both MacArthur’s MUSKETEER plans to seize the Philippines and 
Nimitz’s Campaign Plan GRANITE, which laid out the sequence of island-hopping 
assaults in the Pacific for 1944, illustrate the two theater commanders’ mastery 
of the application of operational art to achieve theater strategic objectives� By the 
end of 1944, the success of these two prongs would destroy the bulk of Japanese 
naval and air power, pushing Japan to the brink of defeat by the spring of 1945�
By mid-1943, when Nimitz’s forces still were fighting for control of the Solo-
mon Islands and MacArthur’s forces were continuing to fight in New Guinea, the 
U�S� Joint Staff planners had developed an accurate assessment of Japanese inten-
tions and capabilities that would be instrumental in planning for Japan’s defeat� In 
short, the Joint Staff knew that Japan’s ability to “establish undisputed control of 
an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific” and to be “self-sufficient economi-
cally” even then was slipping away� Japan was now on the strategic defensive, 
with any hopes for achieving victory resting on (perceived) Allied war weariness� 
American planners understood that Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
had become vulnerable to attack, and that “ultimately greatly superior forces can 
be directed against her�”8 
But even in mid-August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the Allies’ stra-
tegic planning staff that oversaw all operations in the war—still had some differ-
ences of opinion with regard to how to end the conflict with Japan� Together they 
were optimistic that termination of the conflict in Europe would allow a “reori-
entation” of Allied forces to the Pacific�9 While agreeing that the overall strategy 
to defeat Japan required retaining China as an ally, destroying Japanese naval 
and air power, blockading Japan, and conducting large-scale strategic bombing 
of the homeland, American and British planners disagreed on the details� Britain 
thought the target date of defeating Japan one year after Germany was too opti-
mistic, and pushed for Nimitz’s central Pacific campaign to be the main effort, as 
opposed to the mutually supporting campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur that 
the U�S� Chiefs of Staff advocated�10 But these differences were worked out in 
short order—building a consensus in planning for the defeat of Japan that, while 
difficult to achieve, was a necessary condition for a lasting victory�
By the end of 1943, the United States and Britain had agreed on how best 
to defeat Japan� A Combined Chiefs of Staff report entitled “Overall Plan for 
the Defeat of Japan” laid out a clear strategy to achieve victory, and it drove all 
subsequent planning at the theater level of war� No longer disagreeing about 
whether the campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had to be mutually support-
ing, but instead acknowledging that the central Pacific drive could result in “a 
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more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communication,” the 
United States and Britain agreed to conduct intensive bombing and to establish 
an air and sea blockade of Japan, thereby setting the conditions for an assault of 
the Japanese mainland, if necessary� The result would be the destruction of the 
Japanese fleet and air force, the isolation of Japan, and the conduct of carrier-
based attacks on the home islands� The two allies also agreed to take advantage 
of any Soviet intervention in the Pacific War� The planners still hedged their bets 
with regard to plans for future operations, stating that a major assault would take 
place in spring 1945 in the Formosa-Luzon-China area�11 Nonetheless, Nimitz’s 
Campaign Plan GRANITE was the clear result of the Combined Chiefs guidance, 
and the admiral and his staff sequenced all subsequent operations in the central 
Pacific (including in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) “to force the sur-
render of Japan�”12 
As U�S� operations throughout 1944 successfully swept up from the southwest 
Pacific and central Pacific, strategic planners wrestled with what should come 
next� The critical question was whether to seize Formosa or Luzon on the way to 
Japan� The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that a key to the defeat of Japan lay 
in China; the United States planned to launch an “overwhelming air offensive” 
from bases there, and eventually to seize a port in China�13 Therefore, seizing 
Formosa was a strategic priority, because doing so would cut the SLOCs between 
Japan and its Southern Resource Area, provide a base from which to bomb Japan, 
and establish a supply route to China�14 
Differences of opinion between Nimitz and MacArthur over what would con-
tribute most to the defeat of Japan led to a meeting with President Roosevelt in 
July 1944 to resolve the issue� MacArthur argued decisively that Luzon offered 
the greater advantages, both militarily and politically, while Nimitz favored by-
passing Luzon for Formosa� Nimitz eventually would change his mind, after the 
Japanese seized coastal areas in China in September 1944� By December, the JCS 
directed MacArthur to assault Luzon and Nimitz to execute his planned assaults 
of Iwo Jima and Okinawa� Interestingly, the JCS never officially terminated plan-
ning for Formosa; in the end, events simply would make the point moot�15 
Once the decision to strike at Luzon was made, the major question that re-
mained in the Pacific—which drove heated discussions through the spring of 
1945—was whether the United States could defeat Japan through blockade and 
bombardment or instead would have to conduct an actual massive assault on the 
industrial heartland of Japan� The joint planners still hedged their bets at the start 
of 1945; they believed an assault on Kyushu would help intensify the blockade 
and air bombardment of Japan, as well as set conditions for a follow-on assault 
on Honshu�16 The Joint Chiefs knew that difficult fighting remained and warned 
that such an invasion might have to wait until 1946� In fact, the British Chiefs of 
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Staff now feared that it would take up to two years after the defeat of Germany to 
force unconditional surrender on Japan�17 
The key to defeating Japan was to destroy Japanese military and economic 
power by advancing closer to the home islands incrementally� By the beginning 
of 1945, the United States had cut the critical SLOCs between Japan and the 
Southern Resource Area, established bases closer to Japan for follow-on op-
erations, and all but destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as an effective 
fighting force� The series of campaigns and operations that seized decisive points 
throughout the southwest and central Pacific, through the Philippines, and to-
ward Japan itself had established the necessary conditions for a final assault on 
mainland Japan� The penultimate stage of the war included the seizure of Iwo 
Jima and Okinawa, two more decisive points along the main line of operations 
toward the ultimate objective� The capture of Iwo Jima gave the United States a 
forward air base at which to refuel B-29s from the Marianas and from which to 
provide fighter cover for the attacks on the main islands, as well as to act as a 
sanctuary at which damaged aircraft could make emergency landings�18 
Despite the plethora of military successes at the operational and theater levels 
in the Pacific, the United States still expected prolongation of the conflict� In 
May 1945, as Germany surrendered to the Allies only after a titanic battle in the 
streets of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs feared that Japan too would fight on at any cost 
to prevent the invasion of the home islands� They understood that “the prospect 
of the Emperor and the Imperial Family being in the hands of a foreign invader 
is repulsive and unthinkable to the Japanese�”19 Wary that the Japanese might sue 
for peace to prevent an actual occupation of Japan and fearful that the American 
public’s war weariness would lead to acceptance of such a conditional surrender 
in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs reemphasized that their objective was uncondi-
tional surrender�20 
To compel Japan to surrender, the United States continued to conduct strikes 
and attacks throughout the summer of 1945, right up to the final moments of 
the war� Once Okinawa fell to U�S� forces in June 1945, continued bombing by 
the Strategic Air Force in the Marianas, the Tactical Air Force on Okinawa, and 
the Third Fleet intensified pressure on Japan� Strategic bombing, especially by B-
29s conducting incendiary and low-level attacks, devastated Japanese cities and 
industrial areas, killing thousands of civilians in the process� Offensive mining, 
conducted under the aptly named Operation STARVATION, continued to isolate 
Japan from its critical SLOCs�21 In addition, the blockade of Japan through the 
destruction of its merchant shipping and naval fleet by air attacks and submarines 
cut off Japan from essential imports such as oil, coal, and iron ore�22 
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated whether to terminate 
the country’s military operations, U�S� strategic air, carrier-based air, and surface 
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forces continued to pound targets on the main islands of Japan� On 10 August, 
Nimitz warned that “the public announcement by the Japanese of counter pro-
posals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance 
against Japanese attacks” and that “offensive action shall be continued unless 
otherwise specifically directed�”23 In addition, on 14 August, General Carl A� 
Spaatz’s Twentieth Air Force bombed northern Honshu with over eight hundred 
B-29s, from the Marianas� Even on 15 August, the day on which Japan formally 
announced its surrender, over a hundred aircraft from Admiral William F� Halsey 
Jr�’s Third Fleet carriers struck Japanese airfields on Honshu—minutes before 
Nimitz’s order to “suspend attack air operations” was received�24 
The United States also leveraged its “information instrument of power” to 
compel Japan to surrender� Information operations aimed to convince Japanese 
decision makers and the Japanese people that continued resistance was hopeless� 
From February 1945 through the end of the war, U�S� naval aircraft and B-29s 
dropped millions of leaflets on the home islands� With the objective of cracking 
Japanese morale and pressuring the people to petition the emperor, the leaflets 
eventually warned civilians that their cities would be destroyed by B-29 raids and 
informed them of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, the atomic bomb attacks, 
and Soviet entry into the war�25 
With U�S� forces occupying Okinawa and preparing for the final assault, Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki in ruins, and Soviet forces driving deep into Manchuria, 
Japan’s strategic leadership eventually decided that it could resist no longer� In the 
end Japan surrendered, even as 2�5 million combat-equipped troops prepared to 
defend against the American assault forces poised to seize Kyushu and Honshu� 
Thus, by August 1945 successful U�S� military operations finally had created 
sufficient political leverage to force Japanese decision makers (both civilian and 
military) to cease hostilities�
PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION AND BEYOND:  
UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Thorough understanding of the operational environment played a key role in 
winning the war in the Pacific and would play a crucial role in winning the peace� 
Allied intelligence estimates, based on intercepts and decryption of Japanese 
diplomatic and military communications, allowed the United States to offset 
Japan’s advantages and exploit its weaknesses� In the final phase of the conflict 
in the Pacific, the United States developed a comprehensive picture of Japanese 
capabilities and intentions, which supported Allied plans for the final campaign 
against Kyushu and Honshu while simultaneously enlightening planners and 
decision makers regarding the primacy of the emperor to the nation of Japan� 
With this combination of a clear idea of how the Japanese military was preparing 
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to defend the mainland and the thinking of Japan’s national strategic leadership, 
the United States was able to conduct thorough planning for the final assault of 
Japan while concurrently developing termination criteria that not only suited its 
own national interests but also, eventually, appealed to the emperor and members 
of his inner circle�
In planning for conflict termination, the United States (and Britain) had de-
veloped a comprehensive assessment of the state of Japan’s military and political 
strengths and weaknesses� The Combined Chiefs of Staff had an accurate picture 
of Japan’s intent and capabilities that helped shape planning for the final cam-
paign of the war, as well as termination criteria that fell short of unconditional 
surrender� They correctly surmised that the Japanese equated unconditional sur-
render with “national extinction” and understood that the Japanese government 
in July 1945 wanted to “fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope 
of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining position in a 
negotiated peace�”26 
In addition, the U�S� State Department had formulated a plan to shape the 
termination debate and to establish a postwar occupation policy� Acting Secre-
tary of State Joseph C� Grew understood that preserving the institution of the 
emperor was an “irreducible” Japanese condition for surrender and that trying 
the emperor as a war criminal or abolishing the throne would lead to “prolonged 
resistance�”27 His counterpart in the War Department, Secretary of War Henry L� 
Stimson, agreed that if the United States acceded to maintaining a constitutional 
monarchy under the present emperor, then Japan would be much more likely to 
surrender�28 These powerful voices would help influence President Harry S� Tru-
man to accept conflict termination on terms short of unconditional surrender�
Planning the Final Assaults: OLYMPIC and CORONET
The campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had set the conditions for the final 
assault on the main islands of Japan itself� The critical question that remained, 
however, was whether such an assault was necessary to compel Japan to surren-
der or the same objective could be achieved with fewer American casualties via 
blockade and continued bombing�
By April 1945, the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that the invasion 
of Japan was a prerequisite to forcing unconditional surrender� They feared that 
bombardment and blockade could lead to a negotiated peace, and that only an 
assault on the Japanese home islands would force absolute surrender� They also 
questioned whether Japan ever actually would surrender and argued that the 
United States was compelled to bring about a “decisive military defeat�” The 
Joint Chiefs believed that only the military instrument of national power would 
achieve the ultimate objective of defeating Japan: “Unless a definition of uncon-
ditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no 
127
Naval War College: Summer 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 2 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will 
bring about capitulation�”29 
Additional fighting would not be easy� The planned operations—OLYMPIC 
and CORONET—were given an end date of June 1946, under the overall cover 
name DOWNFALL�30 Casualty estimates were high for both sides; for Operation 
OLYMPIC alone, casualties for U�S� forces were projected to be 150,000–160,000, 
including upward of 38,000 killed in action, while Japan was expected to suffer 
upward of 250,000 combatants and 380,000 civilians killed�31
Yet clearly the Joint Chiefs had listened to General MacArthur, who believed 
firmly that invading Kyushu and Honshu would be necessary� In a communica-
tion to General George C� Marshall, the Army chief of staff, MacArthur recom-
mended an attack on Kyushu, to provide land-based air cover for the ultimate 
objective, “a decisive assault on Honshu�” Dismissing two other courses of action 
to force Japan’s surrender—continued bombardment and blockade—as being too 
time-consuming, MacArthur argued that the assaults on Kyushu and Honshu 
“would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground, 
naval, and air, on the decisive objective�” In his estimation, the approach could 
force Japan to surrender earlier than anticipated� Amphibious assaults had been 
a staple of successful maritime warfare in MacArthur’s island-hopping campaigns 
in the Pacific throughout the war, and the general had no intention of dismissing 
the method that had been perfected over the preceding three years�32 
While MacArthur wholeheartedly supported an invasion of Japan, Nimitz 
advocated an alternate course of action� He saw great risk in a major assault on 
Kyushu and Honshu, for three reasons: Japan’s fighting capability in defensive 
warfare, the traditional Japanese refusal to surrender, and the use of suicide at-
tacks� Nimitz firmly believed that the defeat of Japan was inevitable and a direct 
assault rash� In a communication to Admiral Ernest J� King, Commander in 
Chief, U�S� Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, Nimitz argued in April 1945 
that “unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less 
than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the 
long range interests of the U�S� will be better served if we continue during 1945 
to isolate Japan and to destroy Jap[anese] forces and resources by naval and air 
attack�”33 Thus, the two U�S� theater commanders in the Pacific initially were at 
odds over how best to defeat Japan and bring the war to an end�
Soon, however, they would be coordinating their efforts in planning for the 
final assaults on Japan, because on 25 May the Joint Chiefs put an end to any re-
maining relevant discussion over the invasion of the Japanese home islands� They 
issued a planning directive to the theater commanders for the assault of Kyushu, 
Operation OLYMPIC, with a target date of 1 November 1945�34 The amphibi-
ous assault would be the largest in history and would be the first of two major 
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operations planned to seize Japan and force the enemy to surrender� American 
strategic leadership believed that success in these final operations would compel 
the Japanese to terminate the conflict and provide the United States with the 
utmost leverage to set conditions for long-term stability within the context of 
U�S� national interests� In a meeting with President Truman on 18 June, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, along with Stimson and Navy Secretary James V� Forrestal, were 
unanimous in their agreement that Operation OLYMPIC offered the best chance 
to defeat Japan once and for all�35 
Planning the Peace: BLACKLIST and CAMPUS
Although the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that capturing the home 
islands likely was the only way to compel the Japanese to surrender, they also 
ensured that contingency plans were drawn up so they could be executed if the 
Japanese surrendered at any time� On 14 June 1945, the chiefs directed both 
Nimitz and MacArthur to plan for the “sudden collapse or surrender of Japan” to 
ensure that the United States could take advantage of such a situation with regard 
to the subsequent occupation�36 As a result, both theater commanders drafted 
contingency plans—CAMPUS and BLACKLIST—that could be executed on Japan’s 
surrender� Thus, while winning the war was difficult enough, now the United 
States also would plan to win the peace� Once again, employing the right force 
at the right time and place would be paramount in translating a military victory 
into long-term strategic success�
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur synchronized their efforts in plan-
ning for the sudden surrender of Japan� By 3 August, just days before the sur-
render occurred, the two theater commanders had worked out all major issues�37 
Nimitz developed Operation CAMPUS to have three distinct phases: (1) the 
“emergency naval occupation of Tokyo Bay”; (2) the “complete deployment of 
naval occupation forces”; and (3) “amphibious operations connected with the 
occupation of Japan by U�S� Army forces�”38 CAMPUS became the naval compo-
nent of Operation BLACKLIST, detailing the naval and amphibious phases of the 
overall operation, focused on the rapid occupation of Tokyo Bay and other stra-
tegic areas as a prelude to the entry of U�S� Army forces� Its major tasks included 
conducting the amphibious phases of BLACKLIST and supporting the land phases 
of the occupation, maintaining the lines of communication to Japan, clearing 
minefields, ensuring the destruction or seizure of the remaining IJN fleet, and 
establishing naval and naval air facilities for follow-on operations�39 The plan also 
gave American occupation forces the authority to impose “drastic penalties” if 
they encountered Japanese noncompliance with U�S� postconflict directives� Pos-
sible sanctions and reprisals included the forced evacuation and destruction of 
communities, bombing, the destruction of property, and the taking of hostages�40
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MacArthur distributed the plan for Operation BLACKLIST on 8 August, one 
week before the Japanese surrender� The plan acted as a guide for “prompt action 
upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied,” including 
the control of Japanese military forces and civilians and the enforcement of the 
final terms of surrender�41 Overall, the plan consisted of a progressive occupation 
of fourteen areas in Japan (and some areas in Korea) that ensured American con-
trol of Japan’s instruments of national power� A key component of the plan was 
to use existing Japanese military and political organizations� This would reduce 
the number of U�S� forces required for occupation duty and allow for a degree of 
stability in the rebuilding process of Japan� Still, the plan called for the occupation 
of Japan with a total force of over seven hundred thousand U�S� forces� The initial 
focus of BLACKLIST would be to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including 
disarming Japanese forces immediately and establishing control over communi-
cations�42 BLACKLIST would go into effect immediately on Japan’s surrender�
The Atomic Bomb and Entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War
Two final factors—the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific War—exerted additional pressure on 
the Japanese government to surrender and emphasized the point that the United 
States was still seeking unlimited means to destroy Japan� There were, and would 
be, few, if any, restrictions on the means pursued and efforts wielded to achieve 
battlefield success in pursuit of political leverage to affect a postwar settlement�
Historians have written much about the atomic bomb being the decisive fac-
tor in forcing surrender, somewhat less assessing the overall impact of the Soviet 
intervention�43 However, the use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities and 
the Soviet invasion of Japanese-occupied territory were merely additional, and 
certainly not the only, factors in forcing the Japanese government to surrender� 
Asserting any such single or narrow explanation for Japan’s surrender ignores two 
critical contributions up to that point: the relentless push of offensive operations 
that already had driven Japan to the brink of military defeat, and a comprehensive 
understanding of the strategic and operational environments that had allowed 
the Allies to plan for war termination and to develop effective termination crite-
ria that would lead the Japanese to accede to surrendering� Although these issues 
still are debated hotly today, the fact that by 1945 the United States had reduced 
Japanese military strength significantly and had captured key island chains al-
ready had established the conditions in which these final two events took place�44 
The use of the bombs certainly stunned Japan’s strategic leadership, but mostly 
it reinforced the existing intentions of both the war and peace factions, respec-
tively to continue or terminate operations�45 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria 
on 9 August added to Japan’s desperate situation� Earlier in the war, the U�S� Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had supported Soviet armed intervention against Japan, arguing 
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that “every effort should be made to bring the U�S�S�R� into the war against Japan 
at the earliest practicable date�”46 After Germany surrendered, the Soviets had 
agreed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to launch an invasion of Japanese-
held territory� News of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stunned Japan’s strategic 
leadership, but it too essentially reinforced the existing beliefs of both the war and 
peace factions that surrounded the emperor�47 
The confluence of ongoing U�S� operations, the use of the atomic bombs, and 
the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory emphasize the nearly unlimited nature 
of the war the Allies waged to gain political leverage� One final piece—American 
willingness to compromise on unconditional surrender—would give Japan’s stra-
tegic leadership an olive branch to grasp�
Potsdam and Conditional Surrender
One of the greatest challenges for American strategic leadership in the Pacific 
War was the transition from war to peace� At the end of a conflict characterized 
by its brutality, enormous cost in military and civilian lives, and racial overtones, 
how could the United States establish long-term stability in the region, to ensure 
that the achievement of the strategic objective of (almost) unconditional surren-
der would not be ephemeral? By developing and acting on a holistic understand-
ing of the operational environment—particularly the primacy to the Japanese 
people and leadership of the imperial family—the United States was able to ap-
peal to the peace faction and make inroads into the war faction, enabling it to end 
the conflict without conducting a bloody assault on the main islands�
The Potsdam Declaration, signed by the United States, Britain, and China on 
26 July 1945, made it clear to Japan that continued resistance would be met with 
a united military response� The Allies offered a simple but blunt choice: uncon-
ditional surrender or “prompt and utter destruction�” Continuation of the war 
therefore promised Japan a grim future� Unconditional surrender amounted to 
acceptance of the occupation of Japanese territory until Japan eliminated milita-
rism, disarmed its armed forces and industry, and accepted war crimes trials�48 
At this point, there was no specific mention of the fate of the emperor and the 
imperial system, but it soon became a key sticking point affecting the decision 
whether to terminate hostilities�
Although unconditional surrender had been the clear American objective for 
over two years, cracks in its foundation began to appear in 1945� The critical is-
sue that emerged within U�S� (as well as Japanese) strategic leadership circles in 
the waning days of the war was the role of the emperor in postwar Japan� In fact, 
short of conducting an all-out assault on the Japanese home islands, achieving a 
cessation of hostilities in the Pacific depended on it� There were two schools of 
thought in the United States; those who favored keeping the emperor included 
Secretary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of State Grew, and Chief of Staff to the 
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Commander in Chief Admiral William D� Leahy, while those who advocated his 
removal included Secretary of State James F� Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of State 
Dean G� Acheson, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull�
The first group argued that failure to preserve the emperor would prolong 
the war—in particular, that Japanese forces would recognize only the author-
ity of the emperor with regard to surrender� As early as 1943 Grew had argued 
that after the war the Japanese throne could “serve as a cornerstone for healthy 
and peaceful internal growth�”49 He believed that maintaining the emperor 
could hasten Japan’s surrender without the need for a bloody assault on the 
home islands�50 Stimson agreed that if the United States proposed maintaining 
“a constitutional monarchy” under the present emperor, then Japan would be 
much more likely to surrender�51 Leahy, who as military adviser to the president 
had considerable influence on this question, warned President Truman that 
insistence on unconditional surrender would lead to Japanese desperation and 
increased U�S� casualties�52 
The second school of thought believed that keeping the emperor—the symbol 
of Japanese militarism—would encourage the militarists and thereby prolong the 
war, as well as create political problems back in America� Hull considered that 
anything short of unconditional surrender was “appeasement,” while Byrnes ar-
gued that the United States must set the terms of surrender�53 In addition, “uncon-
ditional surrender” was a powerful motto back home; the majority of Americans 
supported it and saw the emperor as a war criminal�54 
In the end, conditional surrender won the day� Sizable Japanese forces still 
waited in the home islands and others were scattered across China, Southeast 
Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies� Allied civilian and military leaders under-
stood the critical importance of the emperor as the figure who could order the 
surrender of fighters who otherwise would be willing to carry on to the death�
Navy Secretary Forrestal’s proposal to keep the emperor in place but follow 
the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration provided a way out for 
both combatants� On 10 August, Japan finally agreed to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration, with the added condition of preserving the emperor� The following 
day, Secretary of State Byrnes sent a reply through official channels in which the 
Allies insisted that the authority of the emperor be subject to the authority of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (General MacArthur)�55 In this way 
an uneasy, and rather vague, compromise to unconditional surrender was worked 
out� President Truman feared domestic political backlash but agreed to the com-
promise, stating simply: “They wanted to keep the Emperor� We told ’em we’d tell 
’em how to keep him, but we’d make the terms�”56 Despite contentious debates 
within American and Japanese strategic leadership circles, the former combatants 
had found an acceptable solution to end the war in the Pacific�
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THE EMPEROR AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEACE FACTION
History is rife with instances in which a combatant facing certain defeat contin-
ued to fight on long after there was any chance of achieving his or its objectives� 
This is particularly true when a nation is confronted with an existential threat to 
its way of life�
Yet political leverage still can exert a significant influence on conflict termina-
tion—even when wielded by the vanquished� The acquisition and retention of 
political leverage was a primary factor that drove Japanese planning for the final 
defense of the mainland� The concept was no different from plans Japan had 
made and executed the previous year, when Japanese forces fought to the death 
on the battlefield in pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the conflict� By forcing 
an unprecedented bloodletting on American forces, and at the cost of the lives 
of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, Japan sought to exact concessions 
from the United States to achieve a postwar settlement that fell short of uncon-
ditional surrender� The importance of maintaining the emperor became the pri-
mary factor that brought the Japanese to a willingness to terminate the conflict�
Faction versus Faction
Once the tide of war turned against the Japanese, political factions emerged in 
Japan that would help shape its surrender� Throughout the war the Imperial 
Japanese Army (IJA) and the IJN held divergent views on the direction of the 
war, and achieving any reconciliation between them or any compromise on how 
to terminate the conflict proved as challenging as ever� Hostility between the two 
services was nothing new in Japan, as it had existed in the years leading up to 
outbreak of the war� Now, with the military situation leaving Japan in dire straits, 
the split between the views of the two political factions, including between the 
services, created difficulties for the emperor� The ministry of the IJN’s Security 
Research Division averred that “the present state is confrontation� The country 
must become one�”57 
As early as September 1943, former premiers (known as jushin [principal sub-
jects]) advocated seeking a peace settlement on favorable terms� They wanted to 
replace Premier Hideki Tōjō, an IJA hawk, with a more moderate premier� When 
Tōjō resigned in July 1944 after the devastating loss of Saipan, the jushin selected 
retired general Kuniaki Koiso and retired admiral Mitsumasa Yonai to lead the 
government (Koiso became premier)� However, the Koiso cabinet’s stance re-
mained one of “all-out prosecution of the war” because Koiso believed that only 
a military success could improve Japan’s power to negotiate an end to the war on 
more-favorable terms�58 Thus, Japan too believed that achieving battlefield suc-
cess was a prerequisite for exerting political leverage�
By January 1945, with the United States in control of Saipan and the Philip-
pines, the emperor had expressed concern that Japan’s hopes for victory were 
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fading fast� At that point, however, the emperor was in favor of continuing the war, 
and he approved a directive to defend the homeland against invasion in “the final 
decisive battle of the war�”59 But when he met in February with members of the 
jushin to hear their views on Japan’s situation at the time, the emperor discovered 
that some favored peace, with former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe going 
so far as to advise the emperor to “end the war as soon as possible�”60 Continued 
defeat on the battlefield combined with diplomatic setbacks (e�g�, the breakdown 
of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact) forced the resignation of Koiso in spring 
1945� Members of the peace faction, however, faced a conundrum� They had to se-
lect as a replacement someone who advocated peace yet also would be acceptable 
to the hawks� Admiral Kantarō Suzuki became the clear choice, and his cabinet, 
consisting of General Korechika Anami as war minister, Admiral Yonai as navy 
minister, and Mr� Shigenori Tōgō as foreign minister, would govern from 7 April 
1945 through the final surrender�61 
Upon taking over, Suzuki believed that the emperor wished to reach a settle-
ment of the war, but the new premier advocated continued hostilities until the 
moment was right for a negotiated settlement� This decision also would help keep 
his cabinet intact�62 So even as U�S� forces assaulted Okinawa and B-29s continued 
to pound Japan’s cities, Japan’s strategic leadership had split into two diametrically 
opposed factions, and the factors that prevented conflict termination in Japan—
insistence on preserving the emperor, the desire to save face, and fear of a coup—
remained dominant�63 
Even as U�S� forces captured Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, Japan’s strategic 
leadership sought to protect its diminished gains by continuing to fight so as to 
reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict� In June 1945, despite overwhelm-
ingly negative reports from the battlefield, a deteriorating diplomatic effort 
regarding the possibility of Soviet mediation, and indications of Soviet troop 
movements toward Japanese-occupied Manchuria, the official policy of the 
Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 8 June was “to prosecute the 
war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the Imperial 
Homeland�”64 The military was in the midst of planning the KETSU-GO opera-
tion—the final decisive battle to annihilate any Americans who attempted to in-
vade mainland Japan—so as to obtain political leverage for a negotiated settle-
ment�65 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan Kōichi Kido, a key advocate of the 
peace faction, now conducted a last-ditch effort to appeal directly to the emperor� 
He aimed to achieve “an honorable peace” with his “Draft Plan of Countermea-
sures to Meet the Situation,” which warned of the inevitability of mass civilian 
casualties from Allied bombing and worsening starvation with the coming of 
winter� At this point, the emperor was moved by Kido’s plan, favoring diplomatic 
efforts over a decisive battle�66 However, the opposition faction, composed of 
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War Minister Anami and the chiefs of the army and navy, believed Japan could 
secure more-favorable conditions if their services defended the mainland against 
invasion and inflicted heavy casualties on U�S� forces�67 In short, political leverage 
could be bought at the cost of thousands of American and hundreds of thousands 
of Japanese lives�
The release of the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July had a polarizing effect on 
the two major political factions� The doves feared that rejecting the terms would 
lead to serious consequences, while the hawks considered acceptance tantamount 
to unconditional surrender� This divided stance led to maintaining the status 
quo in terms of continuing hostilities while clinging to the false hope of either 
a breakthrough in the pursuit of Soviet mediation or a military success that 
forced the United States to negotiate� So at this point Japan rejected the Potsdam 
Declaration� Prime Minister Suzuki claimed that Japan simply would ignore it�68 
However, after reports of the devastation of Hiroshima reached Tokyo on the 
afternoon of 6 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Tōgō again urged acceptance of 
the declaration� The emperor finally agreed that Japan no longer could delay the 
decision to terminate the conflict�69
The dropping of the second bomb, on Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of 
Manchuria and northern Japan exposed once again the deep divisions within 
Japan’s strategic leadership� Even as the doves argued that continuing the conflict 
would lead to the ultimate extinction of the nation itself, the hawks continued 
to counter that once severe casualties had been inflicted on the expected inva-
sion force favorable terms still would be possible� Eventually the combined effect 
of recent events proved to be too much for the emperor, however, and he met 
with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 10 August—a day of 
reckoning� Tōgō pushed for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, with one 
condition: “the defense of the Constitution�” Yonai, the minister of the navy, and 
Kiichirō Hiranuma, lord president of the council, supported him� On the other 
hand, Anami, the minister of the army, demanded a number of conditions: (1) 
the Japanese, and not the Allies, would disarm all overseas Japanese forces; (2) 
only the Japanese government itself could prosecute war criminals; and (3) the 
Allies would not occupy Japan� Despite the fact that insisting on these conditions 
would mean continuation of the war, General Yoshijirō Umezu, the chief of the 
army general staff, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the chief of the naval general 
staff, supported the position�70 
The one issue on which both factions unanimously agreed was the necessity 
to maintain the emperor, in victory or defeat� The emperor was a sacred figure 
in Japan, and his wishes were a decisive influence over policy� Finally, at this des-
perate hour, the emperor forced an uneasy reconciliation of the factions, stating 
as follows: “I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and 
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abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction 
for the nation�”71 Consequently, at 0400 on 10 August, the Supreme Council for 
the Direction of the War agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration—with the 
caveat that the emperor remain as sovereign ruler� Although the political factions 
continued to argue over interpretations of Byrnes’s note, which left the emperor 
on the throne but under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, they sensed a coup d’état looming, so they resorted to a final conference 
with the emperor on 14 August� An emotional emperor reiterated his stance 
that “it is pointless to continue the war any longer�”72 He finally had broken the 
deadlock� The ultimate decision to surrender was sent through official channels 
to the Allies, who accepted promptly, and an imperial rescript was broadcast to 
the people the next day�73 U�S� strategic leadership thereby had compromised on 
unconditional surrender, accepting the continuation of the emperor but under 
the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers�
The decisions of the emperor to intervene to break the deadlock in the council 
over the direction of the war and to broadcast his resultant surrender decision to 
the people of Japan were key components of the successful conflict termination� 
Those actions, combined with an additional imperial rescript on 2 September 
that directed the people to comply with the surrender demands, showed that 
the emperor had embraced peace, belatedly but assuredly�74 Given the emperor’s 
sacred position and authority in Japan, the imperial rescripts exerted a tremen-
dous influence, leading to a successful transition to peace throughout Japanese-
occupied territories and in the home islands�
A Key Advocate for Conflict Termination: Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi
To understand the emperor’s final decision to capitulate, it is necessary to ex-
amine the role of Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi, IJN� This respected naval officer 
wielded a decisive influence within the peace faction�
Takagi’s relationship with the Kyoto school was the source of a critical portion 
of that influence� The Kyoto school was a philosophical and interdisciplinary 
movement centered at Kyoto University that assimilated Western philosophy and 
religious beliefs with Japanese philosophy and religious beliefs; in particular, it 
embraced a synthesis of the Eastern philosophy of religion with Western scien-
tific culture� From early on the Kyoto school had criticized the entire idea of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as constituting an empty motto, believing 
it was impossible to establish cooperation in the occupied areas�75 
Takagi’s role in ending the war began in earnest in 1943� Shortly after his pro-
motion to rear admiral, Takagi received a secret order from Shigeyoshi Inoue, 
undersecretary of the IJN, tasking him with assessing the true situation in the 
Pacific War� By 1944, Takagi was engaged actively in determining how best to ter-
minate the war, by providing key influence and support to IJN minister Yonai�76 
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At the end of August 1944, Takagi resigned his post as Bureau Chief of Military 
Education at the Navy Ministry, having been ordered secretly by Minister Yonai 
and Vice-Minister Inoue to inquire into possible ways to terminate the war� To 
that end, he frequently moved among senior statesmen, IJA and IJN officers, and 
imperial family members to collect information and coordinate actions� After 
months of research, in May 1945 Takagi developed a proposal based on the rap-
idly deteriorating military situation� The report included the idea of conducting 
peace negotiations via Soviet mediation, with the intent of terminating the con-
flict prior to any possibility of a decisive battle on the Japanese mainland� Takagi 
then worked to influence the positions of the emperor and additional IJN offi-
cers�77 However, when the Suzuki cabinet held its first imperial conference on 8 
June, it decided once again in favor of a decisive battle on the mainland, intended 
to exact concessions from the United States�78 
With the IJA intent on continuing the conflict to the bitter end, regardless of 
military and civilian losses, Takagi emerged as an influential moderate� Holding 
frequent discussions with adherents of the Kyoto school, Takagi helped provide 
the IJN with a voice of reason� The relationship between the IJN and the Kyoto 
school produced a combination that emerged as “the only power [that could] 
control the reckless war expansion of the IJA�”79 Discussions among members 
of the Kyoto school and Takagi focused on analysis of the historical background 
of the war, the current domestic and foreign situations, possible modifications 
to the national war strategy and policy, and the prospects for ceasing hostilities� 
With Takagi reaching out to the Kyoto school to produce a body of ideas that 
could help terminate the conflict in the Pacific, the IJN eventually was able to 
help modify the war policy of the emperor and the imperial faction that up to that 
point had advocated the extreme-right nationalism tied to the IJA�
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated how the war in the 
Pacific should end, Takagi worked hard to influence key decision makers to ter-
minate the conflict and prevent additional devastation and bloodshed� He was 
not afraid to speak his mind and assess Japan’s situation in objective terms� To 
counter the IJA’s desire to carry on the fight, Takagi continued to urge the em-
peror to terminate the war�80 He criticized the IJA for “madly proclaiming that the 
time had come to stage a great decisive battle on the homeland that would defeat 
the enemy�”81 Takagi continued this work to enlighten other members of the Japa-
nese military and political leadership right up to the end of the war, contributing 
his objective assessments to the emperor’s cabinet when Japan was in the throes 
of uncertainty and desperation about what lay ahead� He fully understood the 
difficulty of terminating a conflict that many in Japan had believed was certain 
to end in victory� Takagi commented that “there were few people who knew the 
hardship of the front that was near to the IJA and the IJN, the internal conditions 
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and destruction; the government and supreme command were desperate, al-
though we hid the truth�”82 
Takagi, however, was a realist, and he emerged as a critical influence over the 
emperor in the final phase of the war in the Pacific� By August 1945, Takagi had 
become an instrumental figure as the “master of war termination,” advocating 
behind the scenes for an unpopular position: convincing the emperor and key 
cabinet members to seek an end to the war�83 Eventually his efforts helped sway 
the emperor to make a decision amid a factious cabinet� In the end the emperor 
took the position that Takagi and the peace faction supported�
Takagi, along with the intellectuals of the Kyoto school, was able to influence 
the IJN in the final phase of the Pacific War, giving the peace faction within the 
emperor’s cabinet an accurate assessment of Japan’s true situation� Together they 
provided Japan’s strategic leadership with sound military advice that took into 
consideration the impact that continued military operations would have on the 
civilian population� More importantly, they helped shape the emperor’s evolution 
from war to peace�
The surrender ceremony, held on the deck of the Third Fleet flagship USS Mis-
souri, was a solemn affair—punctuated by a clear message to the political leader-
ship, armed forces, and people of Japan� During the signing of the Instrument 
of Surrender, the United States and its allies demonstrated, in the air and on the 
sea, their enormous military power� Hundreds of U�S� Army and Navy planes 
flew overhead, while over 250 ships from the United States, Britain, Australia, 
and New Zealand filled the expanse of Tokyo Bay�84 There would be no way for a 
“stab in the back” myth to arise in Japan; a massive armada had come to the very 
doorstep of the Japanese mainland to emphasize the vast military power that had 
defeated Japan and that could be called on again if Japan did not comply with the 
Instrument of Surrender� Five days later, General MacArthur arrived in Tokyo 
and raised above the U�S� embassy the American flag—in fact, the very same flag 
that had flown over Washington, DC, on 7 December 1941 and on the battleship 
Missouri during the surrender�85 
The American victory over Japan was complete� Not only did Japan agree 
to terminate its military operations and disarm, but it also pledged to work in 
good faith with U�S� forces in the occupation and rebuilding of Japan� In sign-
ing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan agreed to the unconditional surrender 
of all military forces and to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration� The emperor 
would remain in power—under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Pow-
ers� In essence, the arrangements constituted an unconditional surrender for the 
military but a conditional surrender for the nation� Setting the conditions for a 
peaceful occupation, Japan also agreed “to obey and enforce all proclamations” 
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of the supreme commander (MacArthur) and “to carry out the provisions of the 
Potsdam Declaration in good faith�”86 
The transition to a peacetime occupation proceeded remarkably free of con-
flict� Although U�S� occupation forces were given the authority to impose severe 
penalties in cases of Japanese noncompliance with occupation directives, the 
words of the emperor had allowed the Japanese to absorb their shocking defeat 
and begin to work with their former enemy to rebuild their nation� The United 
States, however, took no chances� Third Fleet forces, anchored in Tokyo Bay and 
the Sagami Sea, trained their big guns on targets ashore, while the initial airborne 
and amphibious landing forces on 30 August were equipped with full combat 
equipment�87 Despite a last-ditch coup d’état attempt by a few hard-line IJA offi-
cers who refused to accept the emperor’s surrender proclamation, Japanese army 
commanders took steps to surrender their sizable forces in Japan and throughout 
its overseas empire� General MacArthur was impressed with the level of com-
pliance, reporting that the Japanese in general were “acting in complete good 
faith�”88 This level of compliance would last throughout the seven-year period of 
occupation� Leaving the emperor on the throne, despite an outcry in the United 
States demanding his removal and punishment, was a critical decision that led to 
the relatively smooth transition to peace�
Conflict termination in the Pacific in World War II occurred despite the fact 
that each of the combatants was willing and able to carry on the fight into 1946� 
Driven by their different strategic objectives—unconditional surrender and a 
negotiated settlement—each side sought to translate military action into politi-
cal success, trading lives for political leverage in the postwar period� The United 
States was ready to conduct a final campaign to seize and occupy the home is-
lands, while the Japanese planned to incur (and suffer) unprecedented casualties 
to force the United States to negotiate a peace short of unconditional surrender� 
Fortunately, the strategic leadership on each side was open to compromise� Com-
prehensive understanding of the operational environment allowed the United 
States to set the conditions for termination and to understand and appreciate the 
importance of the emperor’s continued authority, while the emperor himself un-
derstood Japan’s desperate situation and ultimately embraced the peace faction’s 
willingness to end the fighting�
Compelling Japan to surrender without an Allied invasion of the mainland 
prevented tremendous destruction and the unnecessary loss of countless lives� 
This represented the epitome of political leverage borne by success on the 
battlefield� Postwar analysis by the U�S� Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the 
following: “Japan’s acceptance of defeat without invasion while still possessed of 
2�5 million combat-equipped troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home 
islands, reveals how persuasively the consequences of [U�S�] operations were 
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translated into political results�”89 With clear strategic and operational objectives, 
U�S� planners had devised and conducted a series of campaigns and operations in 
a logical sequence that brought U�S� military forces closer and closer to Japan� By 
1945, with U�S� forces poised at the doorstep of the Japanese mainland, the United 
States had set the conditions for terminating the conflict, while the dropping of 
the atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria provided the final push 
to capitulation�
Throughout much of the war, the United States had a clear picture of Japanese 
capabilities and intentions, and this thorough understanding of the operational 
environment helped shape detailed planning and the development of termination 
criteria� With U�S� forces preparing for the final assault on the home islands that 
would compel the Japanese to surrender at great cost, key strategic leaders, such 
as Stimson and Grew, understood that unconditional surrender, especially the 
elimination of the emperor, confronted Japan with an existential threat to its way 
of life that would prolong the conflict� This understanding of the primacy of the 
emperor to the nation of Japan allowed President Truman ultimately to embrace 
the idea of a conditional surrender, at least to the extent of maintaining the em-
peror under the authority of MacArthur� This compromise appealed sufficiently 
to the emperor and his inner circle for them to accept it�
The ultimate factor leading to the termination of hostilities in August 1945 
was the emperor and his decision to embrace the peace faction in Japan� Under 
the keen influence of Rear Admiral Takagi, a key segment of Japan’s political and 
naval leadership pushed for termination to avoid additional bloodshed and save 
the mainland from certain destruction� Despite the splitting of his inner circle 
into two camps, the emperor finally made the decision to terminate Japanese 
military operations when it became clear that continued resistance offered far 
more risk to the nation than the possible reaction from hard-liners in the IJA� In 
doing so, he accepted the weakening of his authority in postwar Japan under U�S� 
leadership, but set the conditions for a successful transition to a peaceful occupa-
tion and the rebuilding of his nation�
The thousands of U�S� soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who died thou-
sands of miles from home, as well as the hundreds of thousands of Japanese 
soldiers, sailors, and civilians who perished right through the waning minutes of 
the war, are testament to the unprecedented destruction resulting from a global 
conflict that often did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants� 
Only relentless operations and careful U�S� planning that resulted from a thor-
ough understanding of the operational environment finally pushed key Japanese 
civilian and military leaders to terminate the conflict on terms they once had 
considered unimaginable� In the end, each side was just flexible enough to seek 
a compromise, modifying their strategic objectives to set conditions for a better 
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future� In doing so, hundreds of thousands of lives were spared� The occupation 
of Japan began immediately, and Japan slowly began to rebuild from the ashes 
of war� More importantly, the United States and Japan would develop a last-
ing relationship that has been a foundation of stability in the Pacific for almost 
seventy-five years�
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
IT’S A GRAY, GRAY WORLD
Nadia Schadlow
In a thought-provoking essay for the Winter 2020 issue of the Naval War College 
Review, Don Stoker and Craig Whiteside argue against the utility of two terms: 
gray-zone conflict and hybrid war. These terms, they explain, are intended to 
capture a range of political, economic, military, and technological activities that 
our adversaries and competitors use to shape political decisions and outcomes, 
but that fall below the threshold of violence� Stoker and Whiteside contend that 
although these constructs are “prominent and fashionable” they detract from 
America’s ability to think clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and 
“their vitally important connections�” The authors go so far as to advocate the 
elimination of these terms from the “strategic lexicon�”
I believe the opposite� The concepts, ideas, and activities comprising the gray 
zone as well as hybrid war remain quite useful, since they reflect the nature of 
today’s ongoing political competitions; help to explain the mind-sets and modes 
of operation of our adversaries and competitors; and compel a broader group of 
Americans to consider their role in the competitions currently under way�
THE WORLD IS NOT BINARY
Stoker and Whiteside argue that the gray-zone 
concept feeds a “dangerous tendency to confuse 
war and peace�” The authors reject the idea of a 
“spectrum of conflict” because it “fails to delineate 
between war and peace”; in fact, they reject any 
analysis that fails to honor “the critical distinc-
tion�” They argue that peace and war are defined 
best in opposition to one another: when states 
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go to war they are “using violence to get something they want,” and most “new 
so-called classifications of war would be instantly killed if properly examined” 
through this lens� 
This binary lens, however, belies the geopolitical realities we face� The world 
is not as neat or precise as the authors wish it to be� It is shortsighted to reject an 
entire set of activities that are not violent (although they may lead to violence) 
because they do not fit into their paradigm of the “critical distinction” between 
war and peace� As I have written in the past, the “space between war and peace 
is a landscape churning with political, economic, and security competitions that 
require constant attention�”1 In the authors’ binary conception, peace is oddly 
static (whereas it actually is not), and all other activities must be closer to violence 
if they are to be considered part of war�
One need glance at only a few weeks’ worth of news to see the range of stra-
tegically competitive activities that fit into neither the war nor peace paradigm� 
These include China’s recent decisions to buy up U�S� firms going bankrupt 
because of COVID-19, so as to acquire key technologies, as well as Beijing’s 
disinformation campaigns related to the virus� The authors’ binary view of the 
geopolitical landscape seems to ignore Sun Tzu’s observation that “the perfection 
of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting�”
How would the authors interpret efforts by China to encourage Europeans 
to adopt Huawei’s telecommunications hardware—a key part of an unfolding 
competition over control of information and data? It is not purely “peace,” yet 
neither does it encompass the violence of war; however, it is strategically im-
portant� What would they call China’s building of artificial islands in the South 
China Sea? This is an act without violence, but one that has shifted the status quo 
fundamentally� Is that an act of war? Or part of a competition designed to shift 
circumstances in Beijing’s favor, without violence? Is that purely peaceful?
The authors’ binary view also contrasts with the emerging view of the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD), captured in the Joint Staff ’s draft manual on campaigns 
and operations, which notes that “competition is its own unique, challenging, and 
indefinite contest for influence, position, and leverage”; which describes a con-
cept of campaigning that explicitly can take place below the threshold of armed 
conflict; and which explains that the most “successful competitor accomplishes 
its aims without invading, occupying, or destroying other regimes, but rather 
subordinating them�”
Moreover, Stoker and Whiteside are somewhat inconsistent in their complaint 
that the terms are “fashionable” (which suggests contemporary), and yet that 
there is “nothing new” about them� Discussions about hybrid war have become 
“fashionable” again because the activities associated with that concept continue 
to occur, and because Americans needed to refresh their memories� Russia was 
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revving up its disinformation bots to sow divisions within our democracy, China 
was continuing its aggressive theft of intellectual property, and North Korea 
kept hacking U�S� databases� In recent years, policy analysts and historians had a 
chance to remind policy makers—many of whom are too young even to remem-
ber the Cold War(!)—that while these types of activities may not be new, they 
warrant fresh study in the current context�
UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER
Second, precisely because our key competitors have developed a body of think-
ing related to the gray zone, there is reason enough to study these concepts� A 
central part of strategy—whether military or grand—is the need to understand 
“the other,” the object of the strategy� This creates the dialectic inherent in the 
way strategy unfolds and the adaptations that must be made along the way� The 
concept of “red teaming” is based on this need to adapt and update, depending on 
how an adversary responds�2 Zachary Shore’s excellent book A Sense of the Enemy 
describes the need to develop strategic empathy—the “skill of stepping out of our 
own heads and into the minds of others�”3
Activities such as political subversion, cyber-enabled economic theft, and 
control over lines of communication (to mention just a few) are part of our com-
petitors’ playbooks; understanding the range of these activities can help Ameri-
can leaders, policy analysts, and private-sector decision makers develop a more 
realistic picture of the geopolitical landscape� However imperfect these terms are, 
they describe an important part of the lexicons of our adversaries and competi-
tors, and how they think about strategy, competition, and war�
In recent years, General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of the General Staff, 
captured the essence of Russia’s thinking about hybrid and gray-zone activities� 
His 2013 article, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” describes the blend-
ing of political, economic, and military power exerted against adversaries�4 The 
scholar Dima Adamsky explained that Russia’s concept of warfare has as its con-
ceptual core “an amalgamation of hard and soft power across various domains, 
through skillful application of coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic 
tools�” Other experts have explained that key characteristics of this type of war 
include the idea of persistence, which breaks down the traditional binary delinea-
tion between war and peace, since hybrid strategies are “always underway�”5 Even 
though some analysts criticize those who read too much into Gerasimov’s view, 
the fact is that Russia thinks about and develops operational concepts that use a 
range of nonkinetic tools that fall below the threshold of conventional conflict to 
shape strategic outcomes�6
China too operates in the gray zone� Its range of activities includes not only 
those that are overtly military, such as military intimidation, but others within 
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the political and economic domains, such as the co-opting of state-affiliated busi-
nesses, information operations, lawfare and diplomacy, and economic coercion�7 
Experts have described the “five shades” of China’s gray-zone strategies�8
In his recent book The Dragons and the Snakes, strategist David Kilcullen 
observes that there are specific, sequenced activities that take place in a “liminal 
warfare campaign�”9 He describes liminal warfare as competition at the “thresh-
old” of war and advocates learning from our adversaries, to include Russian no-
tions of decisive shaping and creative ambiguity.10 Kilcullen explains that China’s 
expanded conception of warfare includes “mobilizing multiple dimensions 
of national power outside the traditional military-owned domains�” He urges 
Western countries to do better at conceptualizing these domains and organizing 
within them�
The gray zone might sit uncomfortably between war and peace, but that is due 
to our narrowly defined constructs of war and peace; our competitors are more 
flexible� When Stoker and Whiteside argue that these techniques are not real or 
legitimate, they inadvertently show how hybrid operators exploit the rigidity of 
our conventional concepts to achieve an advantage before we even understand 
what they are doing� Continued study and awareness of these concepts can help 
us avoid getting caught off guard�
PERPETUAL WAR?
A third reason for thinking twice about discarding these concepts is that contem-
porary democracies are uncomfortable with operating in a state of perpetual war� 
In our democracy, it will be a long time, if ever, before organizations such as the 
U�S� Agency for International Development (USAID) will think of their activities 
as a part of war� Yet USAID’s tools and instruments of aid can be as strategically 
important as the movement of an aircraft carrier� Forcing the range of strategi-
cally meaningful hybrid activities to fit into the category of war is simply not ac-
curate, and demanding that they stay within the construct of peace avoids a con-
sideration of the competitive element of these nonkinetic instruments� Moreover, 
this binary view detracts from the ongoing imperative that individuals outside 
our military and intelligence structures play important roles in the competitions 
we now face� The gray zone concept, while imperfect, captures the continuum of 
competition in which other parts of our democracy must engage�
And that is a good thing� It gives a broader group of Americans a stake in this 
competition� In a democracy, a whole-of-government approach requires improv-
ing and deploying a set of important activities that fall below the threshold of 
violence� In democracies such as the United States and its allies and partners, it 
is impractical to think of key economic, political, and informational activities 
as a part of war� It has been hard enough to inject a more competitive mind-set 
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into nonmilitary and nonintelligence agencies! It is difficult to imagine that our 
diplomats at the State Department or our experts at the Departments of Energy 
and Agriculture ever will see themselves as being in a continual state of war; they 
are much more likely to understand the competitive space we face�
In addition, since so many required U�S� capabilities are tied to different con-
gressional authorities, the “all war” construct does not work within our legislative 
branch, where committees and authorities that shape our nonmilitary instru-
ments are not the same as those that control our defense or intelligence agencies� 
Yet we must ensure that other U�S� government agencies remain a critical part of 
the campaign to protect the country from subversion, precisely because, as the 
authors state, while neither Russia nor China is at war with the United States, 
“both constantly practice forms of subversion against the United States, such as 
meddling in political campaigns and all forms of hacking�”
Many of the elements required to prevail in long-term competition with China 
are not in the hands or within the purview of DoD� These include the many ac-
tivities and tools within the economic domain, from understanding how China 
uses our capital markets to its advantage, to forced tech transfers, to supply-chain 
vulnerabilities� We could lose the “war” without violence, before DoD was even 
involved� Conceptualizing gray zone or hybrid warfare is not an effort to create an 
“illogical, imaginary category of war” but rather a recognition that departments 
and agencies beyond DoD, as well as businesses and academia, have a role to play�
The strategist Colin Gray, who passed away recently, was correct in his observa-
tion that the United States often lacked the “extreme patience” required to achieve 
its political goals� He attributed this impatience to public pressure to achieve swift, 
decisive victories� He explained that “time is a weapon, [and] the mindset needed 
to combat an enemy who is playing a long game is not one that comes naturally 
to the American soldier or, for that matter, to the American public�” Achieving 
long-term political goals is the reason that states engage in this long game—one 
that entails a range of competitions that fall below the threshold of violence—even 
if this constant campaigning fits only imperfectly into our intellectual constructs�
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key publications for the essential study of women, 
peace, and security
Mary Raum
Conflict-Related Violence against Women: Transforming Transi-
tion, by Aisling Swaine� London: Cambridge Univ� Press, 2018� 
334 pages� $99� 
Women and Gender Perspectives in the Military: An Interna-
tional Comparison, ed� Robert Egnell and Mayesha Alam� 
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ� Press, 2009� 278 pages� 
$110�95� 
The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace, and Security, ed� Sara 
E� Davies and Jacqui True� Cambridge, U�K�: Oxford Univ� 
Press, 2018� 869 pages� $175�
The year 2020 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the formal beginning of 
the global initiative on women, peace, and security (WPS) introduced by the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council, when that body unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1325 in acknowledgment of the disproportionate and unique impact 
of armed conflict on women and girls� The year 2020 also will mark ten years of 
the Naval War College formally recognizing WPS as a program of effort�
Today, Resolution 1325 is considered a watershed political framework high-
lighting that women and gender perspectives are relevant to negotiating peace 
agreements, planning refugee camps, develop-
ing programs for conflict inclusion, conducting 
peacekeeping operations, and reconstructing 
war-torn societies for sustainable peace� While the 
word “women” is part of the title of the resolution, 
the scope of the WPS field is not so narrow� The 
field no longer is regarded as just a gendered set 
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of issues; replacing that singular scope are programs, ideas, and missions that 
are part of the global peace and security platform that involves all populations 
experiencing preconflict, conflict, and postconflict situations�
Crucial records of conversations in the area are hard to find� As occurs in all 
paradigm shifts, while the WPS domain has achieved maturity over two decades 
of growth and change, the creation of original written installations and inputs, by 
those who were in the WPS arena from its inception, has reached a plateau� Many 
originators—those with the deepest and longest-lasting experience as initiators of 
WPS programs—have moved on� Now there is arising the publication of second- 
and third-tier books claiming an association with WPS� This new wave tends to 
underestimate the globalized, interdisciplinary expertise required to publish a 
seminal work� Keeping the WPS agenda crisp and moving forward requires filter-
ing through the piles of junk that keep appearing to recognize writing that is of 
long-term value and high quality and that demonstrates theoretical and practical 
knowledge and penetrating analysis about WPS� It is the latter sort of works that 
will pay benefits to future generations�
The three books reviewed here fit that category, not only because of their fu-
ture value, but also because their authors have devoted a minimum of a decade 
of effort to some aspect of WPS, whether as military personnel, researchers, 
program organizers, or field-workers�
CONFLICT-RELATED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:  
TRANSFORMING TRANSITION
While book specialists place Aisling Swaine’s Conflict-Related Violence against 
Women under the category of international law, her work is far more than a legal 
treatise� Sexual violence and its impacts on conflict and peace constitute a critical 
and growing area of interest� The subject has received increased attention at the 
UN level as constituting a challenge to peaceful societies� Between 2008 and 2019, 
the institution passed six new resolutions directed at the problem� Two primary 
events brought official attention to this form of violence: the 1993 mass rapes of 
Yugoslavian women, which helped lead to creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal; and the 1994 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which for 
the first time defined rape as a war crime� Swaine’s book stands out among those 
that address sexual violence and war because the author, as a humanitarian aid 
specialist, has met and lived among women and in their communities� The book’s 
approach to the subject is unique because it does not merely present alarmist data 
and stories, as most examinations do� Swaine’s discourse does more than measure 
violence and report on it; it offers new thinking about the qualitative nature of the 
phenomenon of sexual violence�
The course of the conversation does not keep to the normal, narrow, defini-
tional range, that of the war rape of women; instead, its scope expands to include 
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all people who experience these extremely damaging and demeaning situations, 
including investigating physical, emotional, and economic injuries linked to the 
abuse� Violence is defined in a new way: as being ambulant, not static� The author 
considers transgressors who commit acts of physical criminality and inflict forms 
of emotional and physical loss as being the paramount factor in the sexual vio-
lence equation� The book also explores whether peacetime violence can provide a 
clue to what may happen during a conflict� The discussion differentiates between 
the prevailing “transitional” attitude applied to sexual violence after a conflict and 
a recommendation to embrace transformational approaches, and especially to 
take into consideration the numerous additional harms arising from and associ-
ated with this form of viciousness�
As support for these ideas, the author presents three case studies covering 
sexual violence: in the Southeast Asian nation of Timor-Leste, in Northern Ire-
land, and in the West African coastal nation of the Republic of Liberia� Selecting 
three distinct cultures to serve as backdrops enhances understanding of sexual 
violence’s ties to conflict� Conflict-Related Violence is well researched, with all 
referenced citations drawing on informative sources, and it is evident that the 
work is a first-person creation, not a jog through Google hits� Its only weakness 
is that at times its “dissertation-speak” outweighs the author’s more naturally 
formulated philosophical thoughts and ruminations�
WOMEN AND GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN THE MILITARY:  
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Another must-read for any person connected with WPS is a review of the new-
est work, edited by Robert Egnell and Mayesha Alam, titled Women and Gen-
der Perspectives in the Military: An International Comparison. Egnell is one of 
the most significant documenters of WPS themes and stands as an important 
change agent in putting forward ideas about the global WPS agenda, with an 
emphasis on the security and military aspects of WPS� Egnell’s role as an active-
duty captain in the Swedish army reserve, his advanced theoretical knowledge, 
and his current post as vice-chancellor of the Swedish Defence University make 
his contributions unique� He knows the military, knows the security sector, and 
thinks deeply about WPS� His coeditor, Mayesha Alam, is one of the founding 
members and served as deputy director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, 
Peace and Security in Washington, DC, and she has experience in policy design 
and implementation with the UN and the World Bank�
Included in the volume are twelve pieces by different authors, all of whom 
are recognizable to those who have been involved with WPS over the past two 
decades� Both cross-national analyses and process and contextual elements—
from Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, the United States, NATO, 
and UN peacekeeping—are represented� Inclusion of treatments of the nations 
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of Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden was essential owing to their cutting-
edge approaches to accepting WPS thinking and inculcating it into their defense 
psyches� If there are any weaknesses to this selection they are a heavy emphasis 
on nations that have not experienced and are not experiencing conflict intrusions 
and a reliance on examples from social democratic systems of governance� It also 
is well past the time when the female engagement team, dating from the era of 
Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, should continue to serve 
as the U�S� example of WPS security-sector experience� More essential now is to 
ruminate on the modernization of the U�S� military, which formally has sanc-
tioned the entrance of women into the combat arms; as that evolution unfolds, 
there will be numerous important new areas for discussion�
The book has value as both a text and an informational resource� It embraces 
a wide swath of important topics specific to the security sector� It provides a 
meaningful review regarding military patriarchies, and a walk through both the 
four pillars of UN Resolution 1325 (known as participation, prevention, protec-
tion, and gender mainstreaming) and the positive repercussions that result when 
a gender perspective is added to military systems� One piece covers the history of 
how the UN resolution evolved and who was influential in inserting the gender 
question into global affairs� Other unique ideas presented are soldier discrimina-
tion, internal military gender regimes, and case-based studies highlighting the 
Australian Defence Forces and the South African military gender programs� The 
editors conclude with a set of concise, thoughtful, and vital takeaways drawn 
from the contributions chosen for this volume; they also emphasize the difficul-
ties involved in generalizing about such a complicated field of effort�
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY
Every person involved in the WPS field should at least review the content of this 
first Oxford handbook on the subject� It is likely to be the most crucial, exhaus-
tive resource on WPS extant in this decade� Coeditor Sara E� Davies holds a pro-
fessorship at the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith 
University in Australia; Jacqui True occupies a professorship of international 
relations, serves as director of the Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre, is 
an Australian Research Council Future Fellow, and is a Global Fellow at the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo in Norway�
The size of this work—869 pages—precludes it from being a mobile resource, 
so its greatest value is as a desk reference� As is typical of products from Oxford 
University Press, given its high standards, this presentation is of exceptional qual-
ity and range� The sixty-seven contributors are all leading scholars, advocates, 
and policy makers with links to WPS� The scope of the ideas treated is vast, so the 
handbook is organized into six primary parts: concepts of WPS, pillars of WPS, 
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institutionalizing WPS, implementing WPS, cross-cutting agenda connections 
and mainstreaming, and ongoing and future challenges� Not only is the content 
within each part useful to researchers and practitioners of WPS, but the organiza-
tion of the content also is well developed� Very few existing compilations ensure 
first that the theoretical and contextual ideas represented in the formal aspects 
of Resolution 1325 are dealt with, then follow up by recounting implementation 
experiences� Nor is the effort often made, as it is here, to incorporate the field’s 
updated philosophy: that WPS is a cross-cutting security-sector platform, no 
longer merely a one-dimensional concern� A final segment highlighting future 
challenges allows a review of the qualitative and quantitative ideas that some of 
the best thinkers in the field see as fundamental to achieving progress�
Some exciting content in the first half of the handbook includes the discourse 
on the contested meanings of WPS, as well as what produces success and what 
tends to fail programmatically across the four WPS pillars� The international 
relations topics treated are broadly inclusive, embracing transnational networks; 
NATO; and the world’s least-addressed regions—the African Union, Southeast 
Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas� Both the programmatic and field-
experience aspects of implementation programs are described for the nations of 
Afghanistan, Australia, China, Norway, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Philip-
pines, Sierra Leone, and Syria� This geographical selection provides a mix of 
information, ranging from that drawn from the more peaceful Western societies 
of Norway and Australia to that pertaining to parts of the world where women 
have experienced extensively documented gendered violence and abuse� PNG is 
representative of places where levels of violence against women are particularly 
virulent, owing to the social legitimization of abuses of human rights� In Sierra 
Leone, the brutality visited on women over an eleven-year civil war, the cur-
rent situation of food insecurity, and the lack of access to agricultural resources 
portray a cross-cutting example of the long-term stressors that impact women 
particularly� Syria provides an example in which formal rights for women exist 
on the statute books but extremists continually impose restrictions on these same 
statutory rights�
Some of the insights presented, while perhaps not exclusive to this volume, are 
included in WPS readings only rarely� Among these are deliberations about gen-
der and disabilities, LGBTI inclusivity, and postcolonialism; the last mentioned 
examines the impacts on present-day cultures of the social and political bases of 
past societies� Also worth noting is coverage of two of the newest WPS debate 
zones: the contested meaning of WPS; and the challenges involved in, but also 
the importance of, formally monitoring and analyzing the field of WPS regarding 
scholarship, book content, and academic programs�
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BOOK REVIEWS
“THE QUESTION IS . . . WHICH IS TO BE MASTER—THAT’S ALL.”
The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II, by Evan Mawdsley� New Haven, CT:  
Yale Univ� Press, 2019� 600 pages� $32�50�
It is a daunting task to attempt to write 
a single-volume history of World War 
II at sea from 1939 to 1945, covering all 
the participants in all the theaters of that 
global conflict� I am intimately aware of 
the many pitfalls that await the historian 
who has the hubris to try, since I too 
wrote a book on this topic, published two 
years ago (World War II at Sea, Oxford 
Univ� Press, 2018)� I therefore applaud 
Evan Mawdsley of Glasgow University 
for taking up the challenge� It is a bit 
delicate for a reviewer to evaluate a book 
so similar to one that he himself has 
written, but since the works complement 
one another, I think it can be done fairly�
Interestingly, both books divide the war 
into five parts of about five chapters 
each� The fact that the authors did 
this independently suggests that the 
war in fact can be differentiated into 
identifiable phases: the European war, 
Britain alone, the global war at sea, the 
growing Allied domination, and the 
final victory� Each of us also covered 
the Battle of the Atlantic, or the war on 
trade, in three chapters embedded in 
separate parts of the narrative; this too 
suggests that we are on to something�
The first decision the writer of any 
complex subject has to make is whether 
to approach it chronologically or topi-
cally� World War II was, after all, a huge, 
sprawling conflict, so telling its maritime 
story in sequence means bouncing 
around from theater to theater all over 
the globe� Mawdsley instead chooses the 
topical approach, offering separate chap-
ters on naval aviation, intelligence, and 
amphibious warfare, for example� This 
allows him to develop themes and follow 
through with the consequences of one or 
another technology or decision� On the 
other hand, that approach compels him to 
insert periodic notes into the text indicat-
ing that issues raised while developing 
particular themes were “discussed previ-
ously,” “have already been described,” or 
are forthcoming, “as will be seen�” These 
create a kind of narrative speed bump, 
especially for those not grounded in the 
chronological structure of the war�
Another decision concerns coverage� 
Including every convoy, skirmish, and 
naval confrontation in the war would 
transform the book into a compendium 
or an encyclopedia rather than a history� 
And, of course, including more of the 
157
Naval War College: Summer 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 5 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
smaller actions necessarily means devot-
ing less space to the critically important 
ones� Coverage is always a delicate matter, 
for while leaving something out invites 
criticism that the book is incomplete, 
limiting coverage of the critical turning 
points invites criticism of another kind�
Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive, 
and he covers a number of events that 
are overlooked in most general histories 
(including my own), such as the British 
raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway 
(Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and 
the invasion of Madagascar (Operation 
IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive 
coverage of the Soviet navy in both the 
Baltic and Black Seas� All that comes 
with a cost, of course; running to six 
hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is 
not short, and yet it occasionally feels 
crowded as events pile up on one 
another—although no doubt that is how 
the war felt to those who fought it as well�
Mawdsley is not afraid to make judg-
ments� He argues, for example, that the 
role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) 
has been greatly exaggerated and 
that Hitler gave up on the invasion of 
England (Operation SEA LION) before the 
Battle of Britain even began� He defends 
Churchill’s decision to attack the French 
fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it 
was “correct” (p� 71), and concedes that 
the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” 
for which Mountbatten “deserves 
some blame” (p� 282)� In the Pacific, 
Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and 
Short were “rightly held responsible” 
for being unready on 7 December 
1941 (p� 182) and that Nagumo was 
“surely right” not to approve a third aerial 
attack against Pearl Harbor (p� 181)�
It would be inappropriate for me to 
recommend one of these books over 
the other� Therefore I merely will 
suggest here that those interested 
in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 
should read (and buy) both of them�
CRAIG L� SYMONDS
Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer 
for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P� Galvin� Carlisle, 
PA: U�S� Army War College Press, 2018� 120 
pages� Available for download at publications 
�armywarcollege�edu/� Free�
As Charles D� Allen states in the fore-
word, “70 to 80 percent of organizational 
change efforts fail” (p� vii)� Numerous 
reasons exist why initiatives to improve 
an organization’s performance, effective-
ness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect 
problem diagnosis, poor planning or 
resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, 
and resistance, among others� U�S� 
Army War College professor Thomas 
P� Galvin’s well-researched primer 
effectively distills numerous organiza-
tional change philosophies and strategies 
into a practical and intuitive guidebook 
for military professionals at all levels�
A plethora of books on organizational 
change exists, with an Amazon�com 
search returning hundreds of results� 
Professor Galvin tailors his approach to 
the unique challenges of the military, 
which prepares for an uncertain future 
environment that before the crucible 
of operations and combat can only be 
simulated� He argues that most change 
efforts are too process oriented, at the 
expense of the often-overlooked context 
of the environment and the content 
of the change effort, which explain 
its purpose and the path to success� 
To this end, he develops a framework 
similar to the military’s planning process 
that emphasizes context and content, 
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with sequences of questions to aid in 
navigating all stages of change efforts�
Galvin argues that understanding the 
context requires correctly diagnosing 
the problem, gauging receptivity to 
the proposed change, and determining 
whether it even warrants expending 
the resources� Although hierarchical, 
military organizations are complex 
adaptive systems, highlighting the 
difficulty in tracing causal links and 
often resulting in misdiagnosis� Factors 
that gauge receptivity to the change 
include internal and external environ-
mental pressures; the level of trust and 
empowerment within the organization; 
and, for distributed organizations, the 
fit between the change agenda and 
local contexts� We live in an age of data 
analytics, and often suffer from survey 
fatigue� Therefore, taking the time to de-
termine what data to collect for analysis 
is essential and may flush out funda-
mental issues that need to be addressed 
before implementation can proceed�
The most valuable section deals with 
forecasting, which is the glue of the 
content portion of the book� This links 
the vision, plan, and communication 
effort� While still an endeavor of 
uncertainty, forecasting is differenti-
ated from prediction in that it is more 
quantifiable and probabilistic� Although 
many tools exist within the Department 
of Defense to paint this picture, making 
a convincing case remains a challenge 
from the strategic to the tactical level� 
As General Martin Dempsey said in 
an interview with Kelly Brownell for 
the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter 
podcast concerning the significant cuts 
imposed by the 2011 Budget Control 
Act, “When people ask me if I have 
any regrets during my four years as 
Chairman, one of them in particular is 
I really never managed to convince the 
Congress of the United States that what 
they were doing to the military budget 
would have a detrimental effect over 
time� � � � It’s hard to articulate words 
like risk, they can be parsed and they 
can be twisted or turned, or words like 
readiness�” His salient point highlights 
the difficulties leaders have in articulat-
ing future risk and promoting change�
Professor Galvin recommends 
constructing dual narratives of future 
undesired and desired end states, with 
the former describing a status quo that 
risks mission failure and the latter a 
version in which competitive advantage 
is restored� His principles of prepared-
ness consist of a series of questions to 
spark development of these competing 
stories and include tangible and 
abstract performance metrics� While 
vivid imagery, framing, and marketing 
can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly 
asserts that credibility demands rigor� 
Narratives must limit negations, refrain 
from sounding unduly alarmist, and 
avoid one’s being perceived as simply 
a cheerleader� Once all elements are 
established, the concept should be 
expressed as a cognitive journey in 
practical and actionable terms, with 
obstacles and barriers presented as chal-
lenges that can and must be overcome�
Galvin’s primer is filled with invaluable 
insights, frameworks, and anecdotes� 
He provides examples of failed changes, 
including General Eric K� Shinseki’s 
decision to switch from standard 
headgear to the black beret and Secre-
tary of Defense Donald H� Rumsfeld’s 
attempt to transition to the National 
Security Personnel System� However, 
selection of a case study, vignette, or 
scenario applicable to any number of 
situations and woven throughout the 
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entire primer or as a separate annex 
might have stitched the elements of 
the book tighter together and made it 
resonate more� Regardless, leaders at 
all levels who want to increase their 
chances of successfully implementing 
and sustaining an organizational change 
effort will benefit from making this an 
essential addition to their tool kit�
KENNETH M� SANDLER
The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of 
the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver 
Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, by Anthony J� 
Piscitelli� El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017� 
264 pages� $27�50�
Despite battlefield success in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan over the past fifteen 
years, the threat environment confront-
ing the United States and its Marine 
Corps only has grown more dangerous� 
The United States now confronts a 
variety of challenges both old and new, 
including the return of great-power 
conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe; 
operating in (what until recently has 
been called) an antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) battle space; nuclear prolifera-
tion; and navigating the effects of global 
climate change on military operations� 
Such an environment calls for both refin-
ing old solutions and thinking in new, 
bold ways to ensure that the U�S� mili-
tary—and especially, for purposes of this 
review, the Marine Corps—is ready to 
meet, fight, and defeat any future threats�
Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his 
years of State Department and academic 
experience to map the evolution of the 
Marine Corps’s approach to war in 
the post–Vietnam War era, all the 
while highlighting the personalities 
involved in that process� Piscitelli’s 
work ultimately is most useful, though, 
not for reviewing why the Marine 
Corps adopted maneuver warfare but 
for providing a model for instituting 
structural changes at the service level 
necessary for future battlefield success�
Following the Vietnam War, a combina-
tion of external and internal pressures led 
the Marine Corps to institutionalize and 
train to a war-fighting philosophy it had 
practiced to varying degrees throughout 
its history� The Marine Corps Way of 
War details how the Marine Corps had 
practiced elements of maneuver warfare 
from Belleau Wood to Beirut� This 
historical survey provides the context 
for the interpersonal and bureaucratic 
battles that Piscitelli then recounts that 
led to the Corps’s full embrace of ma-
neuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era�
Piscitelli then uses an excellent combina-
tion of first-person interviews and 
after-action reports to summarize how 
the Corps’s success in all the humanitar-
ian operations, low-intensity conflicts, 
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 
Vietnam resulted from the major internal 
and external bureaucratic struggles over 
the service’s future during that era� The 
book’s emphasis on education and the 
impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’ 
professional development also deserves 
mention� Piscitelli’s decision to explore 
how the adoption of maneuver warfare 
also forced the Corps to rethink the 
professional development of its enlisted 
and officer populations underscores 
how the human element of war remains 
the most important variable in any 
conflict� One should be forgiven for 
thinking that parts of the book serve as 
justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting�
Yet, despite providing an excellent 
analysis that explores how the Corps 
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evolved into its current form, the book 
disappoints readers who want to learn 
more about the implications of maneuver 
warfare on future battlefields� Although 
one might argue that such a discussion 
falls outside the scope of this work, it 
seems like a missed opportunity not to 
devote some pages to answering that 
question� How will the Marine Corps use 
maneuver warfare to fight in an A2/AD 
environment? What capabilities does the 
Corps need to exploit Russia’s or China’s 
critical vulnerabilities? How does the 
service operate effectively and jointly 
in a twenty-first-century great-power 
conflict? Similarly, one also wonders how 
changes to the Marine Corps’s maneuver-
warfare theory that may be necessary 
to succeed on future battlefields will 
alter the professional development and 
training of the service’s next generation 
of recruits� Institutions such as the Basic 
School or Marine Combat Training 
might need a face-lift� Military occupa-
tion schools also will need to rethink 
how they equip their students with the 
skills necessary to support the Corps’s 
war-fighting philosophy in future fights�
One question Piscitelli does answer 
about the future of maneuver warfare is 
how the service can promote the insti-
tutional change necessary to confront 
future challenges� His discussion of the 
informal civilian advocacy networks and 
formal top-down leadership that Marine 
leaders used to transform the Corps after 
Vietnam provides a possible blueprint to 
effect future force shaping� This might 
be the book’s greatest contribution to 
current national security narratives, 
because it highlights how America’s 
most unique service can facilitate 
effectively the necessary structural, 
service-level changes to the force�
ADAM TAYLOR
On Her Majesty’s Nuclear Service, by Eric Thomp-
son� Oxford, U�K�: Casemate, 2018� 269 pages� 
$32�95�
The last few years have seen a surge in 
titles covering different aspects of the 
Royal Navy’s submarine service during 
the Cold War� Together, these have 
provided the armchair naval enthusiast 
with welcome insights into a famously 
understated and secretive part of that 
service’s recent history� Whereas the 
majority of these titles have been written 
either by those who have commanded 
ships and submarines or by historians 
with long naval connections, this book 
is distinctly different, coming as it does 
from neither of these backgrounds� 
Instead, this is an intensely personal 
account of one man’s naval journey: 
from curious schoolboy learning the 
naval “religion,” through some early 
personal disappointments, and finally 
to his emergence as a successful and 
highly respected member of the elite 
brotherhood of nuclear-qualified 
engineers� The book is different because 
the mystique of command at sea is not 
the centerpiece, having been replaced by 
the equally demanding but far less well 
understood world of nuclear safety, with 
its attendant “zero defect” mentality�
Thompson is perhaps perfectly suited 
to weave this tale� A career naval officer 
and early volunteer for submarines 
who was forced to make an early 
“course change” into the engineering 
specialization on account of his eyesight, 
his destiny became inextricably bound 
up with the buildup of the nuclear 
submarine force in the United Kingdom� 
In his case, this was reinforced further 
by the adoption of the Polaris mis-
sile system and the ballistic-missile 
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submarine as the major elements of that 
nation’s independent nuclear deterrent� 
Although he glosses over it, he was 
one of the few to make the transition 
successfully into higher-level nuclear 
management, which took him right 
to the pinnacle of his specialization� 
He therefore can offer his readers an 
almost unique perspective into the 
world of nuclear engineering, from the 
deckplates right through to higher-level 
policy making� Paradoxically, though, 
his illustrious career almost was cut off 
at the knees when his earnest, and in 
some ways naive, early efforts attracted 
some unwarranted judgment from 
colleagues with a less-than-nurturing 
disposition� How many others of us 
suffered similar, “there but for the 
grace of God” moments like these?
Endowed with a wry sense of humor 
and a literary bent, Thompson paints at 
times a disquieting picture of the darker, 
human side of life in submarines� His 
characters are portrayed vividly, and 
anyone who has served will recognize 
their types instantly� Some may take 
exception with what, at times, seems 
a lengthy preoccupation with his own 
youthful insecurities, so the book will 
not be everyone’s cup of tea, focusing as 
it does on the author’s personal experi-
ences and observations as opposed to 
the larger policy issues of the day� That 
said, the book does in passing provide 
some useful insights into the develop-
ment of the Tigerfish wire-guided tor-
pedo and the administration of nuclear 
safety directives at the higher command 
level� There are also memorable, lighter 
moments, such as the vivid description 
of “corporate constipation,” caused by 
the failure of the sewage treatment plant, 
as well as the many mishaps that inevi-
tably befall mariners who essentially 
are deprived of their senses with regard 
to their immediate surroundings�
In sum, this is a book for those 
interested in knowing what it was 
like to live in submarines during the 
Cold War� Those seeking coverage of 
matters of policy and strategy probably 
will be better served elsewhere�
ANGUS ROSS
India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval 
Dominance in the Indian Ocean, ed� David Brew-
ster� New Delhi: Oxford Univ� Press, 2018� 348 
pages� $40�99�
Americans often think of the vast 
Indian Ocean as the “rear area” of the 
Pacific Ocean—a featureless expanse 
notable mainly for the goods, services, 
and military forces that traverse it� The 
view from New Delhi and Beijing is 
profoundly different� Beijing recognizes 
that the flow of energy, raw materials, 
and finished goods across the Indian 
Ocean is essential to China’s economic 
success� Chairman Xi Jinping’s One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) initiative is, in part, 
a strategic investment in securing these 
sea lines of communication� In just over 
a decade, the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) has gone from being an 
occasional visitor to the Indian Ocean 
to a constantly deployed presence, 
supported by its first formal overseas 
base, at Djibouti� The Indian Ocean will 
become, as one Chinese scholar writes, 
“a normal region for the PLAN’s combat 
reach in the future” (p� 94)� India, 
traditionally the dominant regional 
power, views these developments with 
concern, even as it considers its own 
interests in the traditionally Chinese-
dominated areas of the western Pacific�
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In response, David Brewster, a specialist 
in Indo-Pacific maritime security at 
the Australian National University, 
has assembled Indian, Australian, 
Chinese, and American experts to 
consider the maritime trajectory of 
the region� Indian scholars make up 
the majority of the contributors, while 
the Australian authors offer views 
influenced by the unique position of 
their nation: politically close to the 
United States, economically tied to 
China, and physically at the crossroads 
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans�
As the subtitle suggests, competition 
is an assumed reality throughout the 
thirteen collected essays� Through 
the diverse views in this volume, the 
complexity underlying this competition 
emerges—and with it a discussion of 
why both India and China struggle to 
understand, much less assuage, each 
other’s suspicions� On the Indian side, 
intellectual understanding of China’s 
genuine interests in the region collides 
with an “Indian Monroe Doctrine” 
dating to the administration of Jawahar-
lal Nehru, India’s first prime minster� 
Unclear and inconsistently articulated, 
it remains an idea that, if “not actually a 
policy � � � is at least a preferred objec-
tive” of Indian policy makers (p� 20)� 
The Indian view of Chinese maritime 
activity also is influenced by ongoing 
conflict with China over land borders 
and a perception that China has worked 
to minimize India’s rightful role in 
multiple international organizations�
Meanwhile, contributions from Indian, 
American, and Australian scholars are 
particularly harsh in describing China’s 
failure to consider the suspicion and 
resistance that Chinese maritime expan-
sion has produced� India scholar Pramit 
Pal Chaudhuri quotes former Indian 
national security advisor Shivshankar 
Menon’s characterization of China as 
an “autistic superpower”—unable, by 
its very nature, to understand India’s 
concerns (p� 61)� American John Garver 
asserts that a constructed narrative of 
national exceptionalism and peaceful 
Ming dynasty voyages of discovery limits 
China’s ability to understand India’s 
apprehensions about China’s rise as a 
naval power� Australian Rory Medcalf 
describes official and unofficial Chinese 
explanations of its Indian Ocean pres-
ence as being so conspicuously inconsis-
tent with regional perceptions that they 
themselves contribute to suspicions�
Calling India “oversensitive,” Yunnan 
University economics professor Zhu 
Li offers a case study in that narrative� 
Asserting that OBOR is an international, 
rather than a Chinese-led, initiative, 
he outlines the essential choice being 
offered to India—since it cannot stop 
the OBOR initiative, it should partner 
with China and claim a slice of the 
economic benefits� You Ji from the 
University of Macau, in contrast, offers 
a blunt vision of the Chinese military 
role in the Indian Ocean� Noting that 
the 2015 revision to China’s National 
Defense Strategy calls for “projecting 
battles far away from China’s homeland,” 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is 
working to extend its “war fighting into 
the global commons” (pp� 91–92)� In this 
context, he asserts that “the PLA’s land 
reclamation in the Spratlys was meant 
to � � � establish forward deployment en 
route to the Indian Ocean” (p� 96)�
Nonetheless, Darshana Baruah describes 
India’s evolving maritime domain aware-
ness strategy as a response to issues 
beyond just China� Terrorism and the 
proliferation of advanced naval capa-
bilities in the region have pushed India 
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toward new partnerships, especially with 
Southeast Asia and Japan� While promis-
ing, they face the significant challenge of 
what Baruah diplomatically calls India’s 
“history of working in isolation” (p� 172)�
If, as one Australian scholar asserts, “the 
great game in the Indian Ocean is still 
in its early phases,” it will be increas-
ingly important for the United States to 
understand the Indian Ocean region and 
its residents (p� 232)� Students and spe-
cialists will find India and China at Sea a 
succinct and well-crafted overview of the 
disparate voices influencing maritime 
competition in this vital ocean region�
DALE C� RIELAGE
To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the 
Marine Environment, and the Cartography of 
Empire, by Jason W� Smith� Chapel Hill: Univ� 
of North Carolina Press, 2018� 280 pages� $35�
Scholars long have understood the 
power of the map� In To Master the 
Boundless Sea Jason W� Smith explains 
and explores the power of the nautical 
chart, masterfully weaving his observa-
tions into the history of the U�S� Navy� 
It is an exceptional work, strong in its 
scholarship, and boasting a compel-
ling—at times lyrical—narrative�
Smith’s book follows a chronological 
approach, culminating in the years 
following the Spanish-American 
War—the presumed height of the 
American empire; more-modern 
hydrographic activities are mentioned 
only in passing� Major themes include 
the interrelationship between com-
merce and the Navy, bureaucratic 
rivalries within the Navy and with 
other government agencies, the 
linkages between hydrography and U�S� 
imperialism, and the evolution of the 
nautical chart into a weapon of war�
To some degree, hydrography would 
seem to be—and is—a natural adjunct 
to the naval service� No environment is 
more dangerous to mariners than coastal 
and shallow waters; accurate charts are 
a necessity to avoid deadly groundings� 
Shallow-water craft, whether engaged 
in smuggling or combat operations, 
if provided with accurate depth and 
current information, can bedevil larger 
foes who lack that local knowledge� 
A chart—an accurate one—makes 
this knowledge exportable� However, 
such knowledge does not come eas-
ily; Smith details the painstaking and 
backbreaking repetitive work, usually 
conducted by sailors and junior officers, 
needed to gather these data� This 
was work for engineers, not poets�
However, as Smith notes, hydrography—
as part of the larger science of oceanog-
raphy—always has involved more than 
engineering� At least in its early stages, 
understanding the coastlines of distant 
shores also involved understanding 
the nature of the peoples who lived on 
those shores� This required abilities and 
skills associated with anthropologists; 
linguists; and, when these meetings 
became confrontations, military officers� 
The dangers of early hydrographic work 
were considerable, sometimes deadly�
Smith also highlights tensions 
between naval hydrographers and 
the wider community of scientists� 
Naval officers were then and are now 
essentially pragmatists� They do not lack 
for curiosity or imagination, but they 
energize those traits for the attainment 
of a practical objective, such as a 
knowledge of safe passages or the best 
sailing directions� While a generaliza-
tion, it can be asserted that mariners, 
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less concerned with knowledge for its 
own sake—and at times more rough-
hewn than their academic counter-
parts—were not always welcomed 
by pure academics, and vice versa�
Smith details how a powerful connec-
tion between the Navy’s ever-increasing 
knowledge of the maritime environment 
and seagoing commerce was forged 
and strengthened from the beginning� 
Time (and safety) was money to 
merchant captains and the owners for 
whom they worked� Matthew Fontaine 
Maury’s wind and current charts cut 
days or weeks from sailing times, and 
time saved was money earned� One 
of the book’s illustrations—a whaling 
chart produced by the Navy and used 
extensively by the captains of Herman 
Melville’s era—speaks to the cooperation 
between the commercial and military 
spheres� And whaling was not the only 
industry to have such close ties to the 
Navy; as underwater cables began to 
knit together continents and colonies, 
the requirement to map the topography 
of the deep ocean floor became 
more significant as the mechanisms 
to achieve this goal advanced�
As steam supplanted sail and Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s strategic insights grew 
to dominate naval thinking, charts be-
came essential enablers of U�S� imperial 
ambitions� Using the Spanish-American 
War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates 
how charts became tools of conquest� 
Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines were incomplete, 
and without accurate hydrographic 
information American naval com-
manders’ difficulties increased� After 
victory in the Spanish-American War, 
accurate charts were vital in selecting 
the locations of future naval installations 
and coaling stations� The diligence 
of U�S� hydrographers in accurately 
charting these waters is nowhere more 
apparent than in a comparison of prewar 
charts of Guantánamo Bay with those 
created after the American victory�
To Master the Boundless Sea also 
acknowledges the Naval War College’s 
role in the development of naval 
hydrography and the evolution of the 
nautical chart into not only an aid 
to war but also a critical component 
of campaign and battle planning� Of 
particular note was the work of Captain 
William McCarty Little in bringing war 
gaming to Newport� Whereas Mahan 
articulated a strategic vision, McCarty 
Little’s wargaming charts mapped ways 
of making that vision a strategic reality�
Smith fills a major niche in understand-
ing the role of nautical charts, the people 
and organizations that created them, 
and how they all advanced scientific 
understanding and a larger American 
identity� To Master the Boundless Sea 
is a superb work that will reward the 
interested and discerning reader�
RICHARD J� NORTON
The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the 
Transformation of the Cold War, by Michael 
Cotey Morgan� Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� 
Press, 2018� 424 pages� $35�
One of the bigger questions in history—
right up there with why did the Roman 
Empire fall—is why did the Cold War 
end� This question becomes even more 
significant when one remembers that 
the United States and its allies defeated 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
without a direct, military confrontation� 
Other long-term strategic confrontations 
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did not end so well� There are many ex-
amples, but three will suffice: Athens ver-
sus Sparta generated the Peloponnesian 
War, Rome versus Carthage produced the 
Punic Wars, and Britain versus Germany 
resulted in World Wars I and II� As a 
result, the issues that Michael Morgan 
explores in The Final Act are rather large�
While historians will continue wrestling 
with the issue of why the Cold War 
ended, it is a testimony to the intellectual 
power that Morgan brings to bear that 
this book, in all likelihood, will remain 
the book on the final act of the Helsinki 
Accords for decades to come� Why? Both 
the depth and breadth of the research 
are nothing less than astonishing� 
Morgan draws on material from fourteen 
archives in eight nations; this material, 
combined with published sources, is 
in nine different languages� There are 
103 pages of notes for 258 pages of text� 
The writing also is quite impressive, 
with sections reminiscent of Barbara W� 
Tuchman’s work; Morgan even invokes 
her book The Guns of August with a 
chapter entitled “The Pens of August�” 
With that point made, some sections read 
as if a PhD dissertation committee wrote 
and rewrote some paragraphs until all 
the flavor was removed—which actually 
might have been the case� Fortunately, 
these passages are not frequent�
What does Morgan do with these 
strengths? The short answer: he looks at 
the accords of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe “in the 
round,” examining the perspectives of 
powers large and small� After a series of 
crises in the 1960s that raised questions 
about the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, 
Leonid I� Brezhnev pushed for the 
conference, desiring Western European 
recognition of the post-1945 borders 
in Eastern Europe—which also would 
constitute an acknowledgment of the 
validity of the Soviet system� The United 
States agreed to this gathering because 
it had suffered significantly in the 1960s 
from the trauma of Vietnam, which 
raised questions at home and abroad 
about the United States and its leader-
ship in world affairs� While the Soviets 
pushed for the conference, the smaller 
states of Europe were the ones most 
eager to take part� The gathering granted 
them a voice, and in Morgan’s narrative 
they often play key roles—for instance, 
in resolving diplomatic deadlocks�
Americans also were important, but 
more in support than in the lead� 
Presidents Richard M� Nixon and 
Gerald R� Ford both saw the gathering’s 
potential� Secretary of State Henry A� 
Kissinger, on the other hand, did not 
believe in this diplomatic effort, and 
the best thing that can be said about 
his role is that he did not get in the way 
of its progress� American diplomats 
were good, and often bested their 
Soviet counterparts, but mainly because 
Brezhnev wanted to reach an agreement 
quickly, so he often compromised on 
issues involving personal freedoms, 
conflict resolution, and sovereignty, in 
ways that ended up working against the 
long-term interests of the Communist 
system� As Morgan notes (turning some 
issues upside down), “Human rights 
provided a weapon for fighting the Cold 
War, not an escape from it” (p� 6)�
The most intellectually impressive part of 
the book is the epilogue� Morgan looks at 
the legacy of Helsinki on bringing about 
the end of the Cold War� What gives this 
chapter power is that he uses the words 
of the defeated� Using source after source 
from the other side of the Iron Curtain, 
he shows how the final act changed 
Communist policies and behavior� 
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Wars and conflicts end only when the 
defeated accept their loss, and this section 
shows how new thinking developed 
in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact�
Even with all these points made, not 
everyone will accept Morgan’s arguments� 
The crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s 
certainly explains Soviet actions, but the 
decade was not identical for the United 
States� The constitutional legitimacy 
of the U�S� government and American 
leadership of its alliance were different 
and much, much, much stronger than 
those of the Soviets� Despite all the per-
suasive power of the epilogue, it comes 
up a bit short of convincing its readers, 
even if Morgan is right � � � probably�
In the end, though, most historians are 
lucky if they produce one book that 
endures; odds are that Morgan has done 
that� Expect to see this book in print 
for five or six decades—it is that good�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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 This year marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II, the largest and most destructive war in human history—as many as eighty-five 
million people died as the result of combat, genocide, and disease� Throughout 
2020, commemorations will recognize the commitment and courage of men and 
women of character, both in and out of uniform, who brought the conflict to a 
righteous end�
While thousands of books have been written about the war, there remain sto-
ries about innovative weapons developments that largely have been forgotten or 
relegated to the category of “things that cannot be believed�” The paragraphs that 
follow shed light on two such almost-mythical subjects: bat bombs and balloon 
bombs!
Bat Bombs
When its welfare is threatened by an aggressive adversary, a nation energizes the 
talents and creativity of its industrial base and of individual citizens to design, 
manufacture, and employ innovative weapons to meet this aggression and carry 
the conflict to the enemy� Such was the case in the United States in the 1940s� 
The efforts of the massive Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bombs used 
against Japanese cities have been documented well�
But little is known about a different approach that sought an alternate method 
to destroy targets on the Japanese home islands� In January 1942, a Pennsylvania 
dentist named Lytle Adams sent a letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
suggesting that thousands of Mexican free-tailed bats, each with a tiny, time- 
delayed, incendiary bomb attached to its body, could be dropped in bomb-
shaped canisters from long-range bombers� The bats were expected to seek 
shelter in the eaves and attics of Japan’s wood-and-paper structures, and the 
subsequent ignition of the newly invented napalm would set massive fires across 
large areas�
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FDR passed the idea on to the Army Air Forces for development with a note 
that said, “This man is not a nut� It sounds like a perfectly wild idea, but it is 
worth looking into�” During tests conducted in May 1943 at the Carlsbad Army 
Airfield in New Mexico, a group of armed bats was released accidentally, result-
ing in the fiery destruction of the test range! The Army passed the project to the 
U�S� Navy in August 1943, and the U�S� Marine Corps assumed responsibility for 
Project X-ray in December 1943� Successful tests were conducted at the Dugway 
Proving Ground at the end of 1943�
However, despite the fact that the National Defense Research Committee con-
cluded that the bat bomb could be “an effective weapon,” Fleet Admiral Ernest 
J� King canceled the program when he learned it could not become operational 
until mid-1945, so plans to produce one million bat bombs were never executed� 
The project was relegated to the dustbin of history� Additional information can 
be found in the fascinating book Bat Bomb: World War II’s Other Secret Weapon, 
by Jack Couffer, published by the University of Texas Press in 1992�
Balloon Bombs
While American scientists and engineers were working on the Manhattan Project 
and Project X-ray, their counterparts were hard at work on their own remarkable 
weapon: the fu-go balloon bomb� These thirty-three-foot-diameter hydrogen-
filled balloons were constructed of strips of paper made from kozo-tree bark 
glued together with a starchy paste made from a potato-like vegetable� Suspended 
below each balloon was a lightweight metal ring that carried sandbags for ballast 
and both incendiary and antipersonnel bombs�
Launched from the Japanese home islands, the balloons would ride the jet 
stream eastward, crossing the Pacific in about three days� Daytime heating of the 
17,000 cubic feet of gas combined with nighttime cooling caused the balloons to 
vary their altitude; they dropped ballast as necessary to stay aloft� After the final 
sandbag was dropped the bombs would be released, in hopes of starting forest 
fires in America’s Pacific Northwest region� From November 1944 to April 1945, 
over nine thousand fu-gos were launched against the United States�
It is not known how many balloons crossed the Pacific, but the remains of 
at least three hundred balloons were discovered in the United States and west-
ern Canada� In an attempt to avoid public panic on the West Coast from silent 
bombs that were nearly impossible to detect and engage, the U�S� War Depart-
ment imposed censorship on all reports about these mysterious weapons� This 
news blackout likely contributed to the deaths of one adult and five children who 
apparently discovered and disturbed an unexploded fu-go in the forest near Bly, 
Oregon� They were the only casualties attributed to the balloon-bomb attacks, 
and were the only civilians killed in the continental United States by enemy 
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action during the war� The fu-go bombs have the distinction of being the first in-
tercontinental weapon ever used in warfare� A balloon was discovered in British 
Columbia in 2014—seven decades after the weapons were sent flying eastward 
on what have been described as “wings of paper�”
Portions of a number of fu-go systems are on display in the Smithsonian Insti-
tution in Washington, DC; the National Museum of the United States Air Force 
in Dayton, Ohio; and the International Balloon Museum in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico� You can find more details about these attacks in Fu-go: The Curious His-
tory of Japan’s Balloon Bomb Attack on America, by Ross Coen, published by the 
University of Nebraska Press in 2014� 
The scientists and engineers of the twenty-first century are seeking equally exotic 
weapons today, including robots and flying cars� Necessity is, indeed, the mother 
of invention�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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